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„If I knew for a certainty that a man was coming to my 
house with the conscious design of doing me good, I should 
run for my life ...“
          
    Henry David Thoreau (2000) Walden And Other Writings, 85 
Summary
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami exemplifies impressively 
the power media has today in creating a global humanitarian 
momentum in which people develop an ethical virtue of care for 
distant strangers. Through real-time pictorial reporting in the 
aftermath of the tsunami, “the misery of those far away has been 
brought home to the people of the rich countries” (Lumsdaine, 
1993: 186), brutally illustrating the globalized world its universal 
vulnerability towards nature (Beck 2005; Clark 2005).
As the disaster was not only a global crisis but also a national issue for many 
western countries (over 5’000 tourists were among the tsunami victims), the 
visualization of suffering with a strong national reference induced feelings of 
sameness, of being together at the mercy of a larger force. This led to a feeling 
of collective helplessness among various individuals, local and international, 
affected by the tsunami wave but also those who experienced the disaster 
via media in the distance. Feelings of togetherness and being collaborators in 
overcoming the shock and devastation resulted in a wave of solidarity or as 
Korf (2005) designates the “tsunami after the tsunami”, mainly expressed in 
innumerable private and public donations, multilateral/bilateral aid agreements 
as well as promises (Brunkhorst 1997; Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992; 
Linklater 2007; Radtke 2007; Rippe 1998). A massive contingent of aid workers, 
volunteers, individuals, humanitarian and development agencies and money 
flooded Sri Lanka converting the humanitarian moment of compassion and 
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generosity into a field of “competitive humanitarianism” (Stirrat 2006; cf. Bastian 
2005/2009). At this point not only international and national institutionalized aid 
agencies competed with each other but also nations, states, countries, cities, 
companies, private donators and individuals. These various actors launched what 
Emma Mawdsley (2012a) accurately refers to as “donor potlatch” (260) in which 
actors with good intentions to alleviate the suffering of the disaster affected, 
began to overbid each other’s aid promises and public performances of generosity. 
The consequence of this donor potlatch was the elevation of post-tsunami 
rehabilitation to the best-funded international emergency mission in history 
(Telford 2006). Further it brought up new forms of donators and aid supporters 
that not only anonymously give money to aid agencies but transferred their 
benevolence, their genuine ethical and emotional engagement wishing to do good 
into beneficence, taking the crucial step towards action (Silk 2000). This changing 
sense of responsibility resulted in a high quantity of private non-anonymous 
donators getting personally involved in project planning and implementation. 
Their motives are twofold. On the one hand, based on personal or professional 
relations to the disaster affected country and individuals, they want to give 
something back, they feel an obligation to reciprocate. On the other hand they 
want to counter-steer negative reports and evaluations in humanitarianism 
and therefore strive to get involved in order to control, guide and re-position 
the sector towards their core principles – humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and 
independence. However the demand of non-anonymous donators for an active 
participation in decision-making and implementation changes the way in which aid 
is done and works. 
Even though donators publicly present their donations as ‘altruistic’ gifts 
emphasizing to focus only on the demands and needs of the sufferers, their claim 
for an active involvement and the position as controller uncovers paternalistic 
motives. On the way to deliver their ‘gift’ donators not only claim for more 
transparency, accountability and efficiency of aid but also demanding to put 
into effect personal visions, ideals and their understanding of improvement and 
development. Attaching clearly defined conditions and finalities to the donation 
and personally getting involved in the local domain of aid not only changes the 
relation between giver and receiver but the accountability towards the gift. Or, as 
Stirrat and Henkel (1997) put it with regard to charity in development aid more 
broadly, “[w]hat starts off as a counterpoint to the logic of the real world (gifts 
versus markets) ends up as part of that real world. The pure gifts become, in the 
end, the currency of systems of patronage” (74).
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The cumulative PhD project exemplifies in five published, double blinded peer 
reviewed articles (itemized in Part 2), what I will describe as the paradox 
of good intentions: the conversion of the ‘pure’ and well intended gifts into 
a culturally charged political commodity.  As the author was involved as aid 
practitioner in post-tsunami rehabilitation, a former aid project, a tsunami-
housing relocation project for 90 affected families located in Southern Sri Lanka, 
Galle District, was transferred into an academic research field making the thesis 
an “insider ethnography” (Mosse 2006: 936). The fundamental knowledge on the 
resettlement scheme, that was initiated by three German private donators, its 
actors, networks and alliances, project visions and political linkages was gained 
during 30 months of professional involvement. Hence lot of the empirical data 
was ‘produced’ as work material such as internal project documents, field notes, 
memos, monthly project reports, and Email communication documenting various 
processes, decisions and discussions on the donator-driven housing project. In 
order to holistically trace the biography of this particular private non-anonymous 
gift additional fieldwork periods were conducted and semi-structured interviews 
conducted in Sri Lanka but also Germany. The overall aim of the thesis is to 
explore the hidden workings and mechanisms behind good intentions. Hereby 
the question is not whether or not the transferred gift of development fails or per 
se is a mistake. The objective is to understand the logic behind the gift asking: 
what does lead to certain practices of private non-anonymous donators aiming 
to achieve their visions and ideals of a successful rehabilitation and more general 
how does aid work? (Detailed account of each article see chapter 5). In order to 
uncover the paradox of good intentions, the thesis analyses the phenomena of 
private non-anonymous humanitarian giving, distinguishing two phases of the 
private non-anonymous gift (detailed in chapter 2). Firstly, building on Marcel 
Mauss’ (1990) theory of the gift, the analysis focuses on the humanitarian 
moment of the ‘pure’ gift arguing that the active donators’ participation does 
influence and change practices, politics and power networks in the humanitarian 
aid chain and at different localities thereby reinforcing the prevailing modes of 
social hierarchy, the commodification of good intentions and power relations 
(Article 1, Article 2, Article 3). Secondly, the research focus shifts to analyse 
the transformation of the ‘pure’ gift in long-term visions of development. Here 
Foucault’s concept of governmentality helps to uncover the power donators’ exert 
on the receivers of their gift aiming to shape their “…possible field of action…” 
(Foucault, 1982:221). It is claimed that the donators’ initially ‘pure’ and good 
intentions transfer into a will to improve, aiming to produce ‘good beneficiaries’ 
and to implant their visions, logic and socially informed knowledge into their lives 
(Article 4, Article 5). 
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Based on the analysis the PhD in overall concludes that a major problem of the 
humanitarian sector today is: the aspersion of the Maussian gift. Even though 
the thesis highlights this aspersion for the very specific case of non-anonymous 
giving, it is agued that the majority of actors and brokers working within the global 
gift economy act similar to non-anonymous donators. On the one hand the sector 
present their gifts of aid as ‘pure’ and altruistic, a gift free from any obligations 
and reciprocity. On the other hand these performances and demonstrations are 
purposeful and intentional. The logics of compassion, purity and disinterestedness 
are critical at the beginning of doing aid in order to set up transnational gift 
exchanges and further to convince a broad public to materially and financially 
support predefined vision of development and ‘betterment’ for those suffering. 
The problem here is, that development agencies hide the true workings of 
exchange and the business of doing aid behind a benevolent and altruistic self, 
covering hegemonic objectives, self-interests and struggles for power within a 
highly competitive market. Using Mauss’ Theory of the gift it became clear that 
the notion of gift is important to cover these true workings. Combining Mauss’ 
theory with Foucaults’ concept of governmentality in the analysis it is highlighted 
that the language of the gift slips into a language of governing, of educating those 
who do not know, who need guidance in order to achieve betterment for their 
lives. However analysing the governmentality of private non-anonymous gift it 
becomes evident that it is not those who want to govern guide the long-term 
mentality of the governed but the governed themselves modify it based on their 
everyday reality.
The recommendation for the humanitarian sector would be that it develops 
an attitude of mutual learning or in Giri and Van Ufford terms “acknowledged 
dependence” (273). In this understanding, actors within the development gift 
economy at both ends and along the aid chain “…acknowledge the significance of 
the four agents of development – state, market, voluntary organisations/social 
movements, and the self – but not to grant absolute primacy to any” (ibidi 273). 
In doing so it becomes important to understand the socio-political complexity 
of doing aid and the logic of the gift economy in each specific location and most 
important to acknowledge it openly. Aid practitioners arriving in countries in 
the aftermath of disasters need to reflect on involved interests and learn about 
what Korf characterizes as “the political economy of ‘the situation’” (2010: iv). 
Therefore researchers and practitioners have to become partners in order to “…
grasp the social and political processes through which aid policy is made and 
transformed in practice, … [researchers]…have to negotiate space for their 
involvement to be more ethnographic and resist institutional pressure to conform 
to dominant policy-driven or economics-based knowledge systems” (Mosse 
2007:941). The overall aim has to be to frame existing problems of rehabilitation 
and relief not only in a language of development technologies but to uncover the 
political ecology of established gift relations and adjust its practices accordingly.
Prologue:  
Experiencing 
a disaster
‘Pia, something happened in Sri Lanka, thousands of 
people are dead!’ 
M. Hollenbach, 26th December 2004
This was the morning call from my father on the 26th of December 
2004, 9:12 am (CET). I had been staying at my parent’s house, packing 
my boxes to move to Sri Lanka to fulfil a 2 year working contract with 
the University of Heidelberg. The 26th of December 2004 changed all 
plans I had for my last days in Germany before my departure on the 
1st of January 2005. Immediately after my father had heard the news 
on the radio my family and I switched on the TV to find out what had 
actually happened in Sri Lanka. My first thought was ‘war’, but soon 
BBC showed me another reality. Pictures from Thailand, Sri Lanka and 
Southern India were streamed right into our living room. A red banner 
informed us: ‘Earthquake with 9 on the Richter scale in Indonesia set 
off one of the biggest recorded Tsunamis… thousands of people dead’. 
Later a real time-streamer showed constantly the death count of all 
affected countries – Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India, Thailand, Maldives.
I was in shock and hours later, I still sat in front of the TV watching the 
pictures of destruction and crying people running around in despair. I 
listened to interviews with tourists – people from Germany, England 
or Australia. I also started to try to get in contact with my future 
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office colleagues and with my Sri Lankan 
friends, which was impossible at that time. 
For the next two days I was unable to 
reach anyone. During the following hours 
and days my family received many phone 
calls from family and friends all expressing 
their sympathy, shock and worry. Not only 
because I was about to leave to Sri Lanka 
but due to the real time screening of the 
disaster we felt as if we were a part of it 
too.
Many of those who called expressed their 
deep sympathy with the tsunami-affected 
people in the region and asked how they 
could help. As some had been visiting 
Thailand or Sri Lanka as tourists, they were 
thinking of going there to help. Others 
immediately offered money to take to Sri 
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Lanka and give it to people in need. Also the managing director of my future 
workplace called to let me know that the Institute would set up a donations 
account since many people wanted to help by donating something. When I 
left Germany for Sri Lanka on the 2nd of January 2005, I had collected almost 
4’000 Euros from generous givers who wanted me ‘to do something good’. I was 
impressed by their generosity and kindness but also overwhelmed and scared 
whether I would be able to meet their expectations. 
I was quite naïve when flying in to Sri Lanka. I had called the airline and they 
informed me they would not take any civilians to the island besides emergency 
experts, relief goods or technical equipment for the next two weeks until the 
situation were stable and secure. After long discussions the airline accepted 
my argument that I had to take over my duties in the local branch office of the 
University of Heidelberg’s of South Asia Institute and that I had a responsibility 
to be there with my office colleagues and staff. As I had never experienced an 
international emergency situation before, I was not aware of what it triggers off in 
the arena of international emergency aid.
The flight provided a first insight into what I would have to expect when arriving 
in Sri Lanka. The airplane carried a huge Water Treatment Plant, four Red Cross 
emergency experts, one doctor and me. As all passengers were experienced 
with disaster and emergency situations they started to talk about their former 
experiences in Bosnia, Afghanistan and Africa and everyone agreed that this 
disaster was different from all their former experiences. It was not only the 
magnitude and outreach of the wave, but also the immense generosity and 
solidarity expressed by many people around the world. My flight companions were 
all critical about private people or city councils starting fundraising campaigns 
and ‘doing good’. They were convinced that relief work is the job of experts. 
Uncoordinated private initiatives would create chaos and produce counter effects. 
Knowing about the money I was carrying in my suitcase affiliated to expectations 
of generous private people, I became more and more silent. As I listened to the 
emergency experts my anxiety increased with regards to whether I would myself 
be able ‘to do good’.
Arriving at the Bandaranaiake Airport I was physically confronted with the 
reality of tsunami relief and I was completely overwhelmed. Since the 26th of 
December 2004 I had sat, more or less continuously, in front of the TV watching 
real time pictures of the Tsunami disaster but now I was facing its immediate 
consequences: There were still tourists waiting at the airport to leave the island, 
the airstrip was full of containers, the army repacking relief goods on to trucks, 
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and helicopters were coming and going. I was touched by the reality of the 
international emergency and humanitarian aid machinery unaware that soon 
I would become part of it for the next three years. I was picked up from my 
office colleague who directly drove me to the office. All office members and their 
immediate families were fine, as well as my close friend the former SAI Head of 
Office and his partner. What a relief! As I held an official passport and was linked 
to the German Embassy, they were aware of my arrival within just three hours. I 
received a phone call from the German Embassy asking me to join the Embassy as 
soon as possible in order to support the German relief coordination, identification 
of tourists, travel back documents, etc. Two hours later I entered the German 
Embassy. Here, during the next six weeks I would start learning to understand the 
outcomes and consequences of an internationally mediated disaster relief taking 
place in a tourist destination. The numbers of German aid organizations arriving 
in Sri Lanka grew every day; professional agencies and private initiatives along 
with families who had experienced the tsunami disaster asked the Embassy to 
assist them in the implementation of their aid projects. However the attempt and 
effort of the Embassy to coordinate and map German Aid in order to make it more 
efficient while minimizing regional and thematic overlaps failed. Aid organizations 
were not willing to share detailed information either about their work, regional 
proliferation or on budget volumes, aims and local partners. I realized at an early 
stage, that humanitarian aid is a highly competitive business. To make matters 
worse the majority of organisations struggled, to find projects, and paradoxically 
later in identifying affected people. 
In March 2005, having got in contact with many relief organisations that 
had entered Sri Lanka to provide emergency aid and in need of personnel, I 
was offered a contract by a German Emergency Relief Agency as an external 
consultant. My task was to coordinate and organize their immediate relief work 
in Sri Lanka and to identify local partner organisations to conduct emergency 
projects with. In October 2005 my contract and responsibilities were extended 
and I became responsible in co-managing a resettlement project in Southern 
Sri Lanka, in the Galle District, which was initiated by three private donators 
and of which the aid agency became a contracting partner. Here the task was to 
implement the visions and ideas of the donator group. One of my responsibilities 
in this private, donor-driven housing scheme project was to guide communication 
with the actively involved donators and to ‘coordinate’, ‘manage’ and ‘regulate’ 
their demands, wishes and expectations. In this context ‘doing good’ had less to 
do with the real demands, needs and the living environment of aid recipients but 
rather a custom-tailored process.
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Days, weeks, months and years later I still remain impressed by the generosity 
and solidarity that people showed in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean 
Tsunami. However, the experiences I had with private giving, charity, solidarity 
as well as international humanitarian aid, relief and reconstruction work with its 
involved politics as well as struggle over power, increased the desire to better 
understand what I call the paradox of good intentions. On the one hand private 
donators as well as aid agencies want to alleviate the suffering of poor and 
affected people in need. It starts with an altruistic moment, with the intention of 
a ‘pure’ gift but does end in a competitive business of showing visible impacts and 
difference when entering the domain of organized giving. It is obvious that actors 
are trapped in power and patronage systems, and are guided through personal 
politics and self-interests. Being personally involved I have experienced how 
difficult it is to escape the complex system of aid, since at the end it is a business 
sector, which needs to show success, effectiveness and good performance. 
Moreover it secures the survival of many international experts and during this 
particular period of time, mine included.
With the help of an academic research project, I attempt to better understand and 
reconcile my practical experiences with the reality of how humanitarian aid, its 
actors and the narratives of ‘purity’, generosity and doing good is still presented 
in public. In other words: I hope it helps to overcome the personal trauma of my 
personal Tsunami. The aspiration is that analytical and theoretical concepts enable 
me to detach and distance myself from the project as well as institutionalized 
humanitarianism. At the same time I have been able to reflect, clarify and realize 
why certain activities, agreements, decisions, visions and demands of various 
counterparts and involved actors, including myself, were made and implemented. 
I am however aware that my personal history and involvement can never be fully 
detached from my academic work and results showing that research in social 
science can never be conducted ‘outside’ ourselves or outside our biography. 

Hambantota, Sri Lanka 02/2005
Source: P. Hollenbach
Part 1
Frame
Over the last centuries organized and institutionalized 
giving to suffering strangers has not only changed in its 
modalities and practices but also in scale and dissemi-
nation.
1. Disasters, Solidarity and Gift-Giving 
    in humanitarian aid
 
The 1755 Lisbon earthquake known as the first mediatised natural 
disaster marks a first turning point in demonstrations of transnational 
solidarity and organized humanitarian response (Dynes 2000; 
Hannigan 2012; Murteira 2004; Pantti 2012). The visualization of 
suffering beyond Portugal’s borders diminished the distance between 
those suffering the aftershocks of the natural disasters and those 
experiencing it through graphic descriptions and dramatic accounts 
in news papers and narrative reports. After seeing the magnitude of 
destruction, many European countries, states and individuals sent 
money, food, building supplies and labour to Portugal intending to 
alleviate the suffering of the affected people. Since then global media 
coverage has expanded tremendously and today’s improved technology 
broadcasts in real time, one side of the world into the lived reality of 
the other side, evoking an ethical virtue of care for distant strangers. 
As Corbridge (1993) notes: “…our lives are radically entwined with the 
lives of different strangers [and today] … there is no logical reason to 
suppose that moral boundaries should coincide with the boundaries of 
our everyday community…” (463; bracket added; cf Boltanski 1999; 
Brock 2005; Chatterjee 2004; Hannigan 2012; Howitt 2002; Ignatieff 
1998; Korf 2007; Linklater 2007; Proctor 1998; Robertson 2008; Sack 
1997; Silk 2004). 
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A second point of inflexion in international organized giving identifies Henry 
Dunant’s initiative in 1862 inspiring the creation of the International Committee 
of the Red Cross. Since then, and particularly since ending the Second World 
War in 1945, the world has seen the emergence of numerous international/
national multilateral/bilateral, state-led increase of non-governmental and private 
humanitarian and development aid agencies and a growing importance of the 
same. The attempt is to alleviate the suffering of individuals, states and countries 
in a situation of emergency and distress caused by an abnormal event such as 
natural or man-made disasters, thereby recognizing institutionalized rules and 
regulations. Financial support for humanitarian activities is generated through 
public and private money with an increased importance of private donations, 
representing today almost two thirds of the sectors revenue (Fearon 2008; Randel 
and German 2002). While the majority of these generous private givers prefer 
in staying anonymous and not becoming personally involved in the relief work, 
aid organisations act as “…brokers that translate this caring-about into a caring-
for the distant sufferer” (Korf 2007: 376; cf. Barnett 2005; Calhoun 2008/2010; 
Donini 2006; Kent 2004; Wilson and Brown 2009). 
However the growth of globally acting humanitarian agencies have not only 
positive effects in terms of the dissemination and accessibility to aid. Negative 
outcomes are “…competitive dynamics for status, power, and authority” (Barnett 
and Weiss 2008: 29) as well as the critique on the legitimacy, accountability, 
transparency and effectiveness of the sector. It is argued that humanitarian 
organisations that distinguish their work from human rights and development 
activities by “focusing on the immediate ethical imperative of reducing suffering 
– and especially saving lives - …that underwrites the ideal of humanitarian 
neutrality…” (Calhoun 2008: 90) get caught in the mundane world of development 
practices - patronage, favouritism and politics. Good intentions to alleviate 
suffering get contested through conditions, restrictions, interests, rules and pre-
defined finalities resulting in questionable social practices of ‘doing aid’ (Barnett 
and Weiss 2008; Bornstein and Redfield 2010; Mosse 2005; Mosse and Lewis 
2006; Smith 2005; Sogge 2002; Van Ufford and Giri 2003; Weiss 2013). The 
scores of public critique on current organised giving and humanitarianism resulted 
in the emergence of a new actor, presenting themselves and their visions in a high 
moral tone as the antipode of the humanitarian sector, private non-anonymous 
donators1.  
1 The term donator is used in this thesis to distinguish private persons giving donations to aid and 
development organizations from donor-indicating official development institutions like government, 
semi-official foundations or international/national/local aid organizations. The phenomena of private 
(national/international) donator-driven aid projects emerged in a multitude of tsunami projects in Sri 
Lanka in which, private donators acted as ‚experts’ and as part of the project planning team, becoming 
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A growing literature in geography, indicating a “moral turn” (Smith 1997) in 
the discipline, discusses the relationship between space and obligations, and 
the geographies of responsibility towards suffering distant strangers (Barnett 
2005; Barnett and Land 2007; Brock 2005; Howitt 2002; Korf 2007; Massey 
2004; Proctor 1998; Sack 1997; Silk 2004). However less attention in academic 
writing is given to ethnographically informed research on the phenomena of 
non-anonymous giving analysing how and why altruistic acts of generosity are 
presented in ‘pure’ gifts, become entangled in the political economy of aid and 
reciprocal obligations. The aim of the cumulative PhD project is to exemplify in five 
published, double blinded peer reviewed articles (itemized in Part 2), what I will 
describe as the paradox of good intentions: the conversion of the ‘pure’ and well 
intended gifts into a culturally charged political commodity. Using the example 
of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami the thesis traces the biography of a private 
non-anonymous gift trying to explore the hidden workings and mechanisms 
behind good intentions. The question is not whether or not the transferred gift of 
development fails or per se is a mistake. The thesis tries to understand the logic 
behind the gift, asking: what does lead to certain practices of donators aiming to 
achieve their visions and ideals of successful rehabilitation and more general how 
does aid work? (Detailed account of each article see chapter 5). 
The first part of the PhD thesis – the present frame document – introduces the 
overall research context and how the articles stand in relation to each other. The 
first chapter discusses the phenomena of private non-anonymous donators and 
gives a summary of resultant research objectives and research questions. Chapter 
two presents the applied conceptual approaches followed by an introduction into 
the empirical case (chapter 3) that enabled the ethnographic research project. 
Chapter four reflects on critical encounters during the research work focusing on 
the researchers personal involvement in the field first as practitioner and later 
as researcher. Chapter five presents a summary of each article highlighting their 
interplay as well as relation and completes the frame document with a synthesis.
1.1 Non-anonymous private donators in humanitarian aid
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami exemplifies impressively the power media has 
today in creating a global humanitarian momentum in which people develop an 
an active part in the rehabilitation process. This led not only to new relationships and networks within 
the aid chain, but also to new practices of how aid was delivered (cf. Henkel/Stirrat 1997; Korf et al. 
2009; Stirrat 2006).
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ethical virtue of care for distant strangers. Through real-time pictorial reporting 
in the aftermath of the tsunami, “the misery of those far away has been brought 
home to the people of the rich countries” (Lumsdaine, 1993: 186) brutally 
illustrating the globalized world, its universal vulnerability towards nature (Beck 
2005; Clark 2005). Furthermore the disaster was not only a global crisis but 
also a national issue for many western countries, since over 5’000 tourists were 
among the tsunami victims2. This made disaster reporting “…exceptional because 
the Western audience was not only in the position of a witness and a helper but 
also of a sufferer…” (Pantti et al. 2012: 127). In comparison, natural disasters 
like the earthquake in Kashmir 2005 with over 80’000 people dead and millions 
displaced, the cyclone in Burma and the Sichuan earthquake in China in 2008 
or the devastating earthquake in Haiti 2010 with a similar impact on economic, 
social and human losses were not covered by media in such an intensive way 
but critically positioned within local political circumstances making the disaster 
less newsworthy, less media visible, less cosmopolitan and less emotionally 
demanding. The consequences are less private while public donations influenced 
the intensity and capacity of humanitarian aid responses (Boltanski 1999; 
Hyndman 2011; Ignatieff 1998; Natsios 1997; Pantti 2012)
Therefore media coverage and the visualization of suffering with a strong national 
reference induced feelings of sameness, of being together at the mercy of a larger 
force. The collective helplessness as well as being collaborators in overcoming the 
shock and devastation resulted in a solidarity of compassion highlighting that “… 
solidarity is not thought of as recognition of a core self… rather, it is thought of 
as the ability to see more and more traditional differences as unimportant when 
compared with similarities with respect to pain and humiliation” (Rorty 1989: 
192; emphasis added; cf Brunkhorst 1997; Hondrich and Koch-Arzberger 1992; 
Linklater 2007; Radtke 2007; Rippe 1998;). However the tsunami highlights other 
factors in eliciting the solidarity of compassion particularly processes summarized 
under the notion of ‘globalization’ such as increased mobility of people, expansion 
of personal and professional networks of influence and change the spatial 
organization of human life, the sense of mutual reasonability and the scope 
of care for and about distant strangers. The “vanishing distance” (Korf 2007: 
366) between individuals extends both moral boundaries and ethical obligations 
turning solidarity, according to the theory of the gift, into a mutual compliance 
of reciprocity (Chatterjee 2004; Komter 2005; Adloff/Mau 2006; Schieder 
2008; detailed discussion on the theory of the gift in humanitarian aid follows in 
2 The majority of the 275’000 Tsunami victims originate not only from Indonesia, Sri Lanka, India or 
Thailand but also western countries in terms of causalities: Germany 539, Sweden 543, Finland 178 and 
Britain 149 (Source: Pantti et al 2012: 127 and Telford et al 2006)
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chapter 2). Innumerable private and public donations, multilateral/bilateral aid 
agreements and promises however created what Korf (2005) designates as the 
“tsunami after the tsunami”. A massive contingent of aid workers, volunteers, 
individuals, humanitarian and development agencies and money flooded Sri Lanka 
converting the humanitarian moment of compassion and generosity into a field 
of “competitive humanitarianism” (Stirrat 2006; cf. Bastian 2005/2009). Though 
not only international and national institutionalized aid agencies competed with 
each other but also nations, states, countries, cities, companies, private donators 
and individuals. These various actors launched out what Emma Mawdsley (2012a) 
accurately related to as “donor potlatch” (260), overbidding each other’s aid 
promises and public performances of generosity. 
A great number of people expressed their solidarity in form of money donations 
to humanitarian and development aid agencies elevating it to the best-funded 
international emergency mission in history (Telford 2006). However based on 
former social ties, personal or business relations to affected countries a multitude 
of private money contributors transferred their benevolence, their genuine ethical 
and emotional engagement wishing to do good into beneficence, taking the crucial 
step of actively doing good (Silk 2000). This changing sense of responsibility 
resulted in a high quantity of private non-anonymous donators. On the one 
hand the motivation for non-anonymous donations results from an obligation to 
reciprocate. Donators intend to counter-steer negative reports and evaluations 
in humanitarianism. Since the 1994 Ruwandan genocide and the questionable 
involvement of the humanitarian sector, its image presenting “…a symbol of what 
is good about the world, as the world’s superego, as suggestive of the possibility of 
a more human world” (Barnett and Weiss 2008: 6) suffers from public critique and 
debates. Common perception is that concepts like the ‘responsibility to protect’, 
which followed as consequence to better control and legitimize the humanitarian 
sector has a too strong influence on contemporary humanitarian principles and 
worse “…it is mobilized by the powerful nations only when it suits them to depose 
an ‘undesirable’ regime” (Mawsdley 2012b: 90). The consequence is an increasing 
involvement of a variety of non-anonymous donators publicly presenting 
themselves as the antipode to the ‘dirty business’ of current humanitarianism that 
needs to be controlled, guided and re-positioned towards their core principles – 
humanity, neutrality, impartiality, and independence. Prominent examples are 
celebrities such as the well-known actor Sean Penn launching the ‘Haitian Relief 
Organization3 in the aftermath of the Haitian earthquake in 2010 or Brad Pitt 
establishing the ‘Make it right foundation’  in the aftermath of the 2005 hurricane 
3 for more information see http://jphro.org/  and http://makeitright.org
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Katrina, both getting actively involved in the relief work, self-organized but also 
in cooperation with institutionalized relief organizations changing and influencing 
the way of doing aid. Through an active participation in decision-making and 
implementation non-anonymous donators on the one hand want to control the 
money flow and increase the transparency, accountability and efficiency of aid 
work, on the other hand they aim to put into effect personal visions, ideals and 
their understanding of improvement and development. 
Even though donators publicly present their donations as ‘altruistic’ gifts 
emphasizing the focus only on the demands and needs of the sufferers, their claim 
for an active involvement and the position as controller uncovers paternalistic 
motives. Stirrat and Henkel (1997) argue in their article, “The Development Gift” 
that anonymous donations slowly transform “…into an interested, accountable, a 
non-free transaction … a shift toward more and more obvious forms of patronage 
and control” (76-77) when entering the institutionalized and organized system 
of giving. Here donors and receivers do not directly interact but different types 
of aid brokers (Bierschenk, Chauveau and Olivier de Sardan 2002; Mosse and 
Lewis 2006; Sørenson 2008) mediate among different actors in the domain of 
humanitarian giving increasingly commodifying the pure act of generosity. Non-
anonymous donators alter this transformation process. Attaching clearly defined 
conditions and finalities to the donation and personally getting involved in the 
local domain of aid not only changes the relation between giver and receiver 
but also the accountability towards the gift. A detailed discussion on the theory 
of the gift, its incorporation in development studies and its broadening towards 
the humanitarian non-anonymous gift will follow in chapter two. Before this the 
following chapter introduces the main research foci, subsequently presenting 
associated research questions.   
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1.2 Research focus and research question
Previous empirical research on the tsunami, such as the one completed by 
the Tsunami Evaluation Coalition (TEC), have shown the ambivalent impact of 
competitive humanitarianism, its limited outreach, the multiple dilemmas and 
ambiguities embedded in the recovery process, as well as the frustration of aid 
beneficiaries about paternalistic aid practices (Bastian 2005; Bennett et al. 2006; 
Brun and Lund 2008; Brun 2009; Cosgrave 2006; de Mel and Ruwanpura 2006; de 
Silva and Yamao 2007; Fernando and Hilhorst 2006; Haug and Weerackody 2007; 
Hyndman 2007; Keys et al. 2006; Korf 2005/2007; McGilvray and Gamburd, 
2010; Ruwanpura 2008a, 2008b, 2009; Sarvananthan and Sanjeewanie 2008; 
Telford et al. 2006; Telford and Cosgrave 2007; Stirrat 2006). As Korf (2005) 
writes: “For many Sri Lankans, especially the poor and vulnerable, the tsunami 
has often taken all they have – their assets, their loved ones. What has happened 
to many of them after the tsunami is that they have lost their dignity because 
they are treated as ‘pure’ victims, reduced to recipients of foreign gifts and 
the state’s paternalistic benevolence” (i). Further topics such as the politics of 
memorialisation and purification (Simpson and de Alwis 2008; Hasbullah and 
Korf 2009), the gendered world of post-tsunami spatial politics (De Mel 2007; 
Hyndman 2008; Rees 2005; Ruwanpura 2008; Thurnheer 2009) or the politics 
of housing and new challenges for rehabilitation (Barenstein 2013; Birkmann 
2007; Brun and Lund 2008/2009; Boano 2009; Domroes 2006; Hettige 2007; 
Lyons 2009; Ruwanpura 2009; Samarasinghe 2006) have been addressed. All 
these writings underline the fact that it is impossible to understand post-tsunami 
reconstruction without recognising the wider political, cultural, social and cultural 
terrain of war, ethno-nationalism and uneven development in Sri Lanka. 
Less attention in current academic writings is given to the newly emerged 
phenomena of non-anonymous private giving in humanitarian aid (Chouliaraki 
2013; Fernando and Hilhorst 2006; Korf 2010) analysing its consequences and 
impact on everyday practices of aid. Since I have been deeply involved myself 
in tsunami rehabilitation and in particular in the new form of private non-
anonymous giving via professional aid agencies, therefore my PhD thesis is 
informed by ethnographic research material. This enables me to demonstrate 
how the everyday practices, discourses and dilemmas faced by aid workers and 
implementing agencies help to counterbalance inflated expectations, expose 
uncritical admiration, and put unrealistic critiques into perspective. Even if my 
personal involvement and experience as an “aid broker” (Bierschenk et al. 2002; 
Mosse and Lewis 2006) has prepared me well as a participant ethnographer in the 
sense of Mosse’s (2004, 2005) work to produce such ethnography of humanitarian 
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aid (Gould and Marcussen 2004; Korf 2006; Long 2001) in a reflexive ethnographic 
style (Davies 2008; Eyben 2011; Foley 2002; Guillemin and Gillam 2004; Rose 
1997; Salzmann 2002), I have struggled during the deployment of my research 
project with changing positions from ‘aid broker’ (insider) to an ethnographic 
researcher (outsider) (Ergun and Erdemir 2010; Gould and Marcussen 2004) and 
as Coffey (1999) refers to it, my own ‘ethnographic self’. This ongoing struggle 
and arising questions of ethics in conducting such research will be discussed and 
contemplated in chapter four.
During my professional involvement in post-tsunami rehabilitation I was puzzled 
by the continuous disjuncture between donator narratives and the public 
presentation and performance of private non-anonymous gifts. The everyday 
practices of implementation and how donators controlled and influenced 
processes using their personal and professional power positions and networks 
in order to achieve their vision and expectations of a successful project (in their 
understanding) constantly contradicted the narrated ‘purity’ of the project. My 
intention is not to condemn or to blame any of the actors involved in the project 
used as empirical example, but rather to understand and diagnose the rationale 
and logic behind, as the product of a particular vision, a particular socialized 
knowledge, a particular setting and the involvement of politics and power. By 
providing insights into the project, I hope to provide elements for a better 
understanding of the dynamics of post-tsunami aid.
In order to uncover the paradox of good intentions, the thesis analyses the 
phenomena of private non-anonymous humanitarian giving distinguishing 
two phases of the private non-anonymous gift (detailed in chapter 2). First, 
building on Marcel Mauss’ (1990) theory of the gift, the analysis focuses on the 
humanitarian moment of transnational solidarity expressed in form of ‘pure’ 
gifts. The thesis argues that the active donators’ participation does influence and 
change practices, politics and power networks in the humanitarian aid chain and 
at different localities thereby reinforcing the prevailing modes of social hierarchy 
and the commodification of good intentions (Article 1, Article 2). Furthermore the 
research work asserts that rituals and ceremonies around the gift visualize and 
perpetuate power relations and asymmetries expressed in gentle form of violence 
(Article 3, Article 4, Article 1). Second, the research focus shifts to analyse 
the transformation of the ‘pure’ gift in long-term visions of development. Here 
Foucaults’ concept of governmentality helps to uncover the power donators exert 
on the receivers of their gift aiming to shape their “…possible field of action…” 
(Foucault, 1982:221). It is claimed that donators’ initially ‘pure’ and good 
intentions transfer into a will to improve aiming to produce ‘good beneficiaries’ 
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corresponding to their understanding of sustainable ‘development’ and autonomous 
village organization (Article 5). Further the concept helps to highlight how donators’ 
visions, logic and socially informed knowledge influence the objectives of the aid project 
but also the actual practices and technologies of doing aid (Article 4, Article 5).
Each article refers to one main focus of private non-anonymous giving, asking the 
following research questions (see next page):
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Article Research
Focus
Research
Question
Research
Findings
1
H
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t 
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ift
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iv
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g
Multi-local 
dynamics 
of giving
How do donators’ public 
narratives of purity and ethical 
practices of aid delivery in 
their home location influence 
the everyday practices and 
technologies of giving and the 
project implementation in Sri 
Lanka?
•	 development gifts presented as pure  
and altruistic become embroiled in the 
workings of gift exchange 
•	 gifts work through the logic of patron-
age, favouritism, and politics
•	 to understand the geography of a gift 
one needs to understand the socio-
politics of both locations – givers and 
receivers
2 Commo-
dification 
of good 
intentions 
What are the intricate chains 
of relation, obli-gation, and 
expectation pertinent in the 
co-evolving, but often con- 
tradictory, gift rationales that 
permeate and influence the 
practices, performances, and 
discourses of tsunami aid?
•	 Good intentions become contaminated 
through local politics of patronage and 
the workings of an institutionalized gift 
economy 
•	 Gifts establish socio-political relations 
with giver and receiver setting specific 
reciprocal expectations
3 Ritual 
legiti-
mization of 
the gifts’ 
symbolic 
violence 
How does the application of 
rituals and ceremonies around 
the humanitarian gift intend 
to ‘incorporate’ extraneously 
set aid objectives into the 
habitus and social reality of 
local communities? Further, 
how do such rituals underline 
and reinforce asymmetric 
relations between donators 
and recipients, and how are 
these subtly and symbolically 
visualized?
•	 Gifts presented as charitable act carry 
a symbolic violence within deepening 
existing social and power divides 
•	 Private non-anonymous development 
gifts are more concerned strengthening 
the social capital of the giver then the 
betterment of the receiver
•	 Generosity carries a double truth: it 
reveals social asymmetry, hierarchy and 
the manifestation of power
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Article Research
Focus
Research
Question
Research
Findings
4
Lo
ng
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 d
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t 
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ift
Rationale of 
governing 
others’ 
mentality
How are donators’ visions, 
ideals and understanding 
of ‚building back better’ 
transferred into everyday 
practices of concrete 
village reconstruction? And 
through which technologies 
and practices do donators 
intend to shape, form and 
guide the conduct of housing 
recipients in order to fit 
their particular and pre-
assembled visions?
•	 Private non-anonymous donator-
driven aid projects guide and 
govern the beneficiaries based on 
their socialized knowledge and 
logic of development/betterment
•	 Donator-driven aid do change 
and influence the ‘conduct of 
conduct’ of beneficiaries but newly 
interpreted by themselves
•	 The attempt of private donators 
to produce governable subjects 
is a source of power replicating 
existing asymmetries and 
deficiencies in international 
development aid  
5 Governmen-
tality of good 
intentions
How and at which juncture of 
project implementation does 
the initial compassionate 
impetus of donators slip into 
a will to improve resulting 
in an inadvertent obtrusion 
of moral imperatives of 
donators upon the lives of 
aid recipients? How does 
this highlight existing power 
relations but also systems of 
patronage and clientelism?
•	 The logic of compassion is critical 
for generating solidarity and 
financial support in order to 
establish aid projects
•	 Discursive tropes of compassion 
slip during project implementation 
into a will to improve 
•	 The interpellation of religious and 
moral mores are compassionate 
gesticulations, but when taken to 
the scale of willing communities 
to improve they expose and 
underbelly where the political 
economy matters
Table 1: Overall research question
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2. Conceptual Approach
My purpose here is to distinguish two phases of private non-anonymous giving by 
focusing on different objectives of the gift. To analyse the phenomena of private 
non-anonymous giving in the context of mediated international organized aid 
Mauss’ (1924) theory of the gift is able to capture many aspects of private non-
anonymous giving such as the paradoxical combination of interestedness and 
disinterestedness, the three-fold sequence of obligation (to give, to accept, and 
render) or the deep interconnection between the gift and donators socio-political 
and economic identity. Yet the gift theory is able “to demonstrate the ways in which 
the symbolic properties of foreign aid work to assert benevolence and generosity, 
while obscuring more exploitative, hierarchical and self-interested relations” 
(Mawdsley 2012a: 268). However it is less useful to analyse the process and how 
the transferring of this imbedded identity is to its receivers. In order to resolve 
this gap but to reach for a fuller understanding of the phenomena the thesis, in 
addition, applies Foucaults’ (1977) concept of governmentality examining adopted 
development techniques and practices but also to highlight the derivation of the 
gifts’ identity and governmentatlity. 
2.1 Gifts in humanitarian aid
2.1.1 Basic essentials of the Maussian gift
Building on Marcel Mauss’ (1990) theory of the gift, the analysis first focuses on 
the humanitarian moment of transnational solidarity expressed in form of ‘pure’ 
gifts to humanitarian aid organizations. To better understand the consequences 
of such expressions of solidarity, it is helpful to embed the concept of solidarity 
into the theory of the gift carving out the paradox of good intentions and hidden 
ambivalences of the ‘humanitarian gift’ (cf. Stirrat and Henkel 1997). But what 
do the two concepts - solidarity and gift giving - have in common and how can 
solidarity be analysed through the theory of the gift? Seemingly both concepts 
have nothing in common as they differ in their etymological and scientific 
histories: “Whereas solidarity is an abstract concept … gift giving is often 
associated with concrete and material objects exchanged on certain occasions 
between people having a certain type of relationship” (Komter, 2005: 1). However 
looking at solidarity and gift giving in their entirety, it becomes clear, that both 
do relate in their most fundamental manifestations and functions: solidarity and 
gift giving are both motivated by the nature of human relationships creating and 
maintaining social ties. Or as Mary Douglas (1990: XV) puts it “the theory of the 
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gift is a theory of human solidarity” (Komter 2005; Korf 2007; Mauss 1990; Rippe 
1998; Ratke 2007; Smith 2005; Stirrat/Henkel 1997). 
 
In his work “Essai sur le don” Marcel Mauss (1924) (English version 1990 ‘The 
Gift’) came to the conclusion, that gift giving in archaic communities should 
be seen as a system of exchange, which involves “the three-fold sequence of 
obligations (to give, to accept, and render)” (Silber, 1998: 138) emphasising 
the direct relation between donor and giver. Mauss argued, that the exchange 
of gifts connects individuals to a larger society and can be seen as a “total social 
phenomena” (1990: 11) in which economic and social motives are inseparable. 
He identified that gifts carry a wide range of meanings – religious, economic, 
political and social and that the process of giving follows its own logic related 
to an initiated cycle of reciprocity establishing social relations and consolidating 
hierarchy. Based on his observations he further contends that even if a gift is 
given without the thought of a return-gift, the act of giving implies an implicit 
expectation of reciprocity. Derrida (1992) underlines Mauss’ argument noting 
that there is no such thing as a ‘free gift’. In his view gift giving does negate its 
own principle due to the fact that “as soon as a gift is giving knowingly as a gift, 
the subject of generosity is always anticipating a return, already taking credit of 
some sort, if only for being generous” (in Barnett and Land 2007: 1072). Even 
self-congratulation or the hope that good action will bring good (not necessarily 
directly from the recipient of the gift), in which the biblical image ‘as you sow, so 
shall you reap’ fits so well, invalidates the gift as ‘pure’ (Derrida 1992; Laidlaw 
2000). 
Sahlins (1972) identified in Mauss’ essay three forms of gift giving differing in 
their reciprocity: balanced, generalized and negative. The classification is founded 
on the giver and receiver’s capacity to give back. Balanced reciprocity indicates 
giving among social equals, meaning, the given gift can be given back in same 
value. Negative reciprocity on the contrary reveals, that the universal obligation 
of reciprocity does no longer hold as the social divide is too large and the recipient 
is left with a huge moral and social debt and dependency based on the incapability 
to reciprocate. Sahlins sees in negative reciprocity a tool to affirm social hierarchy 
and power over time. Vandevelde (2000) yet suggests that recipients always 
have the capacity to give back, even if it is only by showing gratefulness. He 
notes: “very often situations in which one can only respond to a gift by being 
grateful, are considered as humiliating. They oblige us to admit our inferiority” 
(Vandevelde, 2000: 19). 
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2.1.2 Maussian gift and humanitarian aid
Richard Tittmus (1971) inaugurated with his book ‘The gift relationship: from 
human blood to social policy’ a publicly influential line of thinking, reiterated 
more recently by Godbout and Caillè (2001) and Gouldner (2005), contending 
that Mauss’ approach is no longer applicable evaluating the system of modern 
giving. Agreeing with Marcel Mauss on the fact, that voluntary giving is “not only 
morally superior, and eventually even practically more efficient than the market in 
the provision of public goods and services … and constitutive of a higher level of 
social solidarity” (Silber 1998: 138), he refuses the most fundamental features of 
Mauss’ gift theory. For Tittmus the modern form of giving (or in his words modern 
‘altruistic’ giving) in contemporary societies is based on anonymity and made to 
strangers, therefore not entailing expectations of a return gift from the recipient 
to the donor. In his understanding modern generosity is an act of  “altruism as 
behaviour intended to benefit another, even when doing so may risk or entail 
some sacrifice to the welfare of the actor“ (cited in Adloff/Sigmund, 2005: 217; 
cf. Gouldner 2005). Giving is thereby found on the norm of beneficence that 
requires supporting and giving others the help and aid they need regardless of 
former interpersonal relations or expected gratitude. Modern ‘altruistic’ giving 
represents the ‘pure’ gift that is “…spontaneous, uncoerced, and for those reasons 
often received with surprise…The gift is unexpected by the recipient, completely 
voluntary and unnecessary by the giver” (Smith 2005: 3) and it does deny 
reciprocity. In the opinion of Jacques Derrida (1992) Marcel Mauss in his essay 
does never address this form of the gift.
A growing number of literature in the context of internationally organized 
development aid bring back Mauss’ concept into the analysis disclosing that 
Tittmus’ view is not only a very partial rendering of the concept of today’s 
solidarity but also of the actual workings of international organized giving and 
further remains only as a partial applicability of the conception of the gift process 
(Eyben 2006; Hattori 20031/2003; Karagiannis 2005; Kapoor 2008; Korf 2007; 
Mawdsley 2012a/b; Silber 1998; Stirrat and Henkel 2006). Most of these studies 
argue that the “biography of the development gift”4  (Stirrat and Henkel 1997) 
starts off as a ‘pure’ gift guided by an ethical and disinterested act of generosity 
and not based on personal relations of donors and givers. However its processing 
and mediation through different types of aid brokers (Bierschenk et al 2002; 
Mosse and Lewis 2006; Sørenson 2008) entering “at various nodes in the aid chain 
….both internal to the humanitarian agencies (as consultants, experts, project 
4 The thesis will use the notion development gift and humanitarian gift interchangeably
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managers and volunteers, for example) and external to it (as local bureaucrats 
…, local politicians…, or as other agents of a local or national elite…)” (Korf et al 
2010: 62) does pollute the gift’s purity. 
Motives of self-interest and reciprocity have become prominent features in 
‘development gifts’. From a Maussian point of view, such gifts are ultimately self-
serving and accompanied by a huge range of “…internal and external rewards 
(such as self-esteem or pleasure; social prestige among both peers and inferiors or 
even upward social mobility; business connections; public relations improvement, 
etc)” (Silber 1998: 140). Even so one could doubt an existing reciprocity between 
givers and receivers of development gifts, the analysis of development practices 
uncover a purposeful mediation of reciprocity in the complex and highly regulated 
aid chain. Furthermore, various actors within the aid chain present and ritualize 
the gift at different localities using it as a commodity, a social investment; 
altruism serves self-interest supporting the struggle over power, profit and 
recognition within the highly competitive international aid sector or actors’ socio-
political environment. In other words, “a gift is worth nothing if it does not reflect 
an authentic appreciation of our personal qualities…it proves to establish a good 
reputation and to serve our long-term interests. It supplies us with honour and 
gratitude” (Vandevelde, 2000: 2-3). Humanitarian gifts therefore are intentional, 
personal and even political comprising self-interests while creating or re-enforcing 
social relationships hereby denying pure altruism (Adloff/Sigmund 2005; Bourdieu 
1998; Chouliaraki 2012; Derrida 1992; Gouldner 2005; Hattori 2001/2003; Korf 
2007; Korf et al. 2010; Silber 1998, 2001; Simmel 2005). 
However the rhetoric within the aid chain continues to relate the development gift 
to ‘altruism’; to the humanitarian momentum that opened the charitable space of 
doing good legitimizing the practices of brokerage and mediation as disinterested. 
This illustrates what Bourdieu defines as the open secret of giving:  “no one 
is really unaware of the logic of the exchange, but no one fails to comply with 
the rule of the game which is to act as if one did not know the rule … Everyone 
knows – and does not want to know – that everyone knows – and does not 
want to know – the true nature of the exchange“ (1997: 231-232). Givers and 
receivers participate in the “collective self-deception” (ibid: 231) euphemizing the 
power and symbolic violence that is hidden in the process of gift giving. This line 
of interpretation of the gift suggests that Mauss’ findings on the gift in archaic 
communities are applicable to the problems of humanitarian gifts. He already 
stated that “gifts are presented in rituals looking to be spontaneous, voluntary 
and altruistic, but in general the gestures accompanying the act of giving are 
fiction, formalism and social lies covering the truth of the gift: compulsion and 
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interests” (Mauss in Moebius and Papilloud 2006: 63). That is what makes 
humanitarian gifts so vulnerable for the receiver: it serves the donator and is 
based on the arbitrariness and power of their generosity and interests. As Korf 
argues: “the core problem with geographies of generosity is…that they invigorate 
compassion and emotions as the core virtues that should ground ethical action. 
However, compassion is not per se something that is positive for the one who is 
the addressee of this compassion” (2007: 370).
Based on Mauss’ theory of the gift it was possible to show in the analysis that 
similar to gifts in archaic communities, non-anonymous humanitarian gifts 
still present the three-fold sequence of obligations; remain a blend of political, 
aesthetic and moral dimensions, and further are accompanied by ritual activities, 
ceremonies and public presentations of generosity subtly defining, confirming, or 
modifying prestige and status distinctions (Article 1, Article 2, Article 3). Focusing 
on Mauss’ aspect of a deep connection between the gift and the donors’ identity, 
the empirical case contained evidence illustrating the impact of donators’ personal 
structures, their personal source of identity and socio-political preferences 
(including a particular opinion on ‘good’ life and politics). Yet the research interest 
here does not lie on the fact of this existence but more on the processes of and the 
how of transferring the imbedded donators’ identity to the recipients. As Mauss 
does not provide analytic tools for this research objective, the next chapter will 
introduce Foucaults’ (1977) concept of governmentality outlining its application 
on the non-anonymous humanitarian gift. 
2.2 Governmentality – from ‘pure’ giving to the will to improve 
Even though the system of organized and non-anonymous giving upholds the 
narrative of the ‘pure’ gift, closer analysis uncovered that development gifts 
contain personal and political structures and sources of givers’ identity. In 
addition development gifts inhabit particularly the agenda to improve and develop 
others lives exposing the paternalistic dimension of the gift. Even though givers 
of development gifts focus on the well being of recipients, they assume that the 
receiver exhibits a specific lack, a problem, which therefore needs to be regulated 
and corrected in tailor-made projects. The intention is benevolent, but “…the claim 
to expertise in optimizing lives of others is a claim to power” (Li 2007: 5) based 
on the assumption that human conduct can be regulated, controlled, shaped and 
turned towards specific ends. In this way gifts transferred in aid projects become 
an instrument of power and a technology “…to guide and shape (rather than force, 
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control, or dominate) the actions of others” (Cruikshank 1999: 4; cf Bourdieu 
1997; Dean 1999; Foucault 1991; Li 2007).
Even though development gifts are an exertion of power, it is not a power that 
wants to dominate others, rather a productive power, a subtle form of power 
influencing processes of individualization by structuring and shaping “the conduct 
of conduct” (Foucault 1982: 221) of those governed. Here I turn my thoughts to 
Foucault who defines in his concept of governmentalitiy the governing of people 
not as “…a way to force people to do what the governor wants; it is always a 
versatile equilibrium, with complementarity and conflicts between techniques 
which assure coercion and processes through which the self is constructed or 
modified by himself” (Foucault cited in Lemke 2000: 3-4). To govern in this 
sense is not to dominate but to act upon action in order to advance the capacity 
of action and to direct it (Li 2007; Rose 1999; Watts 2003). Thus Foucault was 
specifically interested in the ‘art of government’ trying to identify and understand 
the practices and techniques implemented as “…deliberate attempts to shape 
conduct in certain ways in relation to certain objectives” (Rose 1999: 4).
In order to understand the governmentality of the development gift it is important 
to analyse and to understand its specific political rationalities, its set of thinking 
and logic and involved calculations, strategies and tactics. Or referring back to 
Mauss, it is important to uncover the gifts’ identity that is based on donators’ 
personal socialized knowledge and lived experiences as it highly influences the 
how of governing. As Rose (1999) highlights: “Thoughts become governmental 
to the extent that it becomes technical…” (51). By identifying visions, ideals, 
rationales and objectives imbedded in the gift it is possible to translate them 
into development technologies aiming for programmed project objectives. In 
the development context experts involved in the aid chain are therefore trained 
and equipped with a variety of technologies that immediately link an identified 
problem to a solution. Or as Li (2007) writes, “Experts are trained to frame 
problems in technical terms…their claim to expertise depends on their capacity to 
diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds of solution that fall within their 
repertoire” (2007: 7). Technologies are linked to a certain degree of acquiescence 
and participation. Development technologies “…operate according to a political 
rationality for governing people in ways that promote their autonomy, self-
sufficiency, and political engagement; in the classic phrase of early philanthropists, 
they are intended to ‘help people to help themselves’…“ (Cruikshank 1999: 4). 
Their aim is to persuade recipients to accept the development gift in order to 
participate in the creation of a miniaturization of their ideals and of their utopian 
vision (Cruikshank 1999; Li 2007; Scott 1998; Watts 2003).
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My reading of Foucault’s concept of governmentality enabled me to identify 
the governmentality of the humanitarian gift by illustrating that development 
technologies camouflage interests, power and politics and the twin possibility of 
domination and freedom. It further helped to understand the logic behind the 
social engineering of the lives of tsunami affected people thereby uncovering 
that “…it always ignores essential features of any real, functioning social order” 
(Scott 1998: 4-6) as it is solely based on donators socialized knowledge and 
the vision to shape their environment as they see fit (Article 4). This is the 
paradox of good intentions: in order to uphold the narratives of a pure ideal of 
the ethical imperative of saving lives and giving ‘pure’, ‘free’ and altruistic gifts, 
non-anonymous donators themselves become subject to the logic of mundane 
development practices they wanted to distinguish themselves from (Article 5). 
The next chapter will now introduce the German non-anonymous gift for tsunami-
affected people in Sri Lanka in more detail. On the one hand embedding it into 
the government structures of tsunami rehabilitation while on the other hand, 
highlighting its distinctive features in relation to donators’ socio-political networks 
in Germany and Sri Lanka and at various junctures referencing to conceptual 
approaches and special characteristics of post-tsunami aid.
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3. The empirical case: 
    A ‘German Gift’ for tsunami-affected people in Sri Lanka
The ‘wave of compassion’ also overwhelmed the federal state of my origin 
in Germany – Baden Württemberg (BaWü). My personal experiences with 
spontaneous acts of generosity and solidarity presented in the prologue 
recurred similarly to a multitude of individuals having close relations – personal, 
professional, economic, or in general familiar with Sri Lanka. In addition the then 
German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder5, was using his traditional New Year speech 
2004/2005 appealing for more solidarity with the disaster affected communities 
in Asia and Africa. The Chancellor’s appeal was particularly directed towards 
states, cities, communities, companies and individuals to take over partnerships 
with districts, town councils and communities in the tsunami affected regions, 
creating new forms of public and private giving.  Within a short period of time a 
multitude of public and private initiatives were formed all with good intentions 
to help. Among these private initiatives was the ‘Baden Württemberg Tsunami 
Relief Cooperation’ (BWTRC) initiated in 2005 through three private donators 
(henceforth designated as “Donators A, B, C”)6, all with long standing close 
private and professional histories as well as networks in Sri Lanka. Their aim was 
to construct a new village for tsunami-affected people in Sri Lanka.
The following sections will introduce the genesis of this private donator initiative, 
its political interference and how it was integrated in the government structures 
5 Abridgement official New Year Speech 2004/2005:
   “Ich habe von der Dimension des Leidens gesprochen, der wir gerecht werden müssen und zwar jeder    
   an seinem Platz. Die Staaten, die Regionen, die Wirtschaft und die ganze Weltgesellschaft. Ich möchte  
   nachhaltige Hilfe für die Region. Ich will, dass wir uns lange verantwortlich fühlen. Alle wohlhabenden  
   Länder sollten Partnerschaften für den Wiederaufbau bestimmter Regionen übernehmen. Ich stelle mir 
   vor, dass sich die großen Industrieländer für jeweils ein Land verantwortlich fühlen. Auch Deutschland.  
   Unsere Bundesländer für entsprechende Bezirke. Unsere Städte für Städte und unsere Dörfer für   
   Dörfer. Unsere Wirtschaft könnte helfen. Hilfe würde so sichtbar und ganz konkret. Deutsche Schulen  
   und ihre Kinder könnten Patenschaften für Schulen dort übernehmen. Unterstützt von ihren Eltern.    
   Das würde zeigen, dass wir über das Spenden von Geld - das gewiss wichtig ist - weit hinaus wollen.  
   Dass wir Verantwortung als etwas Dauerhaftes begreifen...” (Source: http://www.lc-bonn-venusberg.   
   de/lcbnvb_d_eingang_20050102_bk_n-anspr.htm) 
   The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation guided the process of the Partnership Initiative. The    
   ‚Service Agency Communities in One World’ (SKEW) of the Ministry was assigned with the task     
   to coordinate and match partnerships. Communities, town councils, regions, schools, or companies  
   were able to place a request for a partnership with SKEW and they provided the service to identify  
   local aid projects in which the initiators were able to invest their money. However many private   
   initiatives directly contacted aid agencies in order to directly communicate and negotiate possible aid   
   projects and to have a bigger influence in the delivery process.
6 The acronym is used in order to secure the anonymity and privacy of the three key initiatores of   
   the tsunami relocation project.
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of tsunami rehabilitation in Sri Lanka. Further highlighted here is the manner in 
which the specific donator and project constellation annihilate the intention of a 
‘pure’ gift and how initially hidden interests gradually came to the fore not only 
influencing practices but also the objectives of the project.   
3.1 Eco-Village: genesis and background
Based on donator A’s professional position as senior official in the Ministry of 
the Environment Baden-Württemberg (MEBW), the BWTRC became part of the 
ministries’ bilateral relief efforts in Sri Lanka. The official link to the MEBW and 
the efforts donators made in fundraising and setting up a solid foundation for the 
relief project were awarded from the Tsunami Fund of the Baden-Württemberg 
Foundation (BWF) amounting to 750’000 Euro. The donation of the BWF however 
set clear conditions and a finality to the project: the construction of a ‘Green 
Village’, later introduced to the German public and Sri Lankan counterparts 
as ‘Eco-Village’. The project had to fulfil the following criteria7: (1) focus on 
long-term investment into infrastructure by (2) building a new village model 
for eco-friendly living, (3) introduce new technologies originating from Baden-
Württemberg, and (4) transfer knowledge to improve peoples capacities and 
abilities in eco-friendly behaviour. The Sri Lankan Ministry of Development and 
Water Supply became the bilateral partner ministry due to existing political 
linkages based on former bilateral cooperation between the two ministries, 
thereby ignoring the official government tsunami rehabilitation structures and 
rules (cf. chapter 3.1.1). The decision on the locality for the donator-driven 
housing relocation scheme was rather based on personal preferences as well as 
good personal and political relations to the Southern district of Galle than on the 
actual needs and demands for tsunami housing. Based on official statistics and in 
line with the official Tsunami Housing Policy (cf. chapter 3.1.2) Eastern Province 
claimed the highest support for housing reconstruction with over 24’000 fully and 
partly damaged houses followed by the Southern Province with only around 9’000 
damaged houses8. One donator stated: “to be honest, the location for the project 
was decided on personal preferences. The South is a good location. Our partners 
told there is still a demand and it is also much more comfortable to access when 
we come to visit … We also considered the East. But it is really too complicated: 
access and difficult political situation… also we have no contacts there with local 
ministries” (45,082008, DC)9. 
7 Source: Internal Memo MEBW (13052005, MEBW)
8 Detailed statistical information on the number of Tsunami damaged houses by Province and District  
   see Annex 1, Table 3
9 The interviews with German donators and other German interview partners were transcribed and      
     translated from German to English by the PhD author
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With growing funds (over 1,0 Mio Euro) broadening the project size and its 
objectives, as well as the involvement of official political authorities the idea to 
cooperate with a knowledgeable and experienced partner in the humanitarian 
business was generated. BWTRC found a suitable partner in AID10, an experienced 
emergency aid organisation with its headquarters in the capital city of the state 
of Baden-Württemberg. The former director of AID suggested in an interview 
that she was reluctant to accept the partnership at one point, however it was not 
possible to decline, as “…there was so much politics involved that to withdraw 
from the project would have caused problems and a bad reputation for our 
agency” (44, 012009, HH). To counterbalance the donators’ influence AID topped 
up the project budget with 1,2 Million Euros - half of the total budget - to keep a 
say in its planning and implementation and to legitimize the project under their 
organisational mandate. The paradox of this liaison: the gift became a subject to 
struggle over power, representation, legitimization and accountability of involved 
stakeholders.
How did I become part of this liaison? In the early tsunami relief phase incoming 
international NGOs faced a major problem in finding locally available personnel 
well connected in the highly competitive NGO sector in Sri Lanka. Based on 
professional and personal linkages with AID and due to the fact that I already 
lived and worked in Sri Lanka, I was offered a two years consultant contract as 
project manager in the newly set up Colombo office. Since my father, a member 
of BaWü parliament was known to the donators AID headquarters felt that it 
would be suitable if my duties would also include being in charge of the direct 
donators communication as well as for reporting in relation to the Eco Village. For 
this reason I was entrusted to assemble the vision, expectations, and requests of 
donators and to translate them into the reality of everyday project work as well 
as the lived reality of project beneficiaries. Until the end of 2007, I was involved 
in the Eco-Village project and experienced what I will describe as the paradox 
of good intentions: the disproportion between a high moral tone of private 
non-anonymous humanitarian gifts and everyday practices and the reality of 
delivering, but also the one sided selective perception of donators on paternalism, 
clientelism and self-interested exertion of influence. 
To better place the Eco-Village tsunami relocation project within the Sri Lankan 
governmental tsunami structures, the next two sections will introduce the official 
institutional arrangements and the tsunami housing policy in particular. Further 
10 AID is a fictitious name used throughout the thesis to secure anonymity of the implementing aid   
     organisation
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the manner in which the donators utilized their personal political linkages in Sri 
Lanka in handpicking official tsunami structures to accept or to neglect in order to 
gain advantages for ‘their’ housing project is also emphasized.
3.1.1	Official	institutional	arrangements	and	structures
Under the supervision of the then president Mrs Chandrika Bandaranaike 
Kumaratunga the GoSL established the Centre for National Operations (CNO) 
functioning as the core tsunami relief coordinating body in December 2004. 
End of January 2005 the CNO published a first official recovery plan notifying 
two objectives for relief and rehabilitation: ‘rebuilding the nation’ and ‘building 
back better’, linking immediate relief work to long-term development objectives 
(Senanayake 2008). To achieve these objectives the GoSL introduced three task 
forces coping with different key aspects of the relief work: Task Force for Rescue 
and Relief (TAFRER)11, Task Force for Logistics and Law and Order (TAFLOL)12, and 
Task Force to Rebuild the Nation (TAFREN)13. After disbanding CNO in February 
2005, the government formed the Task Force for Relief (TAFOR), which took over 
the combined responsibilities of CNO, TAFRER and TAFLOL. TAFREN remained 
as the primary institution to coordinate, facilitate and assist all international/
national, multilateral/bilateral humanitarian and relief organizations formulating 
four thematic key areas for tsunami rehabilitation: 1) getting people back into 
homes; 2) restoring livelihoods, health, education; 3) providing protection for all; 
and 4) upgrading the national infrastructure. The relief and reconstruction process 
was highly centralized; all relevant instructions, orders, policy guidelines and 
circulars were filtered through TAFRENs’ office. Even though TAFREN cooperated 
closely with relevant line ministries such as the Ministry of Urban Development 
and Housing, Urban Development Authority (UDA), National Water Supply and 
Drainage Board (NWSDB), Ministry of Power and Energy, Electricity Board (CEB), 
Ministry of Highways, Road Development Authority (RDA) and other relevant 
government institutions, the task force was questioned in terms of competency, 
capacity, self-interests and independency. The critique resulted from the fact that 
two TAFREN representatives were senior political advisors, two heads of national 
11 TAFRER: Coordination and facilitating the implementation of all rescue, relief and rehabilitation      
     activities through the relevant line ministries, District Secretaries, Divisional Secretaries and other   
     relevant government authorities
12 TAFLOL: Coordination of relief logistics, and facilitate easy access to necessary relief supplies
13 TAFREN: Guide long-term recovery process implemented through livelihood schemes, education,     
     health and infrastructure programmes. Coordination and implementation of policies related to      
     tsunami issues.
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banks and the other six were leaders of some of the largest corporations in the 
country, mainly from the tourism sector directly acting under the Presidential 
Secretariat. As Bastian writes: “The initial response of the Sri Lankan state 
towards tsunami rehabilitation was guided by the current orthodoxy of the state 
sector playing a minimal role of setting the overall framework, while handing over 
the implementation to private actors…the Sri Lankan government pretty much 
privatised the tsunami rehabilitation” (2009: 232; cf. Barenstein 2013; Bastian 
2009; GoSL 2005; Haug and Weerakoon 2007; Hettige 2007; Kleinfeld 2007; TEC 
2007). 
Following the election of a new president, Mahinda Rajapaksa, in November 2005, 
TAFOR and TAFREN were combined in the Reconstruction and Development Agency 
(RADA) focusing on all recovery issues across all sectors and stakeholders in the 
tsunami affected regions. Since mid-2007 with the closure of RADA, all remaining 
responsibilities and duties related to tsunami rehabilitation and reconstruction 
were assigned to the Ministry for National Building and Development.  
In an early phase of tsunami rehabilitation the complex and intransparent situation 
of official government structures and the continuously changing formation of 
institutions and responsibilities, led a multitude of international aid agencies to 
channel their tsunami budgets through local partner organisations. The principal 
purpose of these liaisons was avoiding time-consuming self-registration processes 
under the government’s tsunami structure’s aim for quick results in relief work. 
AID and the BWTRC initially followed this approach of not registering the Eco-
Village as a tsunami project. They later realized, that if the Eco-Village was not 
registered as an official tsunami relocation project under TAFREN, later RADA, 
the project would not access special government services such as Tax exemption, 
free provision of access roads, electricity and water granted to official tsunami 
projects. Therefore donators used their political networks in Sri Lanka to facilitate 
a belated registration of Eco Village as a tsunami relocation project formulating 
an official Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Tsunami Housing 
Reconstruction Unit under the Donor Driven Tsunami Housing Policy. 
3.1.2	The	official	Post-Tsunami	Housing	Policy
Based on first estimates in early 2005 under the supervision of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), the GoSL calculated the destruction of houses at about 
13 per cent of the overall housing stock within 500 meters of the coast (ADB 
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2005: 12). Hence post-disaster housing and relocation was identified as one of 
the most important core areas in the rehabilitation process. The Action Plan for 
Rebuilding the Nation launched in February 2005 singled out: 
“Rehabilitation and resettlement of the families needs to be done with utmost 
urgency… They need immediate assistance to get back to their normal livelihood” 
TAFREN 2005a: 7
Yet the government policy of a ‘non-building back’ coastal buffer zone announced 
almost immediately after the tsunami immensely influenced the process of post-
disaster housing. In February 2005, building on the Coastal Conservation Act No 
57 (CC Act), which was declared in 1981 targeting the management of densely 
populated areas adjacent to the coast, the GoSL imposed the ‘Buffer Zone or 
Vulnerability Zone Regulation’. The government justified the ‘Buffer Zone’ “as 
a public safety measure against the potential devastation of another tsunami” 
(Boano 2009: 770) in which any construction or reconstruction of houses was 
prohibited up to 500m inland from the coast. This not only created “…uncertainty 
as to where residents within the zone would be relocated and what would happen 
to the land they had been occupying in the zone when the tsunami struck” (Boano 
2009: 769) but also protest and critique. 
The launch of advertisements initiated by the GoSL in cooperation with the Tourism 
Board and Ministry of Tourism offering ‘special tourism zones’ to the private sector 
incited a public protests against the Buffer Zone Regulation. Detractors accredited 
by the official government leaflet that the policy was created in order to move 
poor people and small enterprises away from the coast, thus creating space for 
big private businesses, or providing a complementary ticket for eviction, land 
grabs, unjustifiable land-acquisitions plans preventing homeless and marginalized 
residents to return to their home of origin (INFORM 2005; COHRE 2005, Leckie 
2005; Oxfam 2005). 
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Figure 1: Government Leaflet – Rebuilding 
Tourist Industry. 
Source: TAFREN 27th February 2005
In early 2006 the government 
gave in, gradually reducing the 
protection zone to 100 meter in 
the South and West14, and 200 
meter in the North and East15 
(Barenstein 2013; Boano 2009; 
Brun and Lund 2009; TAFREN 
2005a/2005b). Even though 
the GoSL adjusted the non-
building back zone over 70’000 
households had to be relocated. 
The huge scale of housing 
reconstruction and relocation was 
coordinated and managed under 
two approaches relating to the 
different rights for assistance, 
funding regulations and involved 
stakeholders (see Annex 2):
a) Donor Driven Housing Program for households within the Buffer Zone: 
The policy envisaged that “owners of land within the buffer zone were offered a 
new house in a relocated site without having to surrender their property to the 
government” (Barenstein 2013: 219). The slogan was: ‘a house for a house’. 
Funding for these relocation projects was allocated by national or international 
donor agencies on land allocated by the state. After signing a Memorandum of 
Understanding (MoU) with the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction Unit (THRU) the 
housing project became officially registered as Tsunami Housing Scheme with the 
following shared responsibilities: 
14 Districts: Kilinochchi, Mannar, Puttalam, Gampaha, Colombo, Kalutara, Galle, Matara and     
     Hambantota.
15 Districts: Jaffna, Mullaitivu, Trincomalee, Batticaloa and Ampara.
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b) Owner Driven Housing Program for households outside the Buffer Zone:
All affected households outside the Buffer Zone and able to demonstrate 
ownership of land were entitled to a state grant enabling to rebuild houses. 
Fully damaged houses (repair cost is more than 40% of replacement cost) were 
granted with 250’000 Rs (ca. 1’900 Euro) in four stages. Partially damaged 
houses (repair cost less than 40% of replacement cost) were granted 100’000 
Rs (ca. 760 Euro) in two stages based on the physical progress of construction. 
In addition, households successfully utilizing the grant were eligible to apply 
for a loan of 500’000 Rs (ca. 3’800 Euro) repayable over 20 years with a grace 
period of 24 month for small business development. Even though the borrower 
had to show repayment capacity and offer security acceptable to the lending 
institution (Ministry of Finance), the owner driven approach “…gave beneficiaries 
a high degree of freedom and control over the reconstruction of their houses” 
(Barenstein 2013: 219).
In the month that followed, one of the biggest problems in the post-tsunami 
housing sector was the unavailability of suitable land for housing relocation 
programs under the Donor Driven Housing Program. The goal to identify land 
in close proximity and in suitable size (comprising sufficient parcels measuring 
Responsibility
Donor Funding and construction of houses
Absorption of costs for basic infrastructure related to the 
house: electricity, running water, sanitation and drainage 
facilities
Absorption of costs for overall infrastructure related to the 
settlement: roads, street lamps, community centre, etc.
Government Provision of land and assignment of land rights to recipients
Funding and allocation of infrastructure and services up to 
the relocation site: access road, electricity, national water 
system
 Source: Ministry of Finance 2005a
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between six (ca. 150m²) and 15 perches (ca. 400m²)) was almost impossible due 
to the coastal geography, population density and infrastructural accessibility. In 
the North and East, additionally, ethnic disparities and distribution exacerbated 
land identification. As Boano identified for the two regions: “…the two distinct 
ethnic communities of Muslims and Tamils create a complex and mixed 
geography... A Muslim village is followed by Tamil village and vice versa. This 
alternate geography along the coastal belt, in addition to the area’s structural land 
shortage and ethnic sensitivities, posed serious problems for the identification of 
land for resettlements” (2009: 774; cf. Brun and Lund 2009; Barenstein 2013; 
Hasbullah and Korf 2009; Hyndman 2007; IPS 2005/2006; Ruwanpura 2008; 
Sambandan 2005; Silva 2009).
These difficulties and a general opposition to relocation led the new government 
to again reduce the non-building back zone in April 2006 to a minimum distance 
of 35 meters and a maximum distance of 125 meters16. Hence the dual Tsunami 
Housing Policy was continued and even extended. Under the donor-driven 
policy also tenants, extended family members, and encroachers of government 
land within the Buffer Zone were eligible to receive a house. This reduction of 
the buffer zone and expansion of eligibility shifted the housing reconstruction 
situation, minimizing not only the land requirement for relocation sites but 
also the requirement for donor-driven housing. Although the number of in situ 
owner-driven housing increased, aid agencies continued to invest in donor-
driven resettlement schemes; „the idea of housing projects appealed to NGOs 
as it enhanced their visibility and ability to demonstrate ‘concrete’ results, 
particularly to headquarters’ staff who came to visit on monitoring missions“ 
(Silva 2009: 68). Moreover, as housing schemes are cost intensive they helped to 
clear the organisations’ tsunami budget in a short period of time, which allowed 
organisations to demonstrate and display efficiency and public visibility. As Stirrat 
(2006) notes: “competition was not just a matter of getting rid of money but 
getting rid of it in the ‘right’ way which would fit with Western donors’ visions of 
what relief should be” (2006:13).
16 The distinction was justified based on location, physical environment of land and sea and the extent  
     of tsunami damages.
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3.2.  Project location, village construction process 
and community management system 
Location 
Due to the fact of land shortage and availability of sizable sites, 
the three German donators again used their good personal 
and political contacts within the central government but also 
local government in Galle District to directly negotiate and 
identify suitable land for their project idea. Local bureaucrats 
helped to identify sites, which were deemed beautiful and 
suitable only later filing an application for transference of the 
land as a tsunami relocation site. One tsunami officer in Galle 
remembered: “First time the German delegation came in 2005... 
it was a special request from a ministry in Colombo to assist 
them finding a location for a special housing project ...we showed 
them several sites but nothing was good enough...we took quite 
an effort and time for them” (88, 10012009, ARI). In September 
2005, a suitable relocation site was identified and through the 
use of donators’ political networks it was later officially accepted 
as a tsunami relocation site. 
The relocation site, an old rubber and tea estate (see pictures 
1 and 3) , is located in Akmeemana Division, more specific in 
Meegoda – Pilana Grama Niladhari Administration Division (GN 
division)17, comprising 11,134 hectares. The location is not in 
close proximity to the coastal line but situated 12 kilometres 
inland from Galle Four Gravets, one of the hardest and most 
severely hit division in Galle district. In total 23 (46%) of Galle 
Four Gravets’ GN divisions were directly affected and 2’500 
people relocated in 11 new relocation projects in neighbouring 
divisions, of which Eco-Village is one. The land shows a hilly 
topography and due to its former use as a rubber and tea estate, 
basic infrastructure like roads, water or electricity was not 
available.
17 Grama Niladhari Administration Division (GN): the smallest administrative level  
(village level) within the decentralized Sri Lankan administration, aiming “to 
ensure an administrative system at rural level on par with public policies” (http://
www.pubad.gov.lk/web/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=82&Ite
mid=173&lang=en)
SRI LANKA
Southern Province
Galle District
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Map 1: Geographical location of Eco-Village
Source: W. Schlor 03/2014
KALUTARA
MATARA
GALLE
Galle Four Gravets
GN divisions of origin
Akmeemana
GN divisions of relocation site
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Construction Process
The planning process, as with the identification of a proper location, was highly 
influenced through donators’ interference. The following two statements illustrate 
what they wanted to achieve: 
“The village should be like a German village” 
(German Technical Engineer (GTE))
 “The public buildings should present Sri Lankan architectural tradition” 
(Donator B)
This seeming paradox – a village that should be like a German village while 
representing Sri Lankan architectural traditions through public buildings – shows 
the implicit tension in the spatial and technical design of what also had to become 
a sustainable, eco-friendly village. To some extent the project managers seemed 
to solve the paradox by hiring a German architect familiar with German standards 
as much as with the design requirements for local houses. After becoming an 
official tsunami project, the village plan was conceived in line with the official 
tsunami housing policy, combining landscape potential and the vision of a ‘typical’ 
German village. In line with the official tsunami housing policy the house size was 
about 650 square feet (about 60 m²) and each property size contained 15 perches 
(375 m²). As a result of partially steep topography it was technically manageable 
to locate 90 houses under these requirements.
Picture 1: Housing site, northern view (left) 
Picture 2: Construction site, northern view (right)
Source: J. Bokel 09/2005 and 09/2006
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In order to achieve fast results attending to the humanitarian needs of tsunami-
affected people, donators set a tight time schedule aiming to finish the housing 
construction by end of 2006 with the view of resettling the first villagers by the 
first quarter of 2007. However the reality was other than the expectations. The 
official tsunami housing bureaucracy proved to be lengthy and slow. By the use 
of persistence and repeated interference using political networks, the village 
plan and construction site obtained approval. In mid 2006 AID contracted a local 
construction company turning the relocation site into a huge construction site (see 
pictures 2 and 4). 
At this moment beneficiaries were not yet identified nor selected and the village 
as well as the housing design therefore was fully shaped based on the donators 
visions and aesthetics. The approval letter to RADA presents donators’ vision of a 
well-designed house, combining high standards and local living culture, based on 
their understanding of local housing (see pictures 6 and 7, page 57). 
Picture 3: Housing site, southern view (left) 
Picture 4: Construction site, northern view (right)
Source: J. Bokel 09/2005 and 09/2006
Picture 1: Housing site, northern view (left) 
Picture 2: Construction site, northern view (right)
Source: J. Bokel 09/2005 and 09/2006
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Map 2: Layout Plan Eco-Village 
Source: AID Architect, 01 2006
N
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The letter stated: “The houses will have a 
chimney as the locals use firewood for their 
cooking and each door and window will have 
a ventilation element for air circulation (see 
picture 5). The toilet will be attached to 
the house and accessible through an open 
veranda in the back of the house. For the 
sewage disposal each family will get a three-
chamber cesspit and will be responsible for 
the maintenance. Furthermore the house is 
planned in a way that the owners will be able 
to expand and extend the area with rooms 
if they deem necessary” (Letter 05042006, 
Internal Document). 
Related to the vision of creating a ‘German’ 
village, the houses were settled around a 
public square located in the centre of the 
village comprising a community building 
(see map 2). To meet the requirements of 
a well functioning village, the community 
building included a community centre, 
nursery, library, doctors’ room, dispensary, 
administration office and an open market 
hall. For economic development two buildings 
comprising space for commercial use and a 
separate bakery were constructed. Donators’ 
attached great importance to sustainability 
and future village development. Again the 
approval letter gives evidence: “For further 
development we also kept some areas free 
if there is a need for an extension of the 
village. Therefore we planned more wide 
roads so that there will be no problems with 
future development. The main road will be 
10 m (33 feet) wide with drain and pavement 
and the side road 7 m (23 feet)“ (letter 
05042006, Internal Document).
from top to bottom
Picture 5: House shell construction European architectural style
Picture 6: Public Square with Community Hall
Picture 7: Bakery in local architectural style
Source: J. Bokel 05/2008 (Picture 5)
             P. Hollenbach, 07/2007 (Picture 6), 12/2009 (Picture 7)
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As basic infrastructure was missing at the 
location, the resettlement scheme obtained 
a deep well with solar driven pumps and 
a water tower to provide each house with 
running water (see picture 8). In order 
to meet high ecological standards for the 
village, all public buildings and street lamps 
were equipped with solar lamps (see picture 
9). The houses were built with ecological 
friendly construction material (sustainable 
grown wood, locally produced stones, etc) 
and a technology improving the houses 
internal natural airflow in order to reduce 
internal heat minimizing the usage of 
electrical ventilation. In addition each house 
received a rainwater collection system  (see 
picture 10) providing water for the toilet and 
garden and a specially constructed cesspit 
naturally processing wastewater in a high 
proportion.
This side
Picture  8: Water tower
Picture  9: Solar lamps
Picture 10: Rainwater-collection system
Opposite site
Picture 11: View on Public Square
Source: P. Hollenbach 02/2010 (Picture 8 and 10)
             J. Bokel 05/2005 (Picture 9 and 11)
Pa r t  1  |  6 1
6 2  | T h e  P a r a d o x  o f  G o o d  I n t e n t i o n s
Village Management System
The donators had a long-term development perspective and vision in regard to 
village management. They projected the village to be a model of self-governance 
and peaceful coexistence. One donator remarked: “Eco-Village should be a model 
to show that people participate in community politics and take decisions together 
for their lives… I am sure if they learn to participate in community politics, they 
will start formulating their political desires and make demands for their rights 
as a Sri Lankan citizen…” (42, 102009, Donator B). To achieve a “coexistent 
living pattern” (Village Constitution: 2) and to be more independent from formal 
local government structures, a self-governing system was introduced based on 
donators’ knowledge and experience of community self-governance in BaWü. The 
core idea was an active, self-managing village community, which in turn would 
shape a new political identity and assertiveness towards becoming independent 
citizens empowered to challenge long-established politics in Sri Lanka. This ideal 
is reflected in the mission statement of the village constitution:
To establish a coexistent (sic) village whereby the community who have 
been displaced by the Tsunami disaster is capable of independently 
managing and developing the village to create and generate income to the 
betterment of themselves.
Village Constitution 2009: 2
Picture 12: Training on village self-management system
Source: P. Hollenbach, 08/2007
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The new organization of the village management was openly posted and explained 
in order to admonish the new villagers to adapt the system (see picture 13). In 
a participatory process, facilitated by international and local experts, villagers 
elected a village committee and several sub-committees each responsible for a 
specific sector such as finances, community activities, eco-awareness, economic 
development (promoting self-employment through a micro-credit program) and 
technical maintenance. To attain necessary skills for successful management 
villagers and specially the committee members were given several trainings (see 
pictures 12 and 14). 
In addition the project intended to alter the living style towards a more ecological 
and self-catering life style. For this reason beneficiaries received gardening 
tools and were trained in home gardening techniques learning how and which 
vegetable, fruits and herbs can be grown on the land aspiring towards self-
catering home gardens. In addition under the supervision of a professional 
landscaper AID organized a reforestation program to vegetate public spaces and 
improve the overall ecological value of the village (see picture 16). To increase the 
economic skills women were trained in various skills such as sewing, cloth painting 
and trade. Setting up revolving micro-credit system villagers had the opportunity 
to transfer these skills in self-employment (see pictures 15 and 17). 
Picture 13: Open notice in community hall 
Source: P. Hollenbach, 12/2010
Picture 14: Villagers attending training session 
Source: P. Hollenbach, 08/2007            
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The above presentations of the project should provide an indication of its special 
constellation and its exceptional position within the official tsunami rehabilitation 
process based on donators’ active involvement, through their tight personal 
networks, with local politics. A closer analysis on these specifications and how 
donators’ visions and requests influenced the practices and implementation will be 
provided in the articles itemised in Part 2. Before chapter five briefly introduces 
and outlines the articles highlighting their interplay and succession but also the 
presentation of objectives, I wish to use the following chapter (chapter 4) to 
reflect on my position within the empirical case study. In particular considering 
the influence my shifting positionality had on my research work and the outcome 
of the thesis. Further I introduce my methods and reflect on the (co-)production 
of knowledge, as the thesis is not my lonely effort but the result of working with 
field assistants. I close the section with personal reflections on data writing. 
Picture 15: Self-employment: vegetable shop
Source: P. Hollenbach  02/2010 
Picture 16: Home garden
Source: P. Hollenbach 03/2011
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Picture 17: Self-employment: women’s association producing
self-created pillowcases, napkins and cloth
Source: P. Hollenbach  02/2010
Picture 16: Home garden
Source: P. Hollenbach 03/2011
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4.	Conducting	Internal	Ethnography	in	a	former	working	field		
The thesis opens with the prologue describing how I became involved in post-
tsunami rehabilitation in Sri Lanka further highlighting the motivation to conduct 
academic research on the topic of private non-anonymous giving in humanitarian 
aid. The ‘personal Tsunami story’ shows that this research started off not as a 
‘pure’ research project but as an outcome or side product of my biography. My 
former working field turned into my research field transforming the thesis in to 
an “insider ethnography” (Mosse 2006: 936). As Gould writes, “…what makes 
ethnography ethnographic is the privileging a certain kind of evidence: First-
hand, rich and disaggregated, embedded in processes of contiguous social inter-
and transaction over time” (2004: 269). Hence I am aware, that the research 
is “…multi-positioned and multi-sited…” and that a huge part of my dataset 
was conducted unconsciously as it was “…research not just in, but as part of …” 
my everyday consultant work and life (Mosse 2005: 11; cf. Aull Davies 2008; 
Ergun and Erdemir 2010; Hammersley and Atkinson 1983; Herod 1999; Katz 
1994; Marcus 1995; Mosse 2006; Rose 1997; Sultana 2007). The fundamental 
knowledge on the resettlement scheme, its actors, networks and alliances, project 
visions and political linkages was gained during my 30 months of professional 
involvement. Hence lot of my data was ‘produced’ as work material such as 
internal project documents, field notes, memos, monthly project reports, and 
Email communication documenting various processes, decisions and discussions 
on the donator-driven housing project. Further private motives led to keep a 
diary about my working experiences helping me to reflect and digest my everyday 
struggles of ‘doing humanitarian aid’ in the post-tsunami context in Sri Lanka. 
After starting my research work and analysing the phenomena of private non-
anonymous giving in humanitarian aid, all these documents became “…material of 
the ethnographic text” (Silverman 2008: 17). 
Based on former relations in the field, access to the research field and its subjects 
did not present a problem. Nevertheless the analysing and writing process created 
uneasy feelings. I hence wanted to reflect on these emotional moments following 
Gillian Rose’s (1997) suggestion on common strategies for reflexive research: 
“What we may be able to do is something rather more modest but, perhaps, 
rather more radical: to inscribe into our research practices some absences and 
fallibilities while recognizing that the significance of this does not rest entirely 
in our own hands“ (319). I have to confess, that in my articles I am far from 
what Marcus (1998 cited Foley 2002: 473) has labelled a “confessional” form of 
reflexivity making self-critical assessments of own interpretations available to the 
reader. Nor was I explicit to convey that my empirical data and its interpretations 
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are not the “intellectual accomplishment of a lone researcher” (Unnithan-Kumar 
and de Neve 2006: 5), but took place within the context of various relationships 
and were co-constructed by various actors influenced by “…the places we 
occupy at that moment (physically and spatially as well as socially, politically, 
and institutionally)” (Sultana 2007: 382). Neither did I coherently acknowledge 
the partiality and embodied power relations influencing the data. Therefore the 
following chapters will rehabilitate these shortcomings.
4.1	Turning	former	working	field	into	researcher	field
Starting my PhD I did not struggle to enter the research field but to ‘exit’ it. The 
seeming contradiction results on my former position as unintentional insider 
participant observer. The intensive involvement in the aid project, the fear of 
spoiling personal relations, good rapport and friendships among future research 
subjects however made it difficult to achieve the common advice given in 
ethnographic textbooks: the researcher needs to require the ability to be inside 
the scene as well as remain a stranger to the scene. Or as Labaree (2002) notes: 
“…the situatedness of the insider…first requires the insider to step outside in order 
to gain a new understanding of the inside (‘distancing’)” (109). Turning the former 
working field into a research field implies the researcher does not enter in a place 
as an unknown stranger but needs to learn alienating from it (Chacko 2004; 
Coffey 1999; Aull Davies 2008; Devereux and Hoddinott 1993; Hammersley and 
Atkinson 1983; Labaree 2002; Nagar and Geiger 2007; Roberts and Sanders 
2009; Tembo 2003).
Re-entering Sri Lanka as a researcher I felt insecure experiencing what Johnson et 
al (2006) delineate for the first arrival in the research field: “an anxiety-provoking 
endeavour involving feelings of self-doubt, fear and often helplessness” (112). 
My ontological insecurity was based on the fact that I re-entered Sri Lanka with 
a new identity. Conducting research involved taking a critical and analytical view 
on the behaviour, performance, decisions and practices of former colleagues, 
partners and institutions I formerly belonged to. While having these moments of 
insecurity and discomfort, ‘the field’ welcomed me warmly facilitating the access 
to information and necessary data collection in order to complete the existing 
dataset in relation to identified theoretical entry points elicited in the first phase of 
the research process. 
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4.2 Doing research: Fieldwork and dataset 
The preliminary dataset as mentioned above consisted of former work documents, 
internal papers and personal diary entries up to the point of leaving the project, 
end of 2007. Afterwards I was still provided with internal documents such as 
monthly project reports, in-depth tri-monthly reports and the final project report 
by end of 2008. Also I gained access to minutes of donator meetings conducted 
in Germany between 2005 and 2008, an external evaluation report providing 
a neutral and professional view and perspective on the outcome of the project. 
Even though I was able to gain a lot of additional information and insights 
from these documents I was aware, that they “…are ‘social facts’, …produced, 
shared and used in socially organized ways…They construct particular kinds of 
representations using their own conventions” (Atkinson and Coffey 2008: 58). 
Not feeling sufficiently equipped with enough background information of when, 
where, how and who actually produced these documents, I did not systematically 
analyse but rather used them as additional secondary, (in)-formal information 
sources. This composition of dataset enabled me to focus the research mainly on 
the humanitarian moment arguing in my analysis and findings with the theory of 
the gift (Article 1, Article 2, and Article 3). 
During two fieldwork missions in Sri Lanka, one in November 2009 for a period of 
5 months and a second one in February 2011 for 2 months, I particularly focused 
to gain more insights into the long-term visions and donators’ intentions in terms 
of the housing project. My fieldwork objective was to adjust the existing dataset 
towards the notion of governmentality. Based on the current project status and 
stage, I gained insights into the donators’ centralized formulation process of the 
village constitution and later observed the implementation process, launching 
and introducing the new village constitution as well as village organization 
to the housing beneficiaries. In addition I conducted several interviews in 
Germany between 2009 and 2011 focusing on the same theoretical aspect of 
governmentality directing the interview questions to assess their socialized 
knowledge and personal understanding of development (Article 4, Article 5). Yet 
to complete and sharpen the dataset for the last article using the theory of the 
gift, the interviews in Germany also included aspects to ascertain information on 
the dynamics that the donators’ tsunami initiative caused, in their local socio-
political context back home in Baden Württemberg (Article 3). 
The majority of interviews in Sri Lanka were qualitative oriented semi-structured 
or open interviews. Furthermore several informal conversations were afterwards 
transformed into written field notes. Interviews were conducted with the support 
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of a local research assistant as many were held in ‘half English’, ‘half Sinhala’ 
or fully in Sinhala. Parallel to the research assistant who took rough notes that 
were afterwards written up in the form of continuous texts, I took notes on 
the interview setting, of upcoming emotions and of reactions interviewees or 
surrounding observers had on the questions. Later the research assistant and 
I discussed our notes and impressions in order to minimize shortcomings but 
also to efficiently combine both notes. Interviews conducted in English were 
often self-organized and transcribed by me. Only few interviewees agreed being 
recorded on tape, which were later transcribed by the assistant or me, based on 
the language. Besides this free-flow informational exchanges with informants and 
random encounters provided another relevant information source to clarify given 
or countercheck information. As Holstein and Gubrium recognize, “…interviews 
are special forms of conversations…the narratives that are produced may be as 
truncated as forced-choice survey answers or as elaborated as oral life histories, 
but they are all a product of the talk…” (2008: 141). For subsequent analytical 
editing, all conversations were shortly afterwards transformed into written texts/
transcribes to avoid a loss of recollection and failures of interpretation. 
To analyse the data I used a strategy with an open character relating the 
material not to prefixed categories but developing categories parallel to the 
establishment of the theoretical frame and developed research objectives. The 
first round of analysis started with existing data material compiled from former 
work material but also first interviews held in Germany. The second intensive 
round of analysis took place during and after my fieldwork in Sri Lanka. The 
analysis process started with intensive reading and examination of the material 
(documents, interviews, etc) in order to get to know the dataset. However, as 
Hammersley and Atkinson note, analysing data already began during fieldwork in 
Germany and Sri Lanka, as “field notes, journals, and diaries are, in one sense, 
the ‘data’ that are collected; in another sense, they are written up, in ways that 
constitute preliminary analyses and presentations” (1983: 208). Further when 
transcribing interviews I started not only to identify commonalities and patterns 
but also employed theoretical reflexivity challenging the conceptual frame that 
I had outlined based on parallel theoretical readings. The in-depth reading of 
empirical material led to the next step of setting up relevant analysing categories 
for the analysis. After the categorization the dataset became subject to renewed 
reading, now focusing to classify the material and allocate codes aiming to set up 
a synoptical table. This table then helped to deepen the theoretical interpretation 
or guided the re-assessment of theoretical considerations and/or to develop new 
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theoretical entry points. The intensive reading of the material further helped to 
extract relevant interview parts making a good case in emphasizing the arguments 
that were made (cf. Aull Davies 2008; Flick 2007; Schmidt 2007; Silverman 2008). 
The following table provides an overview on research focus and its corresponding 
dataset. It shows that aspects of different research focuses are interlinked 
reverting to the same dataset. The order of publications however does identify the 
intensity of usage of the dataset. Detailed insights on the composition and numbers 
of interviews and empirical material are provided in Annex 3 and Annex 4.
Table 2: Research focus and corresponding dataset
Research Focus Dataset Survey Publication
Period Location
H
um
an
it
ar
ia
n 
m
om
en
t 
of
 g
ift
 g
iv
in
g
Multi-local dynamics  of giving •	8	donator	interviews
•	41	interviews	with	government	officials
•	24	interviews	with	aid	organisations	
•	3	public	AID	office	statements	
•	1	interview	with	government	official
•	Monthly	project	reports
•	9	interviews	with	aid	officials
2010-2011
2009-2011
2009-2011
2008-2011
2009
2005-2007
2008-2010
Germany
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
Germany
Germany
Germany
1
2, 3, 4
Commodification 
of good intentions 
•	Minutes	of	donator	Meetings	
•	Internal	Documents	Ministry	of	
   the Environment 
•	Tri-monthly	project	reports
•	Personal	Diary	Entries
2005-2008
2005-2008
2006-2008
2005-2007
Germany
Germany
Sri Lanka
2
1, 5
Ritual legitimization of the 
gifts’ symbolic violence
•	Documentary	film	on	opening	ceremony 2007 Sri Lanka 3
Lo
ng
-t
er
m
 d
ev
el
op
m
en
t 
of
 t
he
 g
ift
Rationale of governing 
others’ mentality
•	Donators	communication,	official
   communication documents 
   Ministry of the Environment and AID
•	125	interview	with	housing	beneficiaries
•	Village	Community	documents
2005-2008
2009-2011
2010-2011
Sri Lanka
Sri Lanka
4
5, 1, 3
Governmentality of 
good intentions 
•	13	interviews	with	key	informants 2009-2011 Sri Lanka 5
4
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4.3	Reflections
After conducting interviews in Germany some of my former work colleagues raised 
several objections asking critical questions how I would analyse and interpret 
their answers and information, continuously reminding me of confidentiality. 
Several of these colleagues pointed out to set their answers in relation of the 
special characteristics of the housing project and the exceptional situation of post-
tsunami rehabilitation work in general. It seemed that during the interviews my 
counterparts felt secure and confident talking to an old colleague knowing of the 
problems, dilemmas related to the project – perceiving me as ‘insider’. However 
realizing the reality and purpose of the interview I was positioned as ‘outsider’. 
Due to my shifting identity I became what Katz pictured as: “ethnographers are 
displaced persons…” (1994: 68). Turning a former working field into research 
field evokes a constant negotiation of locality and subjectivity within ourselves; 
we feel simultaneously a part of and apart from the field. It is the ambivalence 
and the discomfort, tension and instability of the subjective position that we 
feel and need to work with – it is the fear of not being a ‘good’ researcher and a 
betrayer of professionally established relations. This ambivalence of positionality 
is comparable with Tringh Minh-ha’s description of post-colonial women: 
“Not quite the same, not quite the other, she stands in that undetermined 
threshold place where she constantly drifts in and out. Undercutting the inside/
outside opposition, her intervention is necessarily that of both not quite an insider 
and not quite an outsider. She is, in other words, this inappropriate ‘other’ or 
‘same’ who moves about with always at least two gestures: that of affirming ‘I 
am like you’ while persisting her difference and that of reminding ‘I am different’ 
while unsettling every definition of otherness arrived at” 
(1997: 418 cited in Sultana 2007: 377)
The next section reflects on the dilemma of being caught between two worlds 
and identities during fieldwork. As England reminds us: “the researcher cannot 
conveniently tuck away the personal behind the professional, because fieldwork 
is personal” (1994: 85). During the research project, mainly during personal 
encounters with the researched, I often found myself in emotional and ethical 
dilemmas. I asked myself ‘who am I’ and ‘am I transparent enough to be 
considered an ethical and reflexive researcher’? I had the feeling of misuseing 
well-established relations and everyone’s generosity and willingness to support 
my research that I afterwards would use to write my thesis taking it out of ‘our’ 
common history. I felt how Katz (1994) phrases: “…these field projects all have 
probably been more beneficial to me than to them” (72). 
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4.3.1	Reflections	on	own	positionality
Ethnographic literature discusses the position of the researcher in relation to the 
researched in the binary divide of inside/outside emphasizing its complexity and 
continuous shifts (Kusow 2003; Ergun/Erdemir 2010, Aull Davies 2008; Herod 
1999). Gould alludes: “Positionality refers to the need for finding a serviceable 
and responsible way of situating oneself in ‘the field’, and is a threshold in all 
ethnography…The specific ways in which positionality is problematic naturally 
depends on the nature of one’s site and on the possible points of entry into the 
field” (2004: 271). In my case I did not face a problem with the nature of the 
research site, in contrast I felt very comfortable and confident to conduct research 
in my former work field. Also finding an entry point constituted no difficulty due to 
my ‘field’ history. However I often felt discomfort with the side I represented – ‘Pia 
as researcher’! Intensifying interviews in time and number, gaining more insights 
into the lives and everyday reality of interview partners who were struggling 
under the politics and implementation practices of the project. This increased 
my wish to get back to my old identity as practitioner. Obvious shortcomings and 
false decisions made during project implementation and now causing hardship 
for beneficiaries picked on my personal work ethics. A feeling of guilt evoked the 
desire to correct, to find solutions and to fix them. Re-entering a former working 
field underlines the veracity of what Fine (1993) notes in his article ‘Ten Lies of 
Ethnography: Moral Dilemmas of Field Research’: “Qualitative researchers need to 
be warned about the difficulty, if not the impossibility, of pretending objectivity…
Participant observation often becomes participant intervention: Finding a problem, 
we wish to fix it. Identifying with our informants in loco parentis we wish to take 
their side, to protect them from harm, and make everything right. This human 
reality suggests that qualitative evaluation research…is always ‘contaminated’…by 
the emotions generated in the field“ (Fine 1993: 286-287; emphasis added).
Even though I tried to distance, continuously reflect while re-negotiating and 
re-defining my new positionality, I had little influence on how my counterparts 
dealt with it. In addition to my difficulties drawing the boundary to my former 
identity, interview partners themselves contextualized and defined my new 
positionality. A shared history and common affinities in relations to the aid project 
helped “…to increase the perceived trustworthiness…while also ensuring openness 
on the part of the respondents, thereby facilitating rapport” (Ergun and Erdemir 
2009:18). Yet several interview partners ignored the fact that I did not re-enter 
as AID project officer. They continuously reminded me of AIDs’ responsibility and 
accountability towards the given promises and depicted shortcomings and failures. 
During interviews in Sri Lanka I often noticed that answers were given in a very 
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strategic and tactical way pursuing the aim to get my agreement and promise 
to help them achieve an improvement or change. Besides interview partners 
within the local authority in Sri Lanka clarified my relation to German donators 
and the implementing aid agency finding out ways to fresh financial support 
for the relocation village. I therefore was often requested to help facilitating 
negotiations with AID and donators to continue their participation in the village 
and to correct and improve apparent shortcomings. In contrast I realized with 
German interview partners that they were reserved in giving answers instead 
asking me back question on the research objective, way of data analysis and 
interpretation. I realized what Mosse noted, that “those reading about themselves 
may be intrigued, amused, or pleased; but turning relationships into data, and 
placing interpretations in public, can also disturb and break relationships of 
fieldwork. It may be ‘anti-social’” (2006b: 937). Therefore strategic or tactical 
answers were given to either achieve a certain aim or interests or to hide a more 
complex reality. It becomes thereby obvious that “research in a particular location 
is thus often influenced and constrained by the politics of the place and the overall 
politics of development, which have to be acknowledged and respected in any 
research process” (Sultana 2007: 381).
Personally I felt in an in-between position causing a huge personal disunion. I 
became aware that “…the reliance of fieldwork on our personal relationships also 
places us at risk of vulnerability, exploitation and hurt. Like reciprocity, issues of 
power also have the potential to cut both ways” (Coffey 1999: 41). The dilemma 
was: on the one hand I felt an urgent need to follow the requests, on the other 
hand I feared to risk my good and trustful relation to AID, donators and other 
relevant actors in the field bringing up critique by questioning current project 
decisions. The fear was caused by the awareness, that “any perception of falling 
within one particular camp would compromise the trust needed to research the 
other” (Labaree 2002: 111; cf. Ergun and Erdemir 2010; Kusow 2003). Hence my 
involvement was rather reserved and unofficial. I helped formulating and writing 
letters to donators and AID, facilitated village meetings developing problem-
solving strategies and used established contacts to local experts and officials 
providing professional advice based on the local situation. My efforts to call AIDs’ 
attention to existing problems were not successful and former colleagues at the 
German Headquarter asked me to stop the interference. In an email AID invoked 
on former project reports of two hired local NGOs responsible for current village 
development that most of the problems I enumerate were solved. In addition a 
letter dated September 2012 asserts that AIDs humanitarian involvement already 
overextends the common project duration, indicating German law defining rules 
and regulations for humanitarian assistance. The letter argued that there was no 
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possibility to continue neither financial nor professional support. Even though my 
first reaction to the letter was anger, I also was appreciative of the proceeding and 
practice. The behaviour highlights Mosse’ (2011) reasoning for aid organizations’ 
resistance on internal project ethnographic research: “…one specific reason why 
ethnographic description is threatening. Its field of inquire – events, context, 
informal relations and divergent views – links it to narratives of programme 
failure” (Mosse 2011: 55). And the public’s taken-for-granted assumption that 
aid organizations are doing good does not leave space for admitting shortcomings 
(Barnett and Weiss 2012). However a reality check shows that the most pressing 
problem ‘sufficient and clean drinking water’ is still not solved (November 2013). 
4.2.2 (Co-)construction of knowledge 
As mentioned earlier I conducted interviews in Sri Lanka with the help of two 
research assistants. On the one hand this was necessary based on my rudimentary 
Sinhalese language skills, on the other hand I was aware that working with a well 
informed and well-networked ‘colleague’ would facilitate getting access to relevant 
people, interview partners, documents, and information. For these reasons I 
decided to work with two former work colleagues: one AID colleague and one 
former university colleague. Both had long lasting and well-established networks 
within local authorities and the Sri Lankan aid sector. Further both were familiar 
with my working style and the private donator driven housing project. Related 
to their personal history and different work experience and networks I was able 
to draw on different skills and access possibilities to the field. The former AID 
colleague was now living in Galle district working as director of an international 
development organisation. She obtained excellent knowledge, good rapport and 
broad networks within the local development sector (tsunami and post-tsunami 
time) but also within the local authorities in Galle District. This enabled access 
to many interview partners and key informants. The university colleague on the 
other hand has great experience in working for several international researchers. 
She supported the process of developing, conducting and transcribing interviews 
and the translation of documents (Singhalese to English).
Briefly outlining the relation to my research assistants but also their affiliation to 
the field shows the importance to reflect upon knowledge (co-)construction and 
the genesis of our dataset. Working with research assistants means their history 
and positionality in the field is reflected in the data we collect. They become 
informants playing a key role in facilitating access and guiding the research 
process by their networks and personal understanding of the field. Assistants 
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are not ‘pure’ or ‘neutral’ companions. Even though their understanding and 
knowledge, insight and access to hidden transcripts and stories of the field do 
have the advantage of making fieldwork insightful and profound. Nevertheless 
the researcher has to bear in mind that those translations, information and 
data always contain a great deal of the assistants’ interpretations, reflections, 
subjectivity and positionality. As Aull Davies (2008) commemorates, “…
ethnographers … must remain aware that translation … is far from a theoretically 
neutral activity and that… [translators/assistance] own perspective, both 
professional and personal, will influence their translations” (125, cf. Coffey 1990; 
de Neve 2006; England 1994; Temple 1997; Unnithan-Kumar and de Neve 2006). 
Through continuous discussion on translations, conducted interviews, interview 
situations/setting and transcripts I cross-checked the research assistants’ 
position, opinion, and interpretation on the context and interview partners aiming 
to get to know their judgment of correctness and how far their translations 
and transcripts were influenced by their knowledge. Even though I was able 
to minimize the scale of subjectivity I am aware that to a certain degree “field 
notes…are necessarily partial and reflect the ethnographers’ perceptions” (Aull 
Davies 2008: 256) and in my case that of two research assistants as well. 
4.2.3 Writing of Text 
The mentioned emotional and personal difficulties arising when re-entering the 
field, aggregated while writing. The first set of intensive writing and analysing 
leading to two articles (Article 2, Article 3) started way before re-entering the field 
again in late 2009. The first writing process enabled me not only to intensively 
ground my working experiences in theory but to physically and temporally 
draw a boundary to the field. However an emotional distancing remained 
undone. Analysing and writing the field is re-writing and re-defining memories 
accompanied by a constant struggle to locate and reduce these memories within 
theoretical boundaries. As Coffey (1999) observed, “…qualitative data analysis 
cannot only be thought of in terms of technique and strategy…it is a point of 
emotional involvement and personal investment… at this stage of our research 
… we manipulate, rethink and represent our endeavours, drawing upon our own 
ideas of what the data are saying” (Coffey 1999: 136-138). 
While writing I consciously left out interview parts anticipating disappointment or 
conflicts with the researched if they identify themselves in the text. I was caught 
in the dilemma that Mosse (2011) pointed out for the production of ethnographic 
text: “…Ethnography is unfair or bad evaluation because it does not involve the 
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usual negotiation of an acceptable story that mediates interpretative differences. 
Ethnography draws attention to different points of view and does not involve, or 
require, a drive to consensus” (55). I would argue that even though I was aware 
that in order to conduct reflexive, accountable and ethical research it is necessary 
to share my work with involved actors, interview partners and the researched, my 
subconscious guided me differently avoiding additional personal dilemmas and 
conflicts I faced since the writing process began. Thus the ethnographic self is 
disturbing, selective and partial, subtly influencing decisions during the research 
process.
Yet another shortcoming appeared in the writing of texts – anonymity. As Shutt 
(2006) remarks based on personal experiences in writing internal-ethnography: it 
is “virtually impossible to both give thick contextual descriptions and anonymise 
communities and organisations in practice” (34). I experienced similar difficulties 
obviously not being reflexive and sensitive enough in relation to anonymity. 
As one anonymous article referee pointed out: “If you give the real name and 
location of the village, will it be easy for people to figure out the identities 
of the donors? Much of the tsunami aid information is still available on the 
internet...” (Anonymous Referee Comment, 13.04.2013). Until I received this 
comment I never was really concerned about writing details of the geographical 
location, not realizing the transparency I create. After double-checking on the 
Internet I realized that with the given information in already published articles 
I unconsciously annihilated the personal right of anonymity of my informants. I 
have to admit, that I failed to fully secure the anonymity of involved donators, 
organisations and institutions and was not able to achieve the agreement of 
confidentiality. 
Nevertheless reflecting on these shortcomings and admitting occurring failures I 
believe is the strength of insider ethnographic data that is particularly dependant 
on the formation of tight and close relations and the development of an emotional 
relation to the field and its actors. As Coffey (1999) writes: “ethnographers are 
not outsiders looking in. They have to be reflective insiders, negotiating roles 
and subjectivities, looking out” (57). My empirical data illustrates first-hand and 
exclusive insights into complex socio-political realities, networks and processes 
within organized non-anonymous giving and the everyday reality of doing aid. 
The following chapter will now give a brief introduction to each article highlighting 
its objective and theoretical starting point. It further completes the frame 
document attempting to consolidate the article findings in a comprehensive 
synthesis. 
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5. Composition of Articles and Synthesis 
Five scientific articles, all subject to a double-blind peer-review process, form 
the main part of the PhD thesis. Till this day four articles have been published 
(Development in Practice, Disasters, Journal of Development Studies, Geoforum) 
and one accepted for publication (International Development Planning Review).
The aim of the articles is to comprehensively uncover different aspects and 
consequential effects of what I define as the paradox of good intentions: the 
practical conversion of ‘pure’ development gifts into culturally charged political 
commodities. The thesis hence does not intend to answer the question if aid works 
or not but to expose how it works (Mosse 2004, Korf 2010) through the everyday 
practice of doing aid. The ethnographic insights into the non-anonymous donator 
driven rehabilitation project provide evidence that even though actors rhetorically 
distance themselves from mundane practices of development aid (or humanitarian 
aid, as it were), they become part of exactly that system of organized gift 
giving that is guided and dominated by self-interest and power. The articles 
therefore write out the hidden mechanisms of the development gift and “how aid 
intermingles with multi-local gift economies and local political economies” (Korf 
2010: vi) transforming good intentions into socio-political interests. 
5.1 Articles
The first set of articles, comprising of one single authored and two co-authored 
articles, focuses on the humanitarian moment of transnational solidarity 
expressed in the form of ‘pure’ gifts. My analysis building on Marcel Mauss’ theory 
of the gift (see chapter 2) shows that the donators’ active participation influences 
and changes practices, politics and power networks in the humanitarian aid chain 
at different localities, creating dynamics that reinforce the prevailing modes of 
social hierarchy as well as serving donators’ self-interest of social recognition and 
honour (Article 1). It further revealed how these influencing factors provoke a 
process of commodification whereby pure and good intentions get contaminated 
through the politics of patronage and international aid (Article 2). Furthermore 
the research asserts that rituals and ceremonies around the gift and the 
direct encounter between those who give and those who receive visualize the 
perpetuating socio-economic asymmetries and existing power relations executed 
through gentle forms of violence (Article 3).
The second set of articles, consisting of one single and one co-authored article, 
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shifts the focus towards analysing the transformation of the ‘pure’ gift into long-
term visions of development. In relation to Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
(see chapter 2) one article illustrates how donators’ visions, logic and socially 
informed knowledge on the one hand influences the projects objective, and while 
on the other hand establishes the basis for actual practices and technologies of 
doing aid (Article 4). The last article in addition uncovers how donators’ initial 
‘pure’ and good intentions transfers into a will to improve the unpacking of 
private non-anonymous donators’ powerful role, in giving meaning to sustainable 
development and village improvement in the context of post-tsunami housing in 
Sri Lanka (Article 5). For article three and five I joined Dr Kanchana Ruwanpura 
in bringing together our separate empirical case material on post tsunami donator 
driven housing project. The two cases complemented each other nicely as Dr 
Ruwanpura’s case study highlights that donators with Sri Lankan origin coming 
from Colombo middle class inhabit the same habitus of giving and the intention 
to govern the lives of others towards their socio-economic standard as is the case 
of international donators. In bringing both cases together it becomes clear, that 
the consequences of development gifts and the paradox of good intentions is 
not a matter of culturally different understanding of giving but a problem of the 
structures and processes of the gift. 
Before outlining the articles in more detail, the following list will provide an 
overview presenting my contribution to each co-authored article:
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Dynamics of multi-local gifts: practices of humanitarian giving in 
post tsunami Sri Lanka
In Development in Practice, 2013, 23(3), 319-331
Hollenbach Article 100
The gift of disaster: the commodification of good intentions in 
post-tsunami Sri Lanka
In Disasters, 2010, 34(1), 60-77
 
Korf, 
Hollenbach
Klem
Hasbullah
•	Writing	one	empirical	case	out	of	three
•	Assisting	in	writing	out	theoretical	entry	
   points and conclusion 
25
Symbolic Gestures: The Development Terrain of Post- Tsunami 
Villages in (Southern) Sri Lanka
In Journal of Development Studies, 2011, 47(9), 1299-1314
Hollenbach
Ruwanpura
•	Developing	and	writing	out	theoretical
   concept and overall article guideline 
•	Writing	analysis	and	conclusion
•	Guiding	joint	writing	process
•	Empirical	cases
70
Lo
ng
-t
er
m
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el
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he
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ift
Seeing like a donator: guiding communities into better lives in 
the aftermath of the Indian-Ocean tsunami
In International Development Planning Review, 
accepted 2013
Hollenbach Article 100
From compassion to the will to improve: Elision of scripts? 
Philanthropy in post-tsunami Sri Lanka
In GEOFORUM, 2014, 51(1), 243-251
 
Ruwanpura 
Hollenbach
•	Developing	and	writing	out	
   theoretical concept
•	Writing	out	the	conclusion
•	Working	up	one	empirical	case	study
   out of two
•	Assisting	the	journal	review	process	
40
Table 3: Articles and PhD authors’ contribution
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Article 1
Hollenbach, P. (2013) Dynamics of multi-local gifts: practices of humanitarian 
living in post tsunami Sri Lanka. In Development in Practice, 23 (3), 319-331
This article takes up the issue of the paradoxical combination of interestedness 
and disinterestedness and the three-fold sequence of obligation (to give, to 
accept, and render) highlighting its effects and influences at different localities 
of the gift. The paradox of the transnational development gift thereby emerges 
from the gap that arises between the presented ideals of private non-anonymous 
altruistic gifts, within the donators’ home arena, and the actual practices of 
delivering the gift in the receiving arena. Donators present their gift within their 
socio-political arena in Germany as “…freed from the ‘total social phenomena’ 
in which economic and social motives are inseparable” (Hollenbach 2013: 322; 
cf. Mauss) claiming not to ascribe any expectations or personal, economic, and 
political interests to the gift. These highly moral presentations create pressure 
that continuously urges donators’ to uphold and present the narrated ‘purity’ 
towards different audiences in different localities. The paper however illustrates 
that as soon as the gift enters the process of brokered aid delivery the ideals, 
good intentions and purity became subordinate to self-interests and demands of 
reciprocity. In line with Bourdieu (1998) it is argued that “without doubt the social 
universe within which disinterestedness is the official norm are not necessarily 
governed throughout by disinterestedness: behind the appearance of piety, 
virtue, disinterestedness, there are subtle, camouflaged interests” (87). Good 
intentions to alleviate the suffering of tsunami affected people get pushed aside 
through donators’ interest of not losing social, political and personal reputation 
in Germany but also to increase their social capital through official honour and 
acknowledgment. The changing interests resulting in pressure to show visible 
success were carried over into the implementation process in Sri Lanka. Brokers 
and mediators of the gift in Sri Lanka were obliged to generate fast success 
thereby applying development practices related to patronage, favouritism, power 
and politics. And even more, actors in the receiving arena were left with a debt 
not only to continue to uphold the discourse of the pure gift, but to demonstrate 
their thankfulness and gratitude. In order to accomplish visible and successful 
outputs everyone complied with the rules and logics of give and take but as the 
case study also illustrates, everyone utilised the gift to fulfil their own purposes. 
The paradox here becomes obvious: in order to produce success, to achieve set 
expectations and promises of a gift enclosed in a space of purity, anti-politics, and 
non-economics, one has to apply the mundane practices of tit for tat, of give and 
take that constitute the economy of aid. 
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Article 2
Korf, B.; Hasbullah, S.; Hollenbach, P.; Klem, B. (2010) The gift of disaster: the 
commodification of good intentions in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. In Disasters, 34(1), 
60-77
This paper analyses the process of commodification of post-tsunami aid in Sri 
Lanka through three unrelated and geographically separated empirical case 
studies. The cases explore the intricate chain of relations, obligations, and 
expectations pertinent in the co-evolving, but often contradictory gift rationales 
that permeated the practices, performances, and discourses of tsunami aid. 
The paper uncovers that development gifts are not just material transfers of 
‘aid’ but also embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, and political 
affiliation. Furthermore each developed biography of the gift discloses that the 
process of contamination of good intentions is mainly driven by the three-fold 
obligation to give, to accept and to return that Mauss identified in relation to 
gift processes in archaic communities. Development gifts therefore have to be 
seen in a system of exchange, and discourses of purity and disinterestedness are 
rhetoric supporting measures to raise financial support and/or social capital for 
those who give. In addition the three empirical cases uncover that gifts reinforced 
and reshuffled loyalties, group boundaries, and socio-political networks on 
different scales influenced by a strong entanglement in local politics of patronage 
and international gift economy. The analysis points out that beyond dominant 
rationales of ethnic or political party patronage, gifts by disingenuous patrons 
not only became patrimonial, but that the patrimonial rationale emerged as much 
from above as from below. This dynamic became nearly inescapable and self-
reinforcing highlighting that gifts bind people together in a system of exchange 
with clearly defined rules, regulations and mutual expectations. 
Therefore, the idea and rhetoric of the ‘pure’ tsunami gift – to enclose aid in 
a space of ‘anti’-politics – was surely naïve in a society shaped by patronage 
rationale but also an important part of the game of international aid. In 
consequence the antagonistic discourses and the seemingly inescapability of 
patrimonial rationales reinforced social asymmetries along political and ethnic 
lines but also contributed to social conflicts and political discontent on different 
levels of the society.
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Article 3
Hollenbach, P. and Ruwanpura, K. (2011) Symbolic Gestures: The Development 
Terrain of Post- Tsunami Villages in (Southern) Sri Lanka. In Journal of 
Development Studies, 47 (9), 1299-1314
This article accesses for its analysis two examples of private non-anonymous 
post-tsunami housing projects, one locally the other internationally initiated. 
The paper highlights that “…there is no such thing as a ‘free gift’ …and giving 
binds people together, it creates individual and social ties; it is motivated by the 
nature of human relationships” (Hollenbach and Ruwanpura 2011: 12). Donators’ 
non-anonymous involvement in project implementation processes establishes a 
clearly defined gift exchange and in Mauss’ understanding creates the three-fold 
obligation to give, to accept and to reciprocate. However, as the two empirical 
cases illustrate, giver and receiver develop what Bourdieu (1990) defines as the 
‘feel for the game’. This feel in the context of organized giving implies that both 
actors – giver and receiver - know what is expected and how to comply with the 
rules and regulations of the game. One of these rules taken up by the article is 
the legitimization and localization of the development gift through local culturally 
adapted rituals and ceremonies. 
Here the article shows, that even though these rituals are portrayed as aspects of 
Sri Lankan life the direct involvement of donators transformed these rituals into 
a process that reproduces and deepens class structures and positioning of power. 
For donators and brokers of the gift these ceremonies often become practices to 
convey habitus of power through symbols of domination and even gentle violence 
(Bourdieu 1990). On the side of beneficiaries these occasions provide a stage to 
fulfil their obligation to reciprocate the tsunami gift, as they were able to show 
their thankfulness and gratitude towards the donators. For Bourdieu (1977: 196) 
an acceptance of these practices results in symbolic violence. He suggests that 
symbolic violence works through the ‘transfiguration of relations of domination 
and submission into affective relations, the transfiguration of power into charisma 
or into the charm suited to evoke affective enchantment’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 
102). But the transformation can only work if all actors within the social field 
do understand the rules of the game thereby accepting practices appearing as 
legitimate and even be taken for granted in the disenchanted economy of ‘‘naked 
self-interest’’ (Bourdieu 1990: 196). The paper therefore shows, that donators 
and receivers collaborate, knowingly and unknowingly, in a work of dissimulation 
tending to deny the truth of gift exchange. This in addition shows the subtle and 
cowardly form violence symbolically takes and how hard it becomes to escape this 
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logic. To escape, people would need to reflect on their habitus, change both the 
‘nature’ of their embodied thinking and their acting (dispositions). The article finds 
that even where the ‘beneficiaries’ play the game creatively and skilfully, political 
economic realities of international organized gift giving keeps the beneficiaries in 
place.
The article concludes, that it is not that the recipients lack the capacity to confront 
their predicament and be deliberately ambivalent in their gratitude. The empirical 
cases rather highlight that they are aware of and use their capacity to subtly and 
creatively counteract the domination by NGOs and philanthropists, yet this in 
itself does not transform social structures and power bases. A change in the social 
relation of the development gift would require all social agents – giver, receiver 
and brokers along the aid chain - to accept each other’s intrusion into their field 
and transform their dispositions. 
Article 4
Hollenbach, P. (forthcoming) 
Seeing like a donator: guiding communities into better lives in the aftermath 
of the Indian-Ocean tsunami. In International Development Planning Review 
(accepted 2013)
This article aims to uncover the logic and socialized knowledge on which donators 
base their visions of ‘improved’ village life and how they attempted to shape the 
conduct of beneficiaries, governing their mentality through humanitarian aid and 
its technicalities. Relating the analysis to Foucault’s concept of governmentality 
the article writes out “…the rationalities of rule, the forms of knowledge and 
expertise …and the specific and contingent assemblages of practices, materials, 
agents and techniques through which … rationalities operate to produce 
governable subjects” (Hart, 2004: 92). 
The empirical case illustrates that donators’ benevolent and generous act of 
giving, of building back better, did on the one hand mean to provide technically 
solid and spacious houses and a more modern design of the village layout, from 
the donators’ personal experience. On the other hand the vision of setting people 
on a better path of development was defined on a larger scale: it meant to create 
new political subjects, new citizens that, in a way, would transgress the limited 
bounds of the mundane, dirty party politics as practiced in Sri Lanka. The vision 
was to ‘conduct the conduct’ of beneficiaries in order to implant peace into local 
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communities as an antipode to the ethnicized antagonisms prevailing in Sri Lanka 
at the time of planning the project, and even today. In this sense, the project 
clearly was designed as a model to govern mentalities – the mentalities of disaster 
victims to make them active political subjects managing their “own community” 
and starting to participate in state politics. Relating to James Scott’s work Seeing 
like a state the post-tsunami relocation scheme can therefore be understood as a 
miniature-modernizing project (certainly on much smaller scale) however with the 
same aim “…to create … microenvironments of apparent order as model villages” 
(Scott 1998: 225).
However the analysis of the data shows that the intention to create an apparent 
order was not fully successful: only parts of the houses are permanently occupied, 
the political life of the village is far from the ideals the donators elaborated in the 
village constitution and considerable frustration is abound among those recipients 
who accepted to settle in the village. But as Li (2005) suggests, that by looking 
“beyond ... failed schemes” it becomes evident that project participants find new 
practices and compromises “to fill the gap between project plans and on-the-
ground realities” (Li, 2005, 391). Therefore improvement schemes such as the 
German tsunami-gift produce new forms of local knowledge and practices, they 
change and influence ‘the conduct of conduct’ but not necessarily in the way as 
laid down and envisioned by the donators but as it is newly interpreted by its 
recipients (Li 2005; Li 1999; Lewis and Mosse 2006). Moreover the case study 
shows what the majority of donator-driven aid projects forgot that “…the most 
important fact about social engineering: its efficiency depends on the response 
and cooperation of real human subjects” (Scott, 1998, 225). The paper therefore 
concludes that attempts to build back better in the sense of producing governable 
subjects through development aid (or humanitarian aid, as it were), is a source of 
power replicating existing asymmetries and deficiencies in international organized 
aid.
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Article 5
Ruwanpura, K. and Hollenbach, P. (2014) From compassion to the will to improve: 
Elision of scripts? Philanthropy in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. GEOFORUM, 2014, 
51(1), 243-251
This paper analyses two privately initiated non-anonymous aid initiatives already 
discussed and introduced in article three. In this article the emphasis is on 
illustrating the logics of compassion and how these logics are critical to set up gift 
exchanges and to generate aid and financial support in post-tsunami Sri Lanka. 
The two case studies demonstrate how during the construction of post-tsunami 
housing schemes and at which point of the gift giving process “...the initial 
compassionate impetus shifted to a will to improve the life of villagers over time” 
(Ruwanpura and Hollenbach 2013: 2). Thereby donators slip from rhetoric of 
compassion into rhetoric of governing, opening the possibility to draw the analysis 
to Foucault’s concept of governmentality. Even though donators act upon best 
intentions and generosity the case studies show what Li notes: ‘‘the objective of 
trusteeship is not to dominate others-it is to enhance their capacity for action, and 
to direct it… Their methods are subtle... They structure a field of possible actions’’ 
(2007: 5). 
Furthermore the analysis exposes that village planning in this context continues 
to be governed by principles of modernization and private donators thereby 
perpetuating hegemonic and nationalist visions of model villages. In doing so 
the paper examines the manner in which donators’ actions are also about subtly 
shifting social relations favourable to neo-liberal incursions into local village life, 
which also bear upon nationalist politics. We show that private donators define 
and envisage post-tsunami ‘better life’ without proper and continuous consultation 
of local knowledge or the gift recipients. This illustrates their increasing role in 
development interventions. Therefore it is important to not only see the state 
(Jeffrey 2007) but to see the non-state (private donators, philanthropists) and 
appreciate its entanglements, intercessions, gentle violence and culpability in the 
social life of post-disaster rehabilitation. The two cases show how socio-political 
well-established private donators use their personal and political connections with 
politicians and high high-profile bureaucrats to outwit state/non-state procedures 
so as to achieve their development vision. Even though the absence of the state 
in these instances may not necessarily lead to ‘‘anarchy, poverty and despair’’ (Li 
2007: 280), but rather results in non-state agencies stepping up their role without 
much scrutiny. The concern then is that social hierarchies are reinforced despite 
the mobilization of localism, culture, responsibility and sustainability with a 
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seeming concern for social justice. Such rhetoric deflects attention from grounded 
political-economic relations, where producing responsible villagers depoliticizes 
their existing subjectivities and neglects prevailing social relations at the village 
level.
Therefore the paper comes to the conclusion that the interpellation of religious 
and moral moves during disasters to assist the affected others are compassionate 
gesticulations, but when taken to the scale of willing communities to improve, 
such schemes expose an underbelly that gives prominence to political economy 
matters. Donators refer ‘better life’ only to their own frames of reference thereby 
instilling an ethos of improvement into Sri Lankan village life resulting in an 
inadvertent obtrusion of donators’ moral imperatives disciplining and guiding 
aid recipients into their predefined will. The moral of the story remains thus: 
Compassion ultimately does not rid social relations of material inequality and class 
discrepancies. These can only be addressed through redistributive social justice.
5.2 Synthesis
Mauss concluded in his “Essay on the gift” (1990) that even though gift processes 
become more and more dispossessed by the primacy of utilitarian market 
economic behaviour in the context of modern societies, they nevertheless remain 
operative in many aspects of ‘modern’ life. He continues that the separation 
of ‘economy’ and ‘gift’ is only a modern conception not withstanding the day-
to-day organization of human civilization arguing that life continues to be “…
steeped in the atmosphere of the gift, mixing interest and disinterest, freedom 
and constraint, persons and things” (Silber 1998: 136). Till today it seems Mauss’ 
visions prove true. Human relations– personal, political and even economical 
within the close social environment but also far beyond are still formed and 
reinforced through gifts. Especially the continuously increasing growth of 
organized gift giving, institutionalized in multi- and bilateral, state and non-state, 
public and private humanitarian and development agencies that are testifying that 
individuals, countries and states are transnationally related through processes of 
gift giving. 
Yet the current PhD articles highlight some major problems of the sector: the 
aspersion of the Maussian gift. It does so for not only the very specific case of 
non-anonymous giving, but since a majority of actors and brokers working within 
the global gift economy consistently present their gifts as ‘pure’ and altruistic; a 
gift freed from any obligations and reciprocity. The analysis uncovers that these 
performances and demonstrations are purposeful and intentional. The logics of 
Pa r t  1  |  8 9
compassion, purity and disinterestedness are critical at the beginning in order 
to set up transnational gift exchanges and further to convince a broad public 
to materially and financially support predefined visions of development and 
‘betterment’ for those suffering, in the given case of post-disaster devastation. 
The problem here is, that development agencies hide the true workings of 
exchange and the business of doing aid behind a benevolent and altruistic self, 
covering hegemonic objectives, self-interests and struggles for power within a 
highly competitive market. As Van Uffold and Giri (2003) remark, “development 
organisations present an image that they are for the people but in reality they 
are interested in their own survival and success” (270). However the articles 
also reveal that within the system of development gifts, actors along the aid 
chain and in different localities knowingly enter into the gift exchange with 
clear expectations and self-interest. As Bourdieu (1997) notes: “no one is really 
unaware of the logic of exchange … but no one fails to comply with the rule of 
the game which is to act as if one did not know the rule” (232). It is therefore 
omnipresent that development gifts work on the basis of what Mauss defined 
as the three-fold sequence of obligations (to give, to accept, and to render) and 
has to be seen in a system of exchange and market economy. The empirical case 
exposes that it is not the technical but the political that is at work when gifts are 
transferred into everyday practice of doing aid. In relations to Mauss’ analytical 
findings on gifts in archaic societies, the fundamental mechanisms influencing the 
organized system of development gift exchange are consequently: self-interest, 
compulsion and politics – personal, economic, social, and institutional. 
So what can we learn from these observations and findings? In my opinion the 
ethnographic insights into the private non-anonymous gift in post-tsunami aid 
in Sri Lanka, being exemplary for the organized sector of development gifts, 
clearly illustrates that the development and humanitarian sector needs to be 
self-reflexive and transparent about the hidden workings of the Maussian gift 
within the everyday practices of doing aid. “The problem with the practice of 
development…” write Giri and Van Uffold (2003), “…in the last fifty years has been 
an agenda of hegemonic application of a priori formulations in which the objects 
of development do not have much say in defining and shaping the contours of 
their development” (254). Even though aid agencies promote partnerships and 
participation, talk of ownership and empowerment, the case study shows that it is 
predominantly the mentality of donators, aid brokers and aid agencies that govern 
the implementation and gift giving processes applying technologies based on their 
professional expertise, personal experiences, socialized knowledge and technical 
repertoire. As Bastian (2005) writes “…this ownership and participation is on the 
basis of fundamental ideas and decisions brought from outside” (22). Through 
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combining Mauss’ gift theory with Foucaults’ concept of governmentality the 
thesis clearly shows that the ethical discourses around the gift slip into a will to 
improve. This slippage and the governmentality of the gift needs to be openly and 
transparently negotiated in order to place policy models within the social context 
of the political economy of gift exchange. The analysis of the thesis highlights, 
that it is important to understand both socio-political ends of the development gift 
but also social, economic and political processes and the logics of actors along the 
aid chain in order to change the everyday reality of practicing aid on the ground. 
Policy therefore needs to become the cause of practice rather then the end of it. 
However even though it is evident that the day-to-day reality of doing aid is 
defined and even more important dependent on the social relationship between 
giver and receiver, the sector on the one hand ignores “the social logic of gift 
economy and patrimonialism” (Korf 2010: iv), and also does widely underestimate 
and ignore immediate local initiatives of self-organized help to overcome disaster 
induced as well as structural suffering. It is the generalisation, the homogenisation 
of socio-political and economic diversity and definition of problems linked to 
already known technical solutions that are dominant in the sector  (Bastian 2005; 
Barnett and Weiss 2008; Giri and Van Uffold 2003; Li 2007). Practitioners and the 
humanitarian sector write Hoffman and Weiss (2008) “…are learning disabled – 
they do not possess the capabilities of cultural inclination to process information, 
correct errors, and devise alternative strategies and tactics” (283). They are 
trained to act and get involved if an emergency situation occurs. Questions on 
ethics, power and politics are thereby tied to the mechanics of the humanitarian 
action such as ‘code of conduct’, ‘best practices’ and the performance or outreach 
of their involvement. However these generalised technologies and policies, 
reminds Bastian (2005), “are unable to capture the specificities of [any] society” 
(22). It is therefore advisable that researchers and practitioners join up their 
experiences in order to reflect and to understand the politics and social logics of 
the organized gift economy of international aid or as Hoffman and Weiss (2008) 
notice the importance to “…reflect more deeply on why they are doing what they 
are doing” (284). In practices this means, that researchers and practitioners 
become equal partners in developing country and disaster specific policy models 
when it is needed. Researchers have the advantage to step out of the situation 
and distance themselves of the logics of giving of which practitioners hardly can 
escape or often do not realize their entrapment within the system and logic of gift 
giving. Even so humanitarian and development aid organisations follow certain 
timely rules and regulations, it is important to allocate decent time for planning, 
coordination and exchange arriving on the ground and starting practicing aid. 
Even so it seems unimaginable, especially in emergency situations, each aid 
situation provides a time window to sufficiently negotiate and to get to know the 
ground reality – politics, economics, networks, actors – upon which the long-
term strategy and aid objectives can be formulated and worked out. The most 
important matter here is to involve local partners – practitioners and researchers 
– as they provide an in depth view and analysis on these important facts and 
findings and can help to guide the process of developing an applied policy frame. 
The recommendation then would be that the sector of global institutionalized gift 
giving develops an attitude of mutual learning or in Giri and Van Ufford terms, 
“acknowledged dependence” (273). In this understanding, actors within the 
development gift economy at both ends and along the aid chain “…acknowledge 
the significance of the four agents of development – state, market, voluntary 
organisations/social movements, and the self – but not to grant absolute primacy 
to any” (ibid 273). In doing so it becomes important to understand the socio-
political complexity of doing aid and the logic of the gift economy in each specific 
location. Aid practitioners arriving in countries in the aftermath of disasters need 
to reflect on involved interests and learn about what Korf characterizes as “the 
political economy of ‘the situation’” (2010: iv). For this reason it is inalienable 
to start collaborations with scholars and local aid agencies in order to gain local 
knowledge of socio-political networks, their intermingling with multi-local gift 
economies and in addition get to know existing evaluations on actual needs and 
demands. Even so aid workers and researchers seem to have different objectives, 
at the core both have the intention to improve the achievements and outreach 
of the humanitarian sector or differently expressed both have the intention 
to sustainably improve the lives of those receiving aid. Therefore researchers 
and practitioners have to become partners in order to “…grasp the social and 
political processes through which aid policy is made and transformed in practice, 
… [researchers]…have to negotiate space for their involvement to be more 
ethnographic and resist institutional pressure to conform to dominant policy-
driven or economics-based knowledge systems” (Mosse 2007:941). Furthermore 
common research project should be set up reflecting on questions of the gift 
dynamic within the aid ‘industry’ and how institutional politics and sector reforms 
can be aligned in order to achieve the overall aim to frame existing problems of 
rehabilitation and relief not only using a language of development technologies 
but to uncover the political ecology of established gift relations and adjust 
practices accordingly. 
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Abstract
This paper explores the paradox of gift giving in privately initiated forms of post-
disaster aid. The paradox emerges from the gap that arises between ideals of 
the altruistic gift, and its practices in the actual implementation in a complex 
and multi-local humanitarian aid arena. An ethnographic study of a privately 
initiated post-tsunami housing project illustrates the paradox. While initiators 
presented the project as opposite to the mundane world of development aid, they 
increasingly came under pressure to deliver and perform visible success, such 
that their practices resembled this mundane world of humanitarian aid and its 
logics of patronage, favouritism, and politics.
Keywords: 
Aid; Civil Society – Partnership; Conflict and reconstruction; South Asia
Introduction
“When we saw the destruction and suffering of the people after the tsunami, from 
the very first second it was clear: we were going to help.” (Donator, Germany)1
Since Henry Dunant’s Red Cross initiative of 1862, the world has seen the 
emergence of international humanitarian aid agencies reorganising the social 
practice of giving with new institutional structures and rules. The nature of the 
gift thereby undergoes change through what we can call the “geography of gifts” 
(Korf et al. 2010): gifts are now linking people beyond group boundaries and even 
1 Donator is used to indicate private persons giving donations to aid and development organisations.  
   Donor stands for official development institutions like government, semi-official foundations or aid  
   organisations.
Pa r t  2  |  1 1 1
beyond their known social space. But while gifts move from donator to recipient, 
located in different societies and social contexts, they change their character from 
being an altruistic act to becoming a commodity in a complex aid economy. 
This paper explores the paradox of gift giving in privately initiated forms of post-
disaster aid, whereby a paradox emerges from the gap that arises between ideals 
of an altruistic gift and the mundane practices of aid delivery in humanitarian 
contexts. This paper examines this paradox through an ethnographic study of 
a housing relocation project in Sri Lanka that private donators from Germany 
initiated in the aftermath of the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. The initiators and 
brokers of the gift positioned their gift as altruistic (or pure), as opposed to the 
mundane world of development aid.2 But this claim of delivering another, a purer 
gift brought the same brokers under pressure to deliver visible success. In doing 
so, their practices more and more resembled the mundane world of humanitarian 
aid and its often-described logics of patronage, favouritism, and politics.
The case study is situated within the very specific conditions of gift giving after 
the 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami. In this particular case, global media broadcasting 
brought real-time coverage from the disaster zone in unprecedented intensities 
making the tsunami “everybody’s disaster” (Fernando and Hilhorst 2006, 294). 
The vast reach of the tsunami, and the fact that several countries hit were well-
known tourist destinations, resulted in an unprecedented scale of generous 
public response and private donations (US$14 billion internationally).3 A specific 
feature of this aid response was that it generated new modes of humanitarian 
gifts, with direct involvement of private and non-professional aid initiatives. In 
some cases donators abandoned their anonymous position and became active 
partners in negotiation, implementation, and decision-making of their projects, 
influencing practices and politics of humanitarian assistance. This created specific, 
often problematic dynamics of gift giving that this paper will describe. This paper 
discusses a privately initiated gift that donators intended as a pure, efficient, and
direct gift to affected people without strings or conditions attached; the opposite 
of common development gifts. As one donor states, “The money we collect 
is given one-to-one for those in need ...not like professional organisations 
who have excessive additional costs... we just want to help, we have no other 
2 The project initiators are called brokers or key brokers (mediators of ideas and translators between     
   different arenas), as they mediated their idea of EcoVillage to numerous donators in Germany and to  
   the political and bureaucratic level in Germany and Sri Lanka (see Mosse and Lewis 2006).
3 Numbers compiled by UN OCHA 2010 (available at http://fts.unocha.org/pageloader.         
   aspx?page=home). For comparison: World Bank estimated in 2005 the amount of tsunami aid to be  
   US$5 billion. 
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long-term agenda” (8, 102008, DA).4 The aim of this paper is to present the 
everyday practices and negotiations around the gift, mediated through a German 
humanitarian aid organisation, to illustrate the new modes of individualised and 
privatised humanitarian gifts that emerged after the tsunami, and make “the ways 
in which humanitarian aid is delivered... increasingly complicated” (Fernando and 
Hilhorst 2006, 293). I will explain how different “gift arenas” emerged at different 
geographical locations, producing a plurality of negotiations and a multi-layered 
complexity of relationships that shaped and conditioned the social practices of the 
involved actors. By following the chain of humanitarian giving, the study shows 
how donators, aid workers, local bureaucrats, and recipients had to
fill various roles while performing to different audiences in order to juggle multiple 
rationales and expectations that were often disconnected from each other. I 
suggest that in order to understand the dynamics of the aid arena in the recipient 
country, we first need to analyse the dynamics of the gift arena in the donor 
country and various sub-arenas that emerge in the chain of humanitarian giving.
This research is positioned within the framework of an “ethnography of aid” 
(Gould and Marcussen 2004; Mosse 2005), which studies humanitarian aid 
as social practice. Many of those who write in the field of ethnography of aid 
are practitioners-scholars, i.e. they have worked in various capacities in the 
development sector. The same applies to me: I have worked for three years 
(2005–07) at the implementing NGO in Sri Lanka and was responsible for 
managing the privately initiated housing project discussed in this paper. During 
my assignment I was a practitioner, an observer, and an active participant 
in stakeholder meetings and discussions with donators, local bureaucrats, 
local politicians, and recipients. For reporting reasons, I took notes and wrote 
reports, which form part of my empirical data. After my assignment, I started 
to work as an academic researcher conducting additional research outside of my 
former institutional affiliation. During 2008–10 I conducted several interviews 
and discussions with the three initiators in German, gaining access to internal 
documents like minutes of donators meetings, official letters to German and Sri 
Lankan ministries, and internal communication among the stakeholders. I also 
carried out semi-structured interviews with seven key informant like former 
colleagues, the former and current director of the aid agency, and two external 
consultants working for the project. Re-visiting Sri Lanka in 2009/2010 and 2011 
I was supported by two local research assistants in conducting 38 individual and 
five group semi-structured interviews with housing recipients aiming to follow up 
4 The referencing note exists of the following information: (line in transcript, Month Year, acronym of 
   interviewee).
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their everyday life, current problems, and their involvement in the project. More 
information was gathered in interviews with 11 local bureaucrats and politicians, 
and four interviews with staff members of the local implementing NGOs to trace 
former and current developments and views on the housing project. The paper 
proceeds as follows: after discussing the concept of the gift, its incorporation into
the study of development, and the analytic distinction between “pure gift” and the 
“gift of the development industry”, I describe the original motivation for the gift 
and its translation into a housing relocation project in Sri Lanka. I will describe 
the dynamics between raising expectations among donators in Germany and how 
these influenced, conditioned, and shaped the practices and negotiations within 
the aid arena in Sri Lanka. The paper thus exposes the paradox of this privately 
initiated pure gift: in order to uphold the idea of a pure gift within the donators’ 
home arena in Germany, the project/gift became subject to logics and practices of
patronage, favouritism, and politics – the mundane world of the development 
industry – from which donators originally wanted to detach and distance 
themselves and their gift-giving practices.
Gifts in humanitarian aid
In his landmark study The Gift Relationship. From Human Blood to Social Practice 
(1970), Tittmus was among the first to suggest that today’s generosity toward 
unknown deserving others is an act of altruism based on spontaneity, free will, 
and voluntariness and is specifically intended to enhance their well-being. His 
study refers to anonymous acts of giving where “donors give to an impersonal 
organisation” (Silk 2004, 232) without expectations or personal, economic, 
and political interests. It is a pure gift, freed from the “total social phenomena” 
in which economic and social motives are inseparable (Mauss 1990, 3). Aid 
organisations present themselves to the public as producers of such pure gifts.
However, studies on the gift in the development industry highlight that best-
intended unconditional donations change “the biography of the gift” (Stirrat and 
Henkel 1997, 68; Korf 2007; Korf et al. 2010; Hollenbach and Ruwanpura 2011) 
as soon as they enter the domain of humanitarian aid. These studies point out 
that actors never act as “free-standing but rather as relational individuals whose 
behaviour is part of a specific socio-political context” (Silk 2004, 232). Therefore 
the gift changes its properties from the pure, disinterested gift, to an interest-
laden exchange, of the kind that makes up the mundane world of the development 
industry: “Aid becomes a culturally charged, political commodity” (Korf et al. 
2010, 61), highly contested through conditions, expectations, pre-determined 
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outputs, and rules. The analysis is informed by Bourdieu’s writings on the gift as 
logic of practice defining, the quality of the gift as being both free and obligatory, 
generated by the habitus of generosity. This habitus, a set of internalised norms, 
governs the agents by something that lies beyond their freedom: “preperceptive
anticipations, a sort of practical induction based on previous experiences, are not
given to a pure subject... they are the fact of the habitus as a feel for the game” 
(Bourdieu 1998, 80). Agents endowed with the habitus of generosity are therefore 
implicitly aware of the social rule of generous action: the denial of egoistic and 
interested calculations. Bourdieu, however, notes that 
“without doubt the social universe within which disinterestedness is the 
official norm are not necessarily governed throughout by disinterestedness: 
behind the appearance of piety, virtue, disinterestedness, there are subtle, 
camouflaged interests.” (1998, 87) 
Therefore actors, who are socialised in a world in which gift exchange is 
institutionalised and professionally brokered, are implicitly aware of the rules of 
giving and also acknowledge the very logic of exchange: a system of rewards, 
recognition, and profit (symbolic and/or economic). Such gifts of development 
aid presented as aid projects therefore re-enforce asymmetry and domination 
and demonstrate social, political, and symbolic power demanding obligations 
and reciprocity, while leaving beneficiaries with a social debt (Bastian 2005; 
Hollenbach and Ruwanpura 2011; Korf 2007; Korf et al. 2010). Thus the 
ambiguity of gifts rests upon the interplay between subjective disinterestedness 
and objective interest, generating the paradox of perception and practice.
To analyse this interplay the paper focuses on the increasing phenomenon of 
private gifts that transpire from donators to aid agencies, with emphasis on 
brokerage and mediation. It is argued that even though private donators may 
practice gift giving with good intentions and present their generosity within 
their home country as opposed to the mundane practices of aid, their gener 
osity triggers dynamics and negotiations around the gift that influence how 
aid is implemented and practiced in the recipient country. It was Marcel Mauss 
who wrote that in archaic societies, “gifts are presented in rituals looking to be 
spontaneous, voluntary and altruistic, but in general the gestures accompanying 
the act of giving are fiction, formalism and social lies covering the truth of the gift: 
compulsion and interests” (2005, 63). Similar logics continue in aid arenas that
are opened up by private and non-anonymous giving to humanitarian agencies. 
As Korf (2007, 370) explains it, “donating... appears to be manageable, but 
practising aid as an encounter is more difficult because it involves the activation of 
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a relationship between self and other, between donor and receiver...”.
Case study: private gift giving after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami
The case study, which I will present shortly, traces the ambivalence of gift giving, 
the tension between the ideal of an altruistic act and its mundane everyday 
practices in the context of private aid initiatives that emerged as new modes of 
humanitarian giving after the 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami. I will describe one 
specific project, the so-called EcoVillage in the southern Sri Lankan district of 
Galle. I have selected this case study for three main reasons: first, the tsunami 
as a globalised event generated an immense number of private initiatives, and 
cooperation of professional aid agencies and private donators as well. Further, the 
intensity of relief efforts, the involvement of multitude actors, and the constant 
observation by global media not only raised high expectations on the outcome 
of aid but also revealed aid practices that remain invisible in non-globalised 
disasters. Second, based on its settings and specific political and personal 
relationships of the key brokers, the project generated a special dynamic not 
only within the donators’ arena in Baden-Württemberg, Germany, but also in 
the receiving arena in Sri Lanka. This highlights how the gift was negotiated in 
various manifestations in the local arena, raising high expectations, and resulting 
in pressure from the various actors to perform according to a specific script that 
was largely designed in Baden-Württemberg and re-shaped along the gift chain. 
Third, my own involvement opened up some possibilities for research, while also 
marking certain limitations: I took part in the project implementation for two 
and a half years; and I originally come from the same area as the three German 
brokers and my father, a politician in Baden-Württemberg, was politically linked 
to these three brokers. These two elements gave me insights into the everyday 
practices of gift delivery, and the opportunity to trace intentions, motivations, and 
ex-post evaluations of the brokers themselves.
Donors, their background, and the ambition to help
When images of the tsunami circulated around the world, three individuals 
from Baden-Württemberg (a wealthy regional state in southern Germany), felt 
compelled to help and initiated a private aid project in Sri Lanka. These individuals 
– subsequently referred to as Brokers A, B, and C5 – represent private and semi-
5 To secure the anonymity and privacy of the three key brokers.
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official institutions, and all had intimateties to Sri Lanka through past work 
relationships. Broker A, for example, lived in Sri Lanka for seven years during the 
early 1970s, where he was involved in a German Development project building up 
a technical school in cooperation with the Sri Lankan Ministry of Education.
Since then, he had remained involved in fostering educational exchange 
programmes and school partnerships and continued to participate in several 
exchange programmes. He regularly spent time in Sri Lanka conducting 
training courses, while being engaged in small aid projects through Lions Club 
International. Throughout this time, he had established strong networks with 
ministries and high-ranking politicians in Baden-Württemberg and Sri Lanka. 
Broker B’s professional history in Sri Lanka and his distinguished political status 
brought him the position as honorary counsel to Sri Lanka in Baden-Württemberg. 
Linked to a political and diplomatic circle and in his position as director of a semi-
public foundation in Baden-Württemberg, he maintained excellent connections to 
the regional and state council. Broker C was a high-level administrative official in 
the State Ministry for the Environment in Baden-Württemberg, and together with 
Broker B had close ties with Sri Lankan officials as they had previously set up a 
bilateral aid project with the Ministry of Urban Development and Water Supply 
(UD&WS) in Sri Lanka to transfer environmental technology.
Two motivations to help thereby came together: the feeling of empathy with 
tsunami victims, and their distinguished social status and strong ties to politicians 
in Baden-Württemberg and Sri Lanka. As Broker B indicated: “It was not only 
empathy, but I received calls and letters from friends and partners in Sri Lanka 
requesting me to help” (12, 032009, DB). When asked about their motivation, 
all emphasised that they felt helping was “the only thing to do” (Bourdieu 1997, 
233). Broker A emphasised: “We did not even think about it, we just started to 
collect money... We wanted to give something back...we have good memories of 
our time in Sri Lanka” (15, 102008, DA). All felt responsible but also obliged to set 
up relief projects. Broker B proudly continues to report how easy it was for him to 
raise money and promote his idea to help:
“I used my good contacts to local companies and started to write ‘begging 
letters’ and introduced my idea to set up relief projects in Sri Lanka. As 
people knew and trusted me, the response was immense. Within couple of 
weeks I was able to collect more than 100,000 Euros... I used my position in 
Baden Württemberg to organise help for others.” (25, 032009, DB)
In the course of his fundraising activities, he also approached his friend and 
former projectsupporter Broker C who stated: “The tsunami offered a good chance 
and opportunity to reestablish our cooperation with Sri Lanka... and support the 
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local government in its relief efforts” (05,082008, DC). He added “we felt a huge 
responsibility to assist our former partners in this utterly devastating situation” 
(14, 082008, DC). For this purpose he managed to allocate third party funding 
from a (semi-public) state foundation, supporting the project with €700,000 
(US$908,530).
The brokers continued to raise funds individually within their home arena, Baden-
Württemberg, using their contacts with political and economic leaders of the state 
to give their endeavour the allure of formality and professionalism but also to 
entice the public and media. The brokers thereby played into public discourses 
about suspected inefficiency and misuse of tsunami funds by distancing 
themselves from the aid industry. As Broker A remarked, 
“all the generously given money in Germany will be given to tsunami 
affected people in Sri Lanka... We do not operate like huge aid agencies 
spending up to 40 per cent on administration costs... we paid all our flights 
and accommodation with our private money.” (56, 102008, DA)
Through close ties to and political networks in Sri Lanka, they argued, the gift 
would be more effective and efficient as its implementation would be direct, based 
on actual needs, and managed and facilitated through locally knowledgeable 
partners. Thus they suggested their gift was pure and free, not contaminated by 
any other interests (that aid organisations might have) or pre-given development 
policies or targets to be reached.
This particular discourse of raising the pure gift – as opposed to gifts of the 
aid industry – would henceforth shape the various discourses, practices, and 
performances of the brokers and others involved. However, the high expectations 
that brokers raised within their social field in Germany of purity, effectiveness, 
efficiency, transparency, accountability, and quality were hard to uphold during 
the ordinary practices of bringing the gift to its beneficiaries. The next section 
will give an overview of the actual gift that the brokers designed and presented 
to the public in Germany. Brokers anticipated producing not only another housing 
project but to introduce a new feature of living: a model village for sustainable, 
innovative, eco-friendly, and holistic living.
The gift: an eco-friendly German village
The need for houses appeared self-evident; as Broker B stated, “driving 
southbound along Galle Road we saw so many damaged houses and tents... It was 
obvious to construct houses” (64, 072007, DB). Further, with the State Ministry 
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for the Environment co-funding the project one condition was a prerequisite: the 
project had to be justified as ecological technology transfer. Hence the objective of 
the project was defined: constructing 90 quality houses with ecological standards.
Given the conditionality, the idea of an EcoVillage was announced early to the 
press in Baden-Württemberg. On 17 December 2005 the state minister for the 
environment stated, “the EcoVillage in Sri Lanka can be characterised as role 
model regarding its ecological standard”.6 Brokers presented EcoVillage as a 
new innovation and highlighted its educational value and quality. The gift was 
thereby coupled with paternalistic ideas of improving the lives, mentalities, and 
capabilities of the recipients. In the official Memorandum of Understanding (MoU)
that was later signed between the brokers, the implementing aid agency, and the 
Sri Lankan Ministry of Urban Development and Water Supply (UD&WS), it was 
clarified that 
“the term ‘EcoVillage’ in this context means that the project intends to serve 
ecological aspects in general infrastructure, sewage, waste management 
and construction. The ecological parts will be included by the Donor on the 
basis of the analysis of the feasibility, sustainability, and cost effectiveness.” 
(Paragraph 1.1 Memoradum of Understanding, Internal Document)
The location for the housing site also emerged through a rather contingent 
process of personal impressions and priorities of the German brokers:
“to be honest, the location for the project was decided on personal 
preferences. The South is a good location. Our partners told there is still a 
demand and as well it is much more comfortable to access when we come to 
visit... We also considered the East. But it is really too complicated; access 
and difficult political situation...  also we have no contacts there with local 
ministries.” (45,082008, DC)
Local bureaucrats helped to identify beautiful and suitable sites (from the point of 
view of the German brokers) and to find the right location. One tsunami officer in 
Galle remembered:
“First time the German delegation came in 2005... it was a special request 
from a ministry in Colombo to assist them finding a location for a special 
housing project... we showed them several sites but nothing was good 
6 Quoted in Ludwigsburger Kreiszeitung (regional journal), 17 December 2005.
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enough... we took quite an effort and time for them.” (88, 10012009, ARI)
From the start, the project design had to be shaped and negotiated according 
to preferences of constellations in Baden-Württemberg, to enable brokers to 
justify and sell the gift in their home as well in the receiving aid arena. The 
special networks of the brokers gave them preferential treatment as the MoU 
documents states: “the UD&WS in consultation with the GoSL and other Local 
Authorities in recognition of the Donor generosity wishes to reciprocate by 
providing all necessary non monetary assistance to ensure the smooth and 
speedy implementation of this construction project” (Paragraph 1.2 Memorandum 
of Understanding, Internal Document). To contextualise this statement: state 
authorities had not granted such treatment to other humanitarian aid agencies; 
the project received this support only through by-passing the official and building
on unofficial channels of political support. The brokers felt pressured to do so in 
order to achieve given promises.
Practicing gift giving
The journey from “pure gift” to “gift of development industry”
As donations increased, brokers realised that they lacked the capacity to 
manage a project of that magnitude. Even though they had originally intended 
to disassociate themselves from the aid industry, the need for an experienced 
implementing partner appeared imperative. Through contacts brokers were 
introduced to the tsunami coordinator of AID7 – a humanitarian organisation 
with its headquarters in Baden-Württemberg. At the beginning AID was not keen 
to accept the mandate, as one former official said “donors set clear conditions 
and a finality at the beginning of the project” (32, 012009, MD). However, AID 
felt that it would lose political support for other work and even feared losing its 
reputation if it did not help to deliver this (dis)interested gift. A former leading 
official confessed: “with the political involvement there was no way to disclaim the 
project...” (06, 012009, MD).
The complex set of relations and the pressure to satisfy the high expectations 
in Baden-Württemberg led through several trajectories of utilising the brokers’ 
power to leverage and steer the project. The conditions of delivering the gift had 
to be negotiated with several actors in the aid arena in Sri Lanka and in Germany. 
7 AID’ is used to secure anonymity of the implementing aid organisation
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All these actors had their own and often differing motivations and expectations: 
those who had donated at home, whose expectations had been nurtured by the 
brokers; AID, which tried to keep humanitarian standards intact; those who 
struggled with the everyday management in Sri Lanka; and finally the recipients. 
Therefore the gift was constantly renegotiated at each of these locations and 
arenas, significantly influencing the implementation and related practices.
The pressure to deliver: leaving the path of unconditional aid 
When implementation started in early 2006, Galle district experienced what 
Stirrat (2006, 11) branded “competitive humanitarianism”: the district was 
flooded with housing projects that the local bureaucracy could hardly absorb. As 
the district secretary (DS) stated, “there were too many organisations in Galle, 
we could not oversee, monitor or guide them with the limited number of officers... 
the situation was totally new to us, we did not have any experience” (45, 032009, 
DSG). Therefore many aid agencies introduced parallel monitoring systems, 
ignoring the official relief structures, and complained about the government’s 
weak management. On the other side housing recipients complained about the 
poor quality of houses. In 2006 one housing recipient complained during an 
official donor meeting at the DS office in Galle that he and his family had to live in 
a house without electricity, a leaking roof, and far from his working place, and that 
the aid organisation had already left, leaving the recipients alone in this miserable 
situation. The frustration was high among aid agencies, beneficiaries, and local 
authorities.
AID staff initially intended to abide by official housing guidelines (of the Sri Lankan 
government) that envisaged liaising with the DS office, but later felt compelled to 
return to unofficial channels in order to speed up the process. Local government 
and administration were overwhelmed, and delays in decisions and authorisations 
of documents became the norm. However, the German brokers had publicly given 
a promise (in Baden-Württemberg) to finalise the project within 12 months, and 
therefore delays endangered their reputation as well as that of AID. In order to 
protect their social and professional prestige and to avoid a publicised political 
quarrel, brokers and AID had to achieve given promises. Hence brokers used all 
their existing networks and goodwill among politicians and central government 
officials in Sri Lanka to push the local bureaucracy to deliver.
Given the over-supply of houses in Galle district, the choice of recipients became 
politically delicate. When AID first met the DS, his enthusiasm about a new 
relocation project was rather limited. When asking for a beneficiary list, he 
suggested, “You do not worry about beneficiaries; you build the houses and hand 
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over the keys to me... and I distribute” (17, 032006, DSG). This position was not 
acceptable to the brokers: “we signed an MoU with the GoSL and they have to 
take over their responsibilities... we have to secure the quality of the project” (23, 
062006, DB). AID came under pressure to deliver progress and present eligible 
recipients to Germany. The difficulty was not only a missing beneficiary list, but 
also that brokers had a clear idea how a proper sample of recipients ought to 
look: “a diverse selection of people reflecting the whole Sri Lankan society – poor 
people living next to middle class people, Sinhalese living next to Muslims and 
Tamils... ” (23, 032006, DE). They hereby pursued a highly idealised model of 
a peaceful Sri Lankan village, where different ethnicities and social classes lived 
side by side, ignoring the social structures of villages which existed prior to the 
tsunami.
To get such an ideal village together, AID depended upon the cooperation of 
local government officials. Informing the brokers about AID’s difficulties in 
collaborating with local government officials, they requested the then Sri Lankan 
prime minister (who had formerly been Sri Lankan ambassador to Germany) lodge 
a complaint at district level urging the DS office to cooperate and find a solution 
for the beneficiary problem. The complaint was successful and subsequently all 
parties involved were required to do things that were normally seen as part of 
the mundane world of development aid: quid pro quo, give and take, obligations 
and reciprocity. For example: AID developed a small training system for local 
administration setting up an effective beneficiary monitoring system. To secure 
the participation of Grama Niladaris (GNs), AID accepted their request to newly 
furnish the tsunami-affected GNs’ offices. This violated AID’s internal regulations 
which did not allow funding government related organisations. To legitimise the 
proposal internally, these activities were labelled as a partner workshop and GN 
officers (who are government officials) were termed semivolunteers.8 A consultant 
commented that
“special circumstances require special adjustments. Disasters and how to 
deal with them cannot be predicted and formulated in standards... We have 
to get creative to justify our work.” (103, 052006, DE)
These special adjustments continued as AID faced difficulties in setting up a list of
90 beneficiaries. Most people did not favour the location of EcoVillage, which was 
up to 18 kilometres away from Galle city and in a rural environment with less 
developed public infrastructure. As one potential recipient said “I am not going 
8 Grama Niladari (GN): the smallest bureaucratic level (village level) within the decentralised Sri Lankan
   administration. GNs are appointed and working under the supervision of the District Secretariat (DS).
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to live there... there is no future for me and my family. I lost my house in Galle 
and I want a house there... ” (73, 052006, HR). Worse, the housing project was 
far from completion. In this situation AID started to use their positive relationship 
with the GNs and organised several meetings in different GN divisions to present 
the concept of EcoVillage. It was a kind of sales pitch supported by local officials, 
who demonstrated the premium character, potential, and outstanding quality of 
the project and pointed out the long-term partnership the German brokers had 
announced. After the presentation recipients demanded:
“we want to see the houses! You can talk a lot but we just saw the plans... 
You have to bring us there, it is too far for us to go there.” (44, 062006, HR)
Under pressure to present housing recipients in Germany, AID organised two field 
trips and hired buses to bring several families to the site. GNs and officers of the 
tsunami housing unit supported the event and presented the advantages of the 
project and its location. Using the rhetoric of development, they presented the 
area’s potential for industrial development. To make the field visits even more 
attractive, a lunch, soft drinks, and coffee was offered afterwards. After the first 
field visit 40 families agreed to live in EcoVillage. These observations indicate 
how brokers used political leverage to impose their ideals of what a post-tsunami 
village ought to look like: (a) it had to be an EcoVillage and all of what that entails 
(e.g., a rural environment with forests around), and (b) it had to incorporate the 
concept of peaceful co-existence that was set on paper concentrating on ethnic 
representation of the village inhabitants. The foreign brokers interpreted their 
version of “build back better” – in the Baden-Württemberg way – and had to 
propagate both these concepts and ideals.9 In order to deliver visibly and quickly 
(Stirrat, 2006), the German brokers who were already coming under pressure 
by donors, the press, and opposition parties in Baden-Wuürttemberg had to use 
their political leverage heavily to further twist and bend local administrative rules 
thereby forcing local administrative officials to comply with their demands.
9 “Building back better” was introduced in 2005 by the UN special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery Bill
    Clinton, highlighting the unique opportunity of a disaster to improve and transform a countries’    
    pre-disaster situation and “set communities on a better and safer development path” providing ten     
    propositions to be considered in the rehabilitation policy (see the 2006 UN report http://www.  
    preventionweb.net/english/professional/publications/v.php?id=2054).
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Performing the successful handing over of a gift
Quid-pro-quo tactics remained throughout the implementation. Whenever it 
was necessary to speed up processes brokers would not hesitate to utilise their 
personal or semi-official networks to higher-level authorities to lodge complaints 
in order to put pressure on the local administration. These practices made the 
project as well as AID well known to local administrative officials in Galle.
Meanwhile some of the local administrative officials involved in the project started 
to realise what they stood to gain by making the gift their project as well. The 
GA, for example, presented EcoVillage to other international donors securing a 
successful cooperation with his office: “EcoVillage is the best tsunami housing 
project in Galle... 18, 092007, GA). Also other local bureaucrats made use of the 
project in order to present their efficiency and to gain recognition. For instance 
the Urban Development Authority (UDA) struggled for months to get financial 
support from the central government to construct access roads to tsunami 
villages; it supported the complaints and pressure from the German brokers by 
promptly delivering measurements and budget and applying for funds at central 
government for the access road to EcoVillage. In 2007 UDA was granted the full 
requested budget and the GA Galle commented on this success:
“We in Galle were granted one of the biggest amounts for road development 
in tsunami affected districts. This is very good for the overall development 
and it is an indication of success and efficiency...” (13, 082007, GA)
Or in the words of a local minister who was using the housing site for his personal 
political rally: “it is good to have such a well-recognised project in my district. 
I can show development, modernisation and success... not many districts have 
this” (07, 012010, MP).
Similarly, the German brokers needed a publicised staging of the successful end 
of the project. One broker said they didn’t want “to lose momentum as public 
attention in Germany diminishes...” (56, 022007, DB). It was important to make 
sure that the project would yield visible and convincing results as they continued 
to narrate the discourse of good intentions and the pure gift for tsunami victims 
through articles and reports in the German media. Some brokers even got public 
rewards in recognition of their generosity and humanitarian involvement in Sri 
Lanka, marking not only a symbolic pay off, but also increasing their social and 
personal status and appreciation in Baden-Württemberg.
The handing over ceremony was organised as a big event with local and 
German press documenting the success of the project. In order to give proof 
of the acceptance and appreciation of EcoVillage within the population, brokers 
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demanded to invite not only selected homeowners but also the neighbouring 
villagers and their families. In addition a local school choir and music band was 
asked to play and sing the national anthem during the hoisting of the Sri Lankan 
flag. To further underline the appreciation and to illustrate harmony and a peaceful
community one representative of each religion in Sri Lanka was asked to 
participate and hold a short prayer. As one AID consultant put it “the village 
should be a symbol of peace and harmony, and we want to show that people from 
different religious backgrounds can live with each other” (04, 11022007, OAC). 
The stage was prepared for celebrating the success of the project. For three 
hours brokers, local politicians, and bureaucrats explained in various speeches 
the exclusiveness and distinctiveness of the gift and what is now expected from 
its recipients. The recipients were to receive and listen. One family was selected 
to symbolically receive a key from the three brokers, which marked the official 
handing over. Further, one recipient held a short acceptance speech and to 
demonstrate their gratitude they handed over small presents (in the form of 
Buddha statues, porcelain elephants, etc.) to the international AID staff and the 
German brokers, saying,
“we know we can not give back what you gave us, but please accept these 
small tokens of appreciation for all the effort and hard work you put into the 
project... by giving us these nice houses...”. (123,18072007, RJ)
The problem, however, was that EcoVillage was far from completion and only eight 
families inhabited the village at the time of preparing for the ceremony. Time was 
limited and pressures on brokers, AID, and local bureaucrats were high to perform 
and present success to the invited audience like the Sri Lankan prime minister, 
German diplomats, and politicians. However, all the gestures of appreciation were 
examples of a cycle of reciprocity whereby recipients and performers in this staged 
theatre of the handing over ceremony received a benefit for the gesture they 
performed. For instance the religious leaders received small donations for their 
temple, mosque, and church, as did the schools in order to ensure their presence. 
AID organised a common lunch for all invitees following the official ceremony and 
each housing recipient with children received a gift hamper consisting of school 
stationery as well as cotton shopping bags, caps, and t-shirts for the children with 
AID’s logo and an official letter signed by brokers, AID, and the DS office, stating 
that they were selected for the project.
This final act of the handing over of the gift highlights, once more, the paradox of 
gift giving in a highly publicised, media-heavy setting: in order to celebrate the 
success of the gift to the donators in Germany, recipients had to be incentivised to 
perform their gratitude.
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Conclusion: the geography of the gift
The 2004 Indian Ocean tsunami was a highly publicised disaster, which generated 
an unprecedented wave of public and private donations, of pure expressions 
of global solidarity, and bringing out a number of new modes of humanitarian 
gifts, specifically the involvement of private and volunteer-based aid initiatives. 
This paper shows how private donations presented as pure altruistic gifts, as 
ethical ideals of generosity detached and separated from other mundane forms 
of humanitarian aid and exchange relations, became embroiled in exactly such 
exchange relations. The case study also shows that when studying the geography 
of gift giving in humanitarian contexts, one needs to study the aid arena in the 
recipient country as well as the complex setting of donors and brokers in their 
home constituencies.
The case study discussed in this article illustrates how private initiatives, brokered 
by political and socially influential figures with well-established networks in Sri 
Lanka and Germany, fell victim to the expectations that they raised through 
discourses and narratives about the idea of staying outside the aid industry and 
delivering a pure, dis-interested gift. Instead, those expectations generated and 
reinforced the paradox of humanitarian gifts in different arenas along the aid 
chain: in order to uphold the pure gift – to enclose aid in a space of purity – one 
has to apply the mundane practices of tit for tat, of give and take. In other words: 
one has to contaminate the gift’s purity. Even more, the expectations raised 
and nurtured by donors’ discourses and narratives in their political home arena 
impacted and put pressure on aid agencies, local officials, and politicians who had 
to deliver the pure gift to its recipients. Actors in the receiving arena were left 
with a debt not only to continue to uphold the discourse of the pure gift, but to 
demonstrate their thankfulness and gratitude. In order to accomplish visible and 
successful outputs everyone complied with rules and logics of give and take and 
everyone utilised the gift to fulfil their own purposes (Korf et al. 2010). The case 
study highlights Bourdieu’s (1997, 232) point, that: “no one [in our case: those 
involved in negotiating the gift in different arenas] is really unaware of the logic of 
exchange... but no one fails to comply with the rule of the game which is to act as 
if one did not know the rule”.
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Abstract 
This paper analyses the commodification of post-tsunami aid in Sri Lanka, a 
process that ‘contaminated’ the ‘purity’ of good intentions with the politics of 
patronage and international aid. It argues that gifts are not just material transfers 
of ‘aid’, but also embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, and political 
affiliations. The tsunami gift re-enforced and reconfigured exchange relationships 
among different patrons and clients in Sri Lankan communities, perpetuating 
the political economy that has driven social conflict and discontent in the 
postindependence years. Beyond dominant rationales of ethnic or political party 
patronage, the paper finds that gifts by disingenuous patrons not only became 
patrimonial, but that the patrimonial rationale emerged as much from above as 
from below—a dynamic that became nearly inescapable and self-reinforcing. 
Through three case studies, we explore the intricate chain of relations, 
obligations, and expectations pertinent in the co-evolving, but often contradictory, 
gift rationales that permeate the practices, performances, and discourses of 
tsunami aid. 
Keywords: 
aid, faith-based development, gift, patrimonialism, Sri Lanka, tsunami 
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Introduction 
In her foreword to Marcel Mauss’s seminal work entitled The Gift, Mary Douglas 
(1990, p. vii) writes that ‘though we laud charity as a Christian virtue we know 
how much it wounds’. ‘Pure gifts’, note Stirrat and Henkel (1997, p. 73), ‘are good 
for the giver but . . . bad for the receiver’. In fact, the aid in response to the Indian 
Ocean tsunami of 26 December 2004 could be seen as a paradigmatic case of 
gift— of charity, Christian caritas, a global form of compassion that transformed 
into a large and unprecedented level of donations from people living in Europe 
and North America to people affected by the tsunami in Asia and East Africa. In 
many cases, these gifts were given with the ‘pure’ intention of helping the victims. 
Yet several reports concluded that many recipients of such charity were not so 
happy with the process and outcomes of aid, or even felt humiliated and reduced 
to being passive ‘victims’ (Cosgrave, 2006; De Mel and Ruwanpura, 2006; De 
Silva and Yamao, 2007; Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006; Hyndman, 2007; Keys, 
MastermanSmith and Cottle, 2006; Korf, 2005, 2007; Ruwanpura, 2008a, 2008b; 
Sarvananthan and Sanjeewanie, 2008; Stirrat, 2006; Telford, Cosgrave and 
Houghton, 2006; Telford and Cosgrave, 2007). 
The humanitarian imperative—‘the desire to prevent and alleviate human 
suffering wherever it may be found . . . to protect life and health and to ensure 
respect for the human being’ (ICRC, 1994; see also Hilhorst, 2005; Walker, 
2005;	Weiss,	Disasters,	2010,	34(S1):	S60−S77.	©	2010	The	Author(s).	Journal	
compilation	 ©	 Overseas	 Development	 Institute,	 2010	 Published	 by	 Blackwell	
Publishing, 9600 Garsington Road, Oxford, OX42DQ, UK and 350 Main Street, 
Malden, MA 02148, USA 1999)—is still considered as the leading guideline. 
This paper, though, contends that the altruistic gift implied by the humanitarian 
discourse—which materialised in the form of posttsunami aid—inevitably collides 
with divergent discourses, practices, and expectations associated with ‘gift’ when 
it enters a local domain. Aid becomes a culturally charged, political commodity. In 
other words, posttsunami gifts—seemingly altruistic acts of generosity—became 
entangled in the economy of charity and reciprocal obligations in the political 
economy of aid (Bastian, 2005; Korf, 2007). Or, as Stirrat and Henkel (1997, p. 
74) put it with regard to charity in development aid more broadly, ‘[w]hat starts 
off as a counterpoint to the logic of the real world (gifts versus markets) ends 
up as part of that real world. The pure gifts become, in the end, the currency of 
systems of patronage’. 
In Sri Lanka, this entanglement of gifts in chains of reciprocal obligations and 
expectations has been quite pronounced. The country is a wellknown holiday 
destination and was easily accessible for the media, foreign aid agencies, 
and volunteers that came in large numbers in the days, weeks, and months 
1 3 0  | T h e  P a r a d o x  o f  G o o d  I n t e n t i o n s
after the event. The incredible inflow of aid moneys, charities, professionals, 
and volunteers and the prolonged attention given to posttsunami relief and 
reconstruction projects in Sri Lanka in the international media created what Jock 
Stirrat (2006, p. 11) has branded ‘competitive humanitarianism’: competition was 
less about getting donations, but spending them by finding ‘marketable clients’: 
aid beneficiaries and photogenic projects. Aid agencies had to demonstrate to 
their private donors that their gifts were making a difference, that they were 
having a visible impact. ‘From the beginning, the pressure was on the agencies 
not only to be effective, but to be seen to be effective’ (Stirrat, 2006, p. 13) 
(emphasis added). 
This paper explores and analyses the intricate chain of relations, obligations, 
and expectations that developed in the economy of private gifts supplied for the 
purpose of humanitarian assistance after the tsunami. Three small case studies 
trace the ‘biography’ of the gift in the situation of posttsunami aid delivery 
and the intricate entanglement of various forms of gift in coevolving, yet often 
contradictory, gift rationales. Our exploration is located in the perspective of an 
ethnography of aid (Gould and Marcussen, 2004; Korf, 2006; Long, 2001; Mosse, 
2004; Olivier de Sardan, 2005; Rossi, 2004), which provides critical analyses 
of aid relationships and their matrices of rhetoric, ritual, power, and material 
transactions (Gould, 2004, p. 1). Indeed, we argue that gifts are not just material 
transfers of ‘aid’, but also embodiments of cultural symbolism, social power, 
and political affiliations. The tsunami gift reenforced and reconfigured exchange 
relationships among different patrons and clients in Sri Lankan communities, 
perpetuating the political economy that has continued to drive social conflict and 
discontent in the postindependence years (Brow, 1996; Moore, 1985; Spencer, 
1990). Our material, however, also pinpoints multiple patronage relationships 
beyond the realm of politics. 
Ethnographies of the gift 
Gifts given to humanitarian agencies are normally channelled through a chain 
of relations in the sphere of humanitarian aid. Donor and receiver are not 
directly interacting, but are different types of aid brokers (Bierschenk, Chauveau 
and Olivier de Sardan, 2002; Mosse and Lewis, 2006; Sørenson, 2008) that 
mediate the multiple interfaces (Long, 2001, p. 89) among donors, humanitarian 
organisations, and aid receivers. These brokers enter at various nodes in the 
aid chain and are both internal to the humanitarian agencies (as consultants, 
experts, project managers and volunteers, for example) and external to it (as 
local bureaucrats who channel the distribution of aid, as local politicians who 
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cater for their electoral clientele, or as other agents of a local or national elite that 
attempt to tap into the resources). Gift relations and their economy of obligations 
and reciprocity are not confined therefore to the relationship between Northern 
donors and Southern receivers, but are constituted by a far more complex chain 
of relations, rituals, and practices that equally play into domestic patterns of 
patronage and victimisation. 
We conceptualise the ‘biography’ of the gift (Stirrat and Henkel, 1997, p. 68) as a 
process of increasing commodification whereby the ideal of the gift as an ethical, 
disinterested act of generosity becomes polluted by the worldly practices of the 
mundane and interested world. Indeed, Marcel Mauss (1990) denounced the 
modern separation of interested and disinterested exchange into ‘economy’ and 
‘gift’. Mauss’s point was that in the ‘primitive societies’ he studied, exchange was 
both interested and disinterested—gift giving was located in systems of exchange 
that involve obligations to give, to receive, and to return, thereby emphasising 
the relation between giver and receiver. He argued in particular that it is a modern 
conception to consider the gift as an interruption of ‘economy’. 
There has been considerable debate, though, on the universal applicability and 
the logical validity of Mauss’s concept of the gift (see, for instance, Derrida, 1992; 
Jenkins, 1998; Laidlaw, 2000; LeviStrauss, 1987; Parry, 1986; Testart, 1998). In 
Given Time, Jacques Derrida (1992, p. 24) maintains that Mauss’s Essai sur le don 
talks of everything except the gift (cf. Jenkins, 1998, pp. 85, 87)—or the ‘pure’ 
gift, the gift as an interruption of ‘economy’. The pure gift denies reciprocity. But 
then, a pure gift becomes an impossibility as any act of giving is already entangled 
in reciprocal relations of obligations, return, and recognition. The problem with the 
pure gift, according to Derrida (1992), is that ‘as soon as a gift is knowingly given 
as a gift, the subject of generosity is already anticipating a return, taking credit of 
some sort’ (Barnett and Land, 2007, p. 1072)—a pure gift could not be recognised 
as a gift by another party (and thus, not even by the receiver). Indeed, Derrida 
(1992) asserts that there is no such thing as a ‘pure’ gift: it is not possible to give 
without immediately entering into a circle of exchange that turns the gift into a 
debt to return, an obligation to reciprocate. 
Arguably, the ‘biography’ of the gift traces the multiple chains of obligations in the 
system of aid delivery—from donor through brokers to receivers. However, while 
looking into the gift’s ‘economy’, we found discourses on gift giving as an ethical 
practice, as ‘pure’ giving—as separate from ‘economy’. These discourses uphold 
the notion of a pure gift. They are moralising discourses that lend legitimacy 
to the relationship forged between giver and receiver—at times with the help 
of humanitarian agencies or other actors, such as local bureaucrats, serving as 
brokers.
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Biographies of the tsunami gift in Sri Lanka 
The tsunami occurred at a time when Sri Lanka’s peace process, which started 
in 2002 after the conclusion of a ceasefire agreement between the government 
and the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), was in stalemate. In spring 
2003, the LTTE had withdrawn from the negotiations. In 2004, the eastern LTTE 
commander, Vinayagamoorthi Muralitharan, alias Colonel Karuna, had split from 
the movement, resulting in infighting within the LTTE and increasing levels of 
political violence. Tsunami aid became enmeshed in the politics of ethnic conflict 
and violence. Most notably, controversies arose about the appropriate ways of 
allocating aid to the three main ethnic communities (74 per cent Sinhalese, 13 per 
cent Tamils, and 7 per cent Muslims2; Department of Census and Statistics, 2006) 
and about channelling aid to rebelcontrolled territories in the north and east. 
These discourses created a dominant dichotomy between the ‘south’ (Sinhalese) 
and the ‘north’ (Tamil) and focused on the administrative mechanisms needed to 
direct aid to areas under LTTE control (Bastian, 2005; Frerks and Klem, 2009; 
Hyndmann, 2007; Uyangoda, 2005). As a result, they sidelined the concerns of 
the second minority group, Muslims, who already felt marginalised in the peace 
talks (Hasbullah, 2001; Lewer and Ismail, 2009; Uyangoda, 2005, p. 343). 
In the patronage system of Sri Lankan society, so well explained by Brow 
(1996), Moore (1985) and Spencer (1990), aid becomes incorporated into the 
exchange relation forged between patrons (politicians) and clients (voters). 
Tsunami aid provided a rich resource for patronage and consequently, the gift 
was reappropriated. The patrimonial rationale with its mechanisms of inclusion 
and exclusion is a driving force of social conflict, political violence, and ethnic 
antagonism in Sri Lanka. While many observers hoped that the tsunami would 
create an opportunity for peacebuilding (as all three ethnic communities 
suffered), the tsunami aid that came to Sri Lanka in fact increased the gulf among 
the different communities and exacerbated the patronage rationale along ethnic 
lines (Frerks and Klem, 2009; Hyndman, 2007). 
While the dynamics of the peace process and the ‘ethnic conflict’ have dominated 
national debates on tsunami aid, at the local level, multiple patronage relations 
have had an impact on the gift economy. The tsunami gifts reinforced and 
reshuffled loyalties, group boundaries, and connections. In political patronage 
2 These are the figures from the 1981 census; the 2001 census does not provide a comprehensive  
   picture as it excluded some of the waraffected districts in the northeast. For reasons of brevity, the  
   figure for the Tamils refers to the Sri Lankan Tamils only and thus excludes the ‘Indian’ Tamils, who   
   constitute another 6 per cent. The figure for the Muslims concerns the ‘Moors’, thus excluding the  
   ‘Malay’ who comprise another 0.3 per cent. 
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relations, gifts are supplied in return for votes (Case 1). But the patronage 
rationale is not confined to the realm of politics and to the local scale. Patronage 
rationales also permeate faithbased exchange relations between churches and 
believers (Case 3) and a multilocal chain of relations linking donors from Europe 
and Sri Lankan receivers (Case 2). The three case studies presented below 
demonstrate the convoluted processes through which a gift, local or foreign, 
considered as ‘pure’ ethical practice, ends up ‘in the real world’ (Stirrat and 
Henkel, 1997) of ‘dirty’ systems of reciprocal obligations. 
This is illustrated by the political geography of our three case studies: two are in 
the southeast and one is in the south. Civil war affected Maruthamunai (Case 1) 
and Akkaraipattu (Case 3), both in the form of Tamil–Muslim antagonisms and 
violence, and in bloody fighting between government forces and the LTTE. Baden
Case 1 
Maruthamunai
Case 2
Ba-Wü Village
Case 3
Akkaraipattu
Location Ampara District
(southeast)
Galle District
(south)
Ampara District
(southeast)
Dominant 
ethnic group
Muslim Sinhalese Tamil
Politics Mosque federation versus
Muslim party politics
Multi-local patronage and
Sinhalese politics
Church politics and
humanitarian principles
Methodsand 
material
Participant observation
(ongoing); interviews,
group discussions (mainly
with key informants and
mosque leaders, but also
with beneficiaries).
01/2005–12/2006
Participant ethnography:
researcher was consultant
for Diakonie—responsible
for organising livelihood
projects and the inaugu-
ration ceremony.
05/2005–12/2007
Interviews; 
group discussions
(with beneficiaries, aid 
personnel, key informants, 
and church members).
07/2007–10/2008
Lead 
researcher
Shahul Hasbullah Pia Hollenbach Bart Klem
 
Table 1: Three gift biographies
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Württemberg Village (Case 2) is in Galle District on the Sinhalesedominated 
southern coast and is a major tourist destination. While these locations were not 
at the centre of combat, national debates on tsunami aid, of course, affected 
the discourses, practices, and rituals of the gift economy in all three settings. 
However, this was only one of a number of equally important discussions. 
Controversies concerning Tamil–Muslim antagonisms, political favouritism by 
Sinhalese politicians, and alleged Christian conversion played a part as well. 
The three case studies are indicative rather than comprehensive. Each illustrates 
a particular biography of the gift and the inherent patronage relations. They draw 
on empirical material collected in different contexts as well as on interviews, 
group discussions, participant observation, and participant ethnography3 (see 
Table 1).
Case 1: from local generosity to competitive humanitarianism 
When the tsunami hit Sri Lanka’s coastline, Maruthamunai, a Muslim town on the 
waraffected southeast coast, suffered major devastation. Approximately onetenth 
of its population died because of the tsunami. As the Muslim community received 
less attention in national debates on aid delivery, foreign aid agencies reached the 
Muslim and Tamilinhabited southeast coast only after some delays. 
Relief and rescue efforts immediately after the event involved many acts of 
local solidarity and pure kindness, often transcending ethnic boundaries (Harris, 
2005). In Maruthamunai and its neighbouring settlements, Tamils and Muslims 
shared relief items and assisted each other with rescue and cleaning activities. 
They received local donations from people throughout Sri Lanka—from Sinhalese, 
Tamils, and Muslims. On several occasions, people told us stories like the 
following: 
the Tamil village of Kalaru, situated north of Periyaneelavanai and 
Maruthamunai, was cut off from the land route. Consequently, Muslims 
from Maruthamunai shared their own relief items with Tamils in Kalaru, 
transporting them by boat. 
Such narratives of kindness and solidarity indicate a ‘kind of give without take, 
generosity without expectation of any return’ (Clark, 2005, p. 385), borne out of 
3 Participant ethnography builds on the material of developmental practitioners who reflect on their  
  own involvement in developmental or humanitarian work and their observance of practices, rituals,     
  and discourses while engaged in developmental work, including as a consultant or as a project   
  manager. For information on the potential and limitations of this method, see Korf, 2006; Mosse, 2004;  
  Rossi, 2004; Sørensen, 2008. 
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the magnitude of the event, the scope of suffering—a type of pure gift. Indeed, 
the kindness appeared as a significant rupture with the widespread patronage and 
ethnic antagonism in the district’s politics—a disjuncture of ‘politics’. 
The mosque became a natural place of refuge for many displaced people 
who sought material and spiritual support. The mosque federation (palibail 
samasam)—a coalition of leaders from various mosques in Maruthamunai—
organised the distribution of relief items, the burial of corpses, and the provision 
of temporary shelter (in mosques, schools, and other public buildings). It 
received food gifts from local donors within the community and from neighbouring 
communities, and it implemented a system of relief distribution that distinguished 
three categories of affectedness and defined the specific entitlements of 
each group. These strict rules were designed to institute transparency and 
accountability to the distribution of scarce relief items. The mosque leaders 
explained to us that they wanted to avoid falling into the trap of politics, 
favouritism, and patronage—practices common within the trappings of Sri 
Lanka’s welfare state and developmental aid. Gift giving was seen as a religious 
act of generosity that needed to be kept clean, ‘purified’, left free of the ‘dirty’, 
mundane procedures of politics. And the mosque was the place to guarantee this 
purification. 
Immediately following the tsunami, relief items were in short supply. A few 
weeks later, Sri Lankan and foreign aid agencies and volunteers brought more 
relief items and aid money. As a result, the nature of gift giving and its handling 
changed: giving became competitive as the different aid agencies had to find the 
most viable and marketable (photogenic) projects on which they could spend their 
funds visibly (Korf, 2007; Stirrat, 2006). 
The change in the gift economy did not happen suddenly, but was rather a gradual 
process. In the beginning, the state authorities and the few nongovernmental 
organisations (NGOs) already present in the area continued to coordinate their 
work through the mosque federation. However, a rising number of new, foreign, 
and often inexperienced agencies largely bypassed the federation and distributed 
their relief directly to ‘suffering people’—frequently in conjunction with the 
media, which reported these gifts back to the public in the donor countries. These 
agencies operated in an increasingly competitive aid market and felt pressure 
to offer an attractive package to beneficiaries in order to gain ‘clients’. This 
competitive humanitarianism aggravated a lot of social tension, discontent, and 
jealousy among the recipients of the gifts. 
Aid dynamics were further complicated by the government’s buffer zone policy, 
announced in January 2005, which required the relocation of all inhabitants 
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who had formerly lived within a specified area along the coastline.4 All families 
that had had their houses in this buffer zone were eligible for a new house in 
a relocation site (see, for example, Hyndman, 2007). Because of this policy, 
largescale relocation and house reconstruction activities commenced, including in 
Maruthamunai. With the start of these programmes, the gift became part of the 
system of patronage and mutual obligations in the fragmented Muslim polity of 
the area, as these relocation schemes provided ample resources for the patronage 
system of exchange relations between politicians and voters. 
The electorate expected their members of parliament (MPs) ‘to deliver’. The 
pressure on Ferial Ashraff, a local MP and the national Minister for Housing, 
was particularly high. Locals believed that as ‘the minister’ she should ensure 
that funding and land were available to her home electorate. Ashraff, though, 
was not alone in tapping into the gift market. Another local Muslim MP offered 
land in his native town of Sammanthurai to relocate displaced families from 
Maruthamunai—Sammanthurai had hosted these families immediately after the 
tsunami. This proposal created concern and resentment among local politicians 
in Maruthamunai who belonged to another political party. The latter thought that 
the MP from Sammanthurai had offered this land to expand his electoral bloc as 
voting for different Muslim political parties is largely placebased. Politicians from 
Maruthamunai did not want to lose votes and thus discouraged the families to 
accept the MP’s offer. Ashraff made paddy land available to end the stalemate, but 
this land had to be filled and elevated to be suitable for housing—a very expensive 
option, but one that allowed the families to be located near Maruthamunai 
(Hasbullah and Korf, 2009). 
The case of Maruthamunai indicates three realms of the biography of the tsunami 
gift: its religious, economic and political dimensions. Immediately after the event, 
the mosque attempted to create a space of antipolitics—the gift was considered as 
a religious practice, and it was to be kept pure, free from ‘economy’ and ‘politics’. 
The inflow of foreign money and agencies changed dynamics and incentives 
in the gift economy and replaced practices and discourses of pure kindness 
and local solidarity. The gift became competitive in the evolving aid market. 
This commodification of the gift also saw the entrance of new kinds of brokers: 
consultants, foreign volunteers, and project managers with their own rationales 
and procedures that were largely shaped by actors from outside of Sri Lanka—
private donors in the North expected to be shown the effect of their gift. When 
4 The buffer zone policy specified a ‘no building’ zone 100 metres from the sea in the south and west,  
  and 200 metres in the north and east. The larger distance in the north and east was justified by the   
  generally more extensive intrusion of the sea along this coast and the higher risk of cyclones.  
  A new policy was launched in 2006 under the name of ‘Coastal Zone Regulation’, which introduced new   
  zones. The minimum distance was now set at 35 metres from the sea and the maximum distance at   
  125 metres, depending on the location, the physical environment, and damage caused by the tsunami. 
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the housing relocation programmes started, the foreign gift was appropriated as a 
patronage resource within Muslim politics.
Case 2: a ‘German village’ gifted to tsunami-affected families 
The posttsunami gift economy developed a particular dynamic because new 
types of collective private donors in Europe—private companies and public and 
semipublic administrative units—collected gifts from among their staff or allocated 
organisational funds as gifts (Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006). These donors then 
sought to find partners who could implement their project ideas in Sri Lanka. 
In the German federal state of BadenWürttemberg, senior officials of four 
semipublic organisations pooled donations and formed a donor group called the 
Tsunami Relief Cooperation. The donor group wanted to implement a housing 
relocation project. Its four representatives all had longlasting personal ties or 
organisational and political linkages with Sri Lanka. For example, the regional 
Ministry for Environment, one of the four donors, had been collaborating with the 
Sri Lankan Ministry of Development and Water Supply. The donor group utilised 
its relations with toplevel Sri Lankan bureaucrats and politicians and signed 
a memorandum of understanding with the Sri Lankan government, thereby 
formalising the ‘German gift’ of BadenWürttemberg through a bilateral agreement. 
This memorandum allowed the donor group to sideline the bureaucratic and legal 
procedures implemented by the Sri Lankan governmental Task Force for the 
Reconstruction of the Nation (TAFREN), later the Tsunami Housing Reconstruction 
Unit (THRU). Local politicians helped to acquire ‘beautiful sites’ in the Galle region, 
which served the purpose of the project idea of building ecofriendly houses in a 
liveable environment. 
The German donors soon realised that they did not have adequate capacities 
to implement the housing programme. Consequently, they drew on personal 
relations in their home country, BadenWürttemberg, to identify a professional 
broker, an aid agency, to implement the housing project. Some ministry officials 
and the representative of the Rotary Club had strong personal ties with the 
German Protestant aid organisation, Diakonie. Diakonie (whose headquarters is 
in the capital of BadenWürttemberg) was reluctant at first to accept the mandate, 
but it finally agreed. A leading Diakonie official told us that because of the high 
profile of the people involved, ‘there was no way to disclaim the project any 
longer’. Diakonie depended on the goodwill of influential people within the donor 
group for future funding and cooperation. 
Diakonie started implementing the ‘BadenWürttemberg Village’ in early 2006, 
when Galle District, where the relocation site was located, was experiencing 
1 3 8  | T h e  P a r a d o x  o f  G o o d  I n t e n t i o n s
increased competition among different aid agencies for access to relocation 
sites and beneficiary lists. This competition created a number of tensions 
among different agencies, as well as among foreign aid professionals and Sri 
Lankan bureaucrats (who were considered to be slowing down the pace of 
implementation) and the large numbers of potential beneficiaries who became 
increasingly frustrated with slow progress in house construction. Sri Lankan 
friends felt obliged to support their German counterparts. Several political party 
officials wrote recommendation letters and made their influence felt with local 
governmental authorities to speed up certain decisions, such as on the allocation 
of sites, on the recognition of land titles, and on obtaining an exemption for 
valueadded tax (VAT). Diakonie formally followed official procedures, but the 
‘recommendations’ and ‘persuasions’ helped it to resolve its concerns much faster 
than a number of other aid agencies that did not have such political networks. 
In the donors’ home constituency in BadenWürttemberg, the ‘Sri Lanka project’ 
received mounting criticism. The Ministry of Environment was challenged in the 
regional parliament. The donor group urged Diakonie to bring the project to 
completion and to conduct an inauguration ceremony to demonstrate visibly its 
success. 
The donor group decided that the opening ceremony should be held in July 2007, 
during the German vacation season, so that the donor representatives and their 
families could travel to Sri Lanka easily. The donor group insisted on the erection 
of street name signs such as Stuttgart Para (street), Rotary Road, Speidel Pedesa 
(small street), and Neckar Padipela (stairs)—all related to BadenWürttemberg or 
to the donor representatives’ organisation. 
The ceremonial setup was a great concern for the donor group, too. It insisted 
on the hoisting of the German, Sri Lankan, and Baden Württemberg flags, 
accompanied by each country’s national anthem. Each donor wanted to deliver a 
speech, which generated tensions regarding who was to speak when. One donor 
claimed: ‘as we donated more money we should have the right to speak first and 
longer’. Several artistic performances were to take place, such as by a choir or a 
dancing group—‘something from the local culture’. Diakonie headquarters’ officials 
wanted to use the ceremony to demonstrate peaceful harmony in the village and 
among ethnic communities in the region, instructing the local Diakonie office to 
invite and ensure the presence of religious leaders of all ethnic groups at the 
ceremony. 
State officials, including the Government Agent (GA) from Galle District, and 
local politicians, while exerting their influence and power to speed up project 
implementation, used the ‘BadenWürttemberg Village’ as a model case to make 
evident their political effectiveness. The GA publicly announced that ‘this is the 
best housing project in the Galle region’. The ‘German gift’ thereby entered into 
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Galle’s dynamics of political appropriation and patronage. When, in early July, 
the GA noticed delays in road construction, he personally ordered the Road 
Development Authority (RDA) to prepare the roads for a high profile visit by 
Germany and Colombo. The inauguration ceremony and the noticeable political 
interference in its implementation demonstrated that the housing scheme had 
gained strong political backing. In the eyes of the recipients of one house, this 
scheme was ‘special’—some said that they had the best housing scheme in the 
area. 
Case 2 shows two interrelated discourses and practices at work. On the one 
hand, the German donors wanted to invigorate a ‘German’ gift—with German 
credentials (ecofriendly, for instance). They visibly inaugurated the gift and 
communicated the generosity back to audiences at home in BadenWürttemberg. 
Diakonie, the aid broker, attempted to rescue the inauguration of the gift from 
worldly and mundane elements—the inauguration should become a celebration 
of peace, of the common good, an interruption to Sri Lanka’s messy politics 
of conflict and antagonism. It was designed as a celebration of a ‘pure’ gift, 
but by commemorating the gift, presumed ‘purity’ became impossible. On the 
other hand, local politicians and bureaucrats transformed the gift into a political 
resource, embedding it in the reciprocal networks of obligations. Thereby, the 
‘German gift’ became reappropriated as a patronage resource in local politics. 
Both elements of the gift, however, were coevolving: the ‘German gift’ and the 
patronage gift each had their own rationale, ritual(s), and recipients. 
Case 3: religious patrimonialism in Akkaraipattu 
This third case involved the neighbourhood of Akkaraipattu, a coastal town 
in Ampara District in the southeast with some 60,000 inhabitants. Traditional 
caste, kudi (matriclans), and dowry systems are still an everyday reality in 
Akkaraipattu (McGilvray, 2008). The study explored the relocation programme for 
the inhabitants of Sinna Muhattuvaram, a small settlement (1,100 people) just 
south of Akkaraipattu. It lies on a narrow coastal strip between the lagoon and the 
sea and thus the tsunami almost completely washed it away. Its inhabitants are 
mostly lowcaste Tamils (and some Burghers) who are either Hindu or belong to the 
Catholic or Methodist Church. They could not resume life in Sinna Muhattuvaram 
after the tsunami, because most of the village lies inside the buffer zone. The 
Divisional Secretary (DS) took vital decisions about planning and coordination 
of the relocation scheme. He selected three organisations to implement the 
relocation and allocated beneficiaries to each of them: the Smyrna Fellowship; the 
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Eastern Human and Economic Development (EHED); and the Methodist Church. 
All three organisations are explicitly Christian. Smyrna Fellowship is the aid 
channel of a USbased evangelical church and relies on private funding from a 
Swedish family.5 EHED is the wellestablished local developmental agency of the 
Catholic Diocese in Batticaloa, which has been working in the east of Sri Lanka for 
a long time and has a dense network of offices throughout the region. EHED is still 
embedded in the Church’s hierarchy, but operates as a professional developmental 
NGO with offices and cars. It receives funding through the Catholic Caritas 
network as well as from secular donors and governments. Compared to EHED, 
the developmental wing of the Methodist Church is more firmly connected to the 
clergy and congregation. The housing scheme discussed was operated through 
the Methodist circuit in Thirukkovil (south of Akkaraipattu) and was supervised 
directly by the priest. 
The Methodist Church and EHED were eager to represent themselves as 
nonpartisan. They explained that they assist Hindus, Muslims, and Christians, 
because need is their only valid criterion—they provide aid regardless of the 
recipient’s religious or ethnic affiliation. Both churches have a long history of 
offering help, education, and consolation to marginalised segments of society. 
Methodist informants were vividly aware of the views of their founder, John 
Wesley, who created the church to reach out to the underclass and underlined 
that ‘there is no holiness without social holiness’. Catholic priests emphasised 
that nonpartisanship could be directly related to Jesus Christ’s and the Catholic 
Church’s teaching on caritas. Gift giving as a religious practice is deeply 
embedded in the Church’s networks—Caritas, for example, is a global organisation 
that channels gifts from donors in far away countries to Sri Lanka. Christian aid 
agencies were therefore quite accustomed to the dual nature of the gift as a 
religious practice and as a developmental resource, including the reciprocal 
relations between donor and receiver attached to it. 
Although connected to the church and its religious and ethical teachings, the 
developmental wings of the two mainline churches also operate within the modus 
operandi—networks, practices, and discourse—of the humanitarian sector. In their 
proclamations, Christian NGOs, such as EHED or the Methodist developmental 
wing, describe themselves as professional aid agencies, but working with the 
inspiration of Christian values, making them even more committed to charity and 
development than secular NGOs. However, the massive influx of funds after the 
tsunami created concern among Christian NGOs that the pressure to deliver could 
compromise their Christian values. The Office Manager of a Dutch Christian NGO 
5 At the time of our research (2007–08), the Smyrna Fellowship was no longer present on the sites.    
   Given its noninstitutionalised nature, it was not possible to interview a representative and it was    
   difficult to get more details on its views and activities through other channels.
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in Akkaraipattu said that: ‘To the extent it was there previously, the tsunami and 
the subsequent aid rush destroyed all the Christian ethos . . . All organisations go 
through that boom and they are confronted with competition, spending pressure, 
audits and so on. It evens out the difference’. 
In Sinna Muhattuvaram, this tension emerged quite clearly. The three 
organisations accepted the division of labour decreed by the DS, which allocated 
houses irrespective of the religious identities of the future inhabitants. However, 
the recipients attached significant importance to religious identity and had clear 
expectations about their religious leaders and the way they handled gifts. While 
the churches had long abandoned the idea of using gifts for conversion or as a 
patronage resource for their followers, their constituencies appeared to expect 
them to do exactly that. Christian respondents wanted their religious patrons to 
provide assistance to them. Informants living in the Smyrna section of the tsunami 
housing project complained that their own churches (Catholic and Methodist) had 
not helped them much, and what they had given came from foreign gifts. Smyrna, 
though, had done well. The receivers considered the church that had delivered 
gifts to be one that cared for them. Therefore, this church deserved their loyalty. 
One informant said: ‘The priest [from their original congregation] was worried 
people might join Smyrna, but no church came . . . If Smyrna builds a church, 
certainly we will go there. They built all the houses and the playground. Certainly, 
we will join’. Apparently, the villagers did not know that state officials had 
allocated the beneficiaries to the three agencies. Aid workers and priests of the 
Catholic and Methodist Church acknowledged the tension. The EHED Information 
Officer explained: ‘The Catholics expected us to help them, but actually we are 
not the ones to decide who helps whom. The DS does that’. The Methodist priests 
protested: ‘we did so much for these people, but they are complaining’. 
Inside the Methodist congregation in Akkaraipattu, faithful people were concerned 
that the priests were so involved in aid work that they were neglecting 
their religious services for their home congregation. As the congregation in 
Akkaraipattu town itself did not suffer much in the tsunami, priests were mainly 
helping other people. Prominent Methodist Church members said: ‘The people are 
busy earning money. They don’t think about Jesus. Christians have started a lot 
of NGOs. The fathers don’t have time for preaching anymore. They are busy doing 
NGO business and neglect visiting the houses and praying with the people’. These 
criticisms fit into a wider religious discourse of antipolitics that surfaced in the 
Maruthamunai case as well: worldly affairs are seen as temporary and inferior to 
the religious. Money and politics are key symbolic manifestations of the world and 
are viewed as dirty or sinful. From this perspective, the churches had transformed 
their religious service of caritas and gift giving into an NGO business, thereby 
becoming similar to secular NGOs. 
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This case presents the story of the reappropriation of the developmental gift 
in religious terms. Although inspired by religious faith and practices of caritas, 
mainline Christian aid agencies nowadays largely operate using the discourse, 
practices, and principles of the developmental world. Paradoxically, however, 
religious followers expected their churches to use the developmental gift as a 
patrimonial resource for their own flock. This divergence of expectations created 
tension at a time when gifts were abundant. While the ‘pure’ gift as caritas—
as religious service—has been an important Christian value, the expectations 
attached to the relational and symbolic meaning of the developmental gift differed 
among the Christian aid workers, who were often from the clergy and the Christian 
laity. Many tsunami victims from Sinna Muhattuvaram wanted their church to care 
for them first—to provide them with tsunami gifts. It was unreasonable to them 
that their church offered gifts to people other than those in their congregation. 
Their view suggests a sense of religious patrimonialism from below, where the 
gift becomes a relational object that binds the laity to the church. This mirrors 
the rationale of political patronage relations that bind politicians to voters through 
gifts. The mainline churches have been insisting that their gifts should go to all 
who are in need, regardless of their affiliation. While they can find justification in 
the Christian teaching on caritas, based on the notion of ‘pure’ religious service, 
these principles also adhere to the frameworks and guidelines of humanitarianism. 
But engagement with this kind of developmental gift brought the priests criticism, 
first because some of their own people felt that they engaged too much with the 
mundane and worldly affairs of the NGO business, and second, because other 
followers felt that the church did not do enough for them. 
The entanglement of the gift 
In posttsunami Sri Lanka, the narrative of the gift has been permeated by 
development discourse, jargon, and rituals: all kinds of coordination meetings, 
terminology, minimum standards and principles, different project phases, 
beneficiary categories, the latest fashion of crosscutting themes, and a continuous 
‘stock trade’ of projects, target groups, aid commodities, budgets, contacts, and 
so on. These rituals and practices of humanitarianism blended with different gift 
rationales. What started as an otherworldly practice in the global North—as a 
‘pure’ gift—ended in a chain of relations, obligations, and reciprocal expectations 
and the dirty world of politics and patronage. Table 2 summarises and compares 
the logic of the gift in its state of coexistence as humanitarian gift and as 
patrimonial gift. These two spheres are, of course, not separate, but entwined. 
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The contradiction lies in divergent gift rationales. Different actors employ different 
strategies to negotiate, bend, or circumvent the contradictions between these gift 
rationales. 
Case 1 Case 2 Case 3
Place Maruthamunai, Ampara
District (southeast)
Baden-Württemberg
Village, Galle District
(south)
Sinna Muhattuvaram,
Akkaraipattu, Ampara
District (southeast)
Donor First local, then foreign German donor group Foreign
Broker First mosque federation,
then international aid
agencies, then politicians
Diakonie and local
politicians
Churches, Christian aid
agencies
Recipient Muslim Sinhalese 
plus a few Tamils and 
Muslims
Tamil
(Christian and Hindu)
plus a few Burghers
‘Humanitarian’ 
gift
From non-political
kindness to competitive
humanitarianism
The inflow of foreign 
money and agents disturbs 
the ‘non-political’ space of
kindness and fosters com- 
petitive humanitarianis
The ‘German’ (eco) gift
as symbolic domination
Special relations between
German donors and Sri
Lankan patrons provide 
the ground for a very 
special ‘German gift’, 
which needs an adequate 
gratification ceremony
Thechurch’sengage- ment in 
the developmental gift
Christian charities are inspired 
by religious values to care, 
but also demonstrate that 
they follow universal (secular) 
principles of humanitarianism 
(such as non-partisanship)
‘Patrimonial’ 
gift
Political contestation
‘The minister’ needs to
deliver the gift to her local
electorate, but other 
politicians contest the 
move, wanting to use the 
gift to expand the realm of 
their patrimonial system
The re-appropriation of
the German gift as a Sri
Lankan patrimonial gift
Local and national 
politicians and state 
officials re-appropriate 
the meaning and symbols 
of the ‘German gift’ as an 
expression of their caring 
patronage
The laity’s expectation
of a patrimonial gift
Some believers expect their 
clergy to provide caritas 
primarily to church members 
and others argue that priests 
have sacrificed their religious 
work for worldly NGO business
 Table 2 Humanitarian and patrimonial gift 
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The three case studies indicate how gifts given in situations of asymmetric 
relations create what Pierre Bourdieu (1990) calls symbolic domination: in 
extending a gift, a donor transforms his or her status in the relationship from 
dominant to generous. In accepting a gift, particularly one that cannot be 
reciprocated equally, the receiver implicitly acknowledges the social order that 
made this gift possible—he or she becomes grateful (Bourdieu, 1990, pp. 98–110; 
Hattori, 2001). The recipients of tsunami gifts could express gratefulness, 
demonstrated in various ways common in the realm of humanitarian aid, including 
donation ‘handover’ ceremonies and the performance of dances, songs, and 
theatre plays as part of donor celebrations. 
The gift is also embedded in local systems of patronage, as local patrons 
reappropriate the foreign (humanitarian) gift, making it ‘their’ patrimonial gift 
to be given to their clients. Here, the receiver acknowledges the social order by 
accepting this kind of gift—and provides a return in the form of political support, 
electoral votes or, in the case of religious leaders, faithful following. However, 
several tensions emerged at the intersection of humanitarian and patrimonial 
rationales of the gift. Catholic and Methodist aid workers attracted criticism 
because they failed to deliver a gift to their faithful. Many believers expected the 
churches to transform a humanitarian gift into a patrimonial one (Case 3). Muslim 
politicians felt pressure to find appropriate land and housing for their voters, 
otherwise they could have been lost to competing patrons (Case 1). Gifts became 
patrimonial not simply through disingenuous patrons, but also via the penetration 
of patrimonial rationale dynamics from above and from below—the dynamic 
became nearly inescapable and selfreinforcing. 
Conclusion 
The tremendous, destructive force of the Indian Ocean tsunami seemed to have 
created a moment of rupture, a break with the mundane world of politics. The 
global wave of solidarity and local acts of kindness in waraffected areas were 
often seen as opportunities to reconcile the divided society of Sri Lanka and to 
promote the peace process. However, this ‘gift of disaster’ vanished into the air. 
National contestations regarding aid distribution hardened the frontlines of the 
different political camps and ethnic communities and triggered the disintegration 
of the peace process (Frerks and Klem, 2009). The international NGO community 
became subject to vociferous attacks by the Sri Lankan media for failing to deliver 
the tsunami gift. The ‘purity’ of good intentions became contaminated in the local 
politics of patronage and the international gift economy. Indeed, Jacques Derrida 
(1992) has argued that the notion of a ‘pure’ gift is unfeasible: it is not possible to 
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give without immediately entering into a circle of exchange that turns the gift into 
a debt, an obligation to reciprocate. 
The humanitarian or developmental ‘gift’ is loaded with ethical ideals of 
otherworldly generosity, as an expression of religious practice, of global 
solidarity—it is a manifestation of the separation of ‘gift’ and ‘economy’—drawing 
a boundary between disinterested and interested exchange. In his study of the 
gift in ‘primitive societies’, Marcel Mauss (1990) suggested that gift giving has to 
be located within systems of exchange that involve obligations to give, to receive, 
and to return. The kinds of gift giving that Mauss described were embedded in 
social systems of prestations. Indeed, the French term prestation is closer to the 
idea of social welfare or insurance than disinterested generosity. 
Prestation is possibly a good term to describe the nature of what we have 
depicted as patrimonial gift: reciprocal obligations are articulated in patrimonial 
relations where both giver and receiver have specific expectations. The gift 
economy is not simply created by disingenuous patrons. Its patrimonial rationale 
permeates social reasoning from above and from below—it is almost inescapable. 
For instance, Muslim politicians provide gifts to ensure votes—potential voters 
expect their ‘minister’ to deliver according to the very same logic of the 
patrimonial gift. Disjuncture occurs when giver and receiver follow different gift 
rationales. Faithbased charities, for example, failed to respond adequately to the 
expectations of their laity who wanted the humanitarian gift to be transformed 
into a patrimonial gift. 
The idea of the ‘pure’ tsunami gift—to enclose aid in a space of ‘antipolitics’— was 
surely naive in a society shaped by patronage rationale. The national debates 
on mechanisms to allocate tsunami aid to different communities and on political 
favouritism brought out the political patronage rationale quite clearly. These 
antagonising discourses and the seeming inescapability of patrimonial rationales 
penetrated and reinforced social divisions along political and ethnic lines and as 
a result, they contributed also to the social conflict and political discontent that 
undermined the peace process (Goodhand, Korf and Spencer, 2009). 
Our material, however, also suggests that in addition to these dominant discourses 
of patronage and ethnic communalism, several other patronage rationales 
pervaded the practices, performances, and local, often more silent, discourses 
associated with the gift, exacerbating social conflict and discontent. In the words 
of Mary Douglas (1990): charity wounds. 
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Abstract 
This article analyses how rituals and ceremonies were deployed in the post-
tsunami rehabilitation process in Sri Lanka to ‘incorporate’ development projects 
into the habitus and social reality of local communities. It argues that even though 
the aid delivery process is represented as a gift, in reality it is more concerned 
with strengthening the social capital of the local and foreign donors. Through this 
process there is an expectation and an implicit demand for acquiescence from 
the	 beneficiaries,	which	 leaves	 them	with	 a	 social	 debt.	 This,	 in	 turn,	 compels	
them to participate in the game of development rituals and ceremonies, in order 
to express their (ambivalent) gratitude and thankfulness. Through two case 
studies, we explore how the good intentions of donors to provide aid and alleviate 
suffering and the acceptance of this aid by the local communities, results in an 
asymmetric relationship where both become accomplices of Bourdieuian notions 
of subtle and gentle violence. 
I. Introduction 
Rituals in Sri Lanka are not uncommon. In a country that proclaims to be steeped 
in a 2,500 year old history, there is often great fanfare marking particular 
moments as auspicious, celebratory occasions. From the mundane, for instance 
shifting to a new abode, to the more propitious occurrences such as marriage, the 
performance of numerous rites is considered a crucial aspect in the cultural life 
of Sri Lanka. Even though rituals are largely associated with people’s private life, 
there is no shortage of ways in which ceremonies are drawn upon to legitimise 
activities in the public world – whether it is for opening a newly constructed 
hospital or a prize-giving ceremony at school (see also Spencer, 2007). 
1 Department of Geography, University of Zurich, Switzerland
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Unsurprisingly, development efforts in post-colonial Sri Lanka too have employed 
ceremonies and rituals. In such cases  ‘‘‘tradition’’ is copiously invented in state 
rituals, political speeches, (and) offcially sponsored ‘‘revivals’’’ (Brow, 1988: 316). 
Given the involvement of the state in development projects in the immediate 
post-independence years, it became the leading actor in creating, reinventing and 
advancing traditions to legitimise numerous development practices and projects 
(Brow, 1988; Tennekoon, 1988). In more recent decades, Sri Lanka has witnessed 
an explosion of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) making incursions into 
the world of ‘development’. In particular, in the immediate post-tsunami period 
there	was	 an	 intense	 flurry	 of	 activity	 by	 both	NGOs	 and	 private	 philanthropic	
foundations. Given that these institutions are increasingly the primary vehicles 
of development practice, a key question is how do they deploy ceremonies and 
rituals in the Sri Lankan context? 
In the immediate post-tsunami phase, the authors became intimately linked to 
the efforts at reconstruction in two separate villages in southern Sri Lanka. Our 
association with each village was arrived at through different means. In what 
we term E-village, one of us was an implementing officer for more than two 
years, and took on management responsibilities for reconstructing a new village. 
In L-village, the other author has strong ties, as a close relative is the founder 
involved	in	rebuilding	the	village;	it	was	also	a	site	where	previous	fieldwork	had	
been undertaken. Because of these unusual connections, we were able to easily 
gain access to, and hold frank and lengthy discussions with, respondents. These 
associations also meant that there were numerous opportunities to become 
participant observers over an extended period of time and record the different 
phases of a village construction. It was during this time (2005-2008), we had the 
chance to partake, observe, and even initiate ceremonies and rituals. Given the 
extensive use of symbols and ceremony as critical markers of achievements, of 
moving onto another phase, we thought it was important to understand what the 
use of symbols and ceremonies signalled regarding the reconstruction process in 
the post-tsunami context. 
Existing debates on the post-tsunami Sri Lankan context have explored a range 
of themes including: the temporality and places of recovery (Ruwanpura, 2009); 
the multiple dilemmas and ambiguities embedded in the recovery process (Brun 
and	 Lund,	 2008;	 Brun,	 2009);	 the	 politics	 of	 memorialisation	 and	 purification	
(Simpson and de Alwis, 2008; Hasbullah and Korf, 2009); the gendered world of 
post-tsunami spatial politics (De Mel, 2007; Hyndman, 2008; Ruwanpura, 2008); 
and the geographies of goodwill (Korf, 2007; Korf et al., 2010). A key theme 
which underlies these interventions is the impossibility of understanding the 
reconstruction process without recognising the wider political, cultural, social and 
cultural terrain of war, ethno-nationalism and uneven development in Sri Lanka. 
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The	 recurrent	 failures	 to	 grasp	 the	 fissures	 in	 the	 country’s	 social	 fabric	mean	
that the mantra of ‘building back better’3 has not really tackled existing fault 
lines or the continuing tensions in an already fragmented sociality. Our article 
extends these debates to look more closely at the symbolic gestures deployed 
in reconstructing the post-tsunami villages. We argue that these gestures 
underscore the prevailing modes of social hierarchy. 
The literature on the politics of development highlights the importance of 
how ‘authoritative interpretations have to be made and sustained socially’ 
and where supporting actors need reasons to become stakeholders in 
‘interpretive communities’ of development (Mosse, 2004: 646). As post-tsunami 
reconstruction efforts shifted from humanitarian relief to development work, a 
cornerstone of numerous initiatives taken to socially legitimise these activities 
was that of generous giving. The generosity of the giving state as an imperative of 
development is well documented, where ‘inputs are framed as gifts, and they are 
ritualized accordingly’ (Li, 1999: 314; see also Brow, 1990). Ceremonial idioms 
highlight	the	processes	of	generosity;	at	the	same	time,	the	gift	is	reified	through	
the mundane visits by state officials, at which people constantly record their 
gratitude. What the logic of gift then does is to ‘preclude an alternative framing in 
terms of rights and entitlements’ (Li, 1999: 314). The post-tsunami milieu in Sri 
Lanka presents a situation in which villagers have survived the onslaught of the 
tsunami waves noting their good fortune to live, where gratitude – rather than 
claims to rights and entitlements – is registered for any ‘gifts’ obtained. 
We show through our article that it is not simply the state that invests in the 
construction of generous giving and evokes tradition through ritual, but so do 
the private philanthropists and NGOs (Simpson and Corbridge, 2006; Simpson 
and de Alwis, 2008). As NGOs and private philanthropists participated in post-
tsunami development via the process of gift giving, their involvement in creating 
and participating in ceremonies and rituals became a central plank in legitimising 
the ways in which they uphold their custom and culture. More critically from 
a Bourdieuian perspective, these ceremonies and rituals are important for 
deepening the NGO/philanthropist power base by investing in initiatives which 
enhance the social capital of these individuals and institutions (see also Jeffrey, 
2008, 2009). 
A corpus of existing literature points to the ways in which Bourdieu’s work is 
deployed by scholars of South Asia to tender perceptive readings of ethnographic 
material (Thapan and Lardinois, 2006; see also Jeffrey, 2009). These contributions 
are useful in analysing the ceremonies deployed in the post-tsunami development 
3 This is the espoused Sri Lankan government policy position on post-tsunami reconstruction efforts.
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context since they show how ‘symbolic systems (are) efficacious in maintaining 
relations of domination... in the obscurity of habitus’ (Jain, 2006: 111). Within 
every	 field,	 symbolic	 forms,	 struggles	 and	 violence	 are	 constitutive	 elements	
of each symbolic system (Jain, 2006). We show how ceremonies and rituals 
deployed	unravel	the	ways	 in	which	 ‘internalized	orientations	to	action...	reflect	
people’s (agents) histories and structure future action’ (Jeffrey, 2009: 186). 
These symbolic manifestations are then expressions of the social and material 
environments where class-power and its representational forms are transferred 
across multiple communities in seemingly durable forms. Yet even as some of 
these rituals are portrayed as vital aspects of Sri Lankan life, Bourdieu (1990, 
1998) serves as a critical entry point to show how they are also social practices 
which convey habitus of power, symbols of domination and even gentle violence. 
II. A New Lease of Life: The Process of Rebuilding Villages 
The two institutions under scrutiny here became involved with the reconstruction 
of villages in the post-tsunami context in different ways. In this section a 
synopsis of the critical particulars of this involvement relevant for the purposes 
of this article is offered.4 We show that despite the different trajectories of the 
organisations involved with rebuilding the villages, both establishments used 
ceremonies, rituals and symbols as key aspects to their reconstruction efforts. 
Research in L-village came about through the involvement of a local foundation, 
which had an active base of philanthropic work in the community. The tsunami, as 
unexpected and unfortunate as it was, offered the opportunity for the foundation 
to	become	a	 significant	agent	 in	attending	 to	 the	needs	of	 the	neighbourhood.	
Rebuilding	destroyed	and	partially	damaged	houses	became	a	significant	aspect	
of the reconstruction efforts put into place by the organisation. These efforts 
had rudimentary beginnings in the immediate post-tsunami context. Although a 
significant	portion	of	the	village	was	devastated	by	the	tsunami,	the	local	founder	
did	not	have	the	finances	to	commence	a	village	rebuilding	scheme.	Financially,	
the initial rebuilding plans were made possible through the generosity of a 
network within the Sri Lankan diasporas. It started with building the destroyed 
residences of the ‘poorest’ members of the community – with a woman who lost 
her	spouse	 to	 the	 tsunami	waves	being	 the	first	 recipient.	Over	 time,	however,	
the local foundation – given its impressive achievements of reconstruction efforts 
and well established links – moved on to acquire an NGO status and struck 
4	Elsewhere	a	detailed	analysis	of	fieldwork	processes	is	given	(Ruwanpura	and	Hollenbach,	2011					
   forthcoming).
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partnerships with corporate and foreign donors to embark upon an ambitious 
programme of rebuilding smaller compounds of houses within the village. As of 
today, the foundation has built or renovated some 600 houses in L-village. The 
ceremonies and rituals that went on display in this shifting scene of events moved 
from the small scale to the large scale, and in the following pages we present the 
ways in which the events came to be performed. 
Events unfolded in E-village rather differently. Here the rebuilding of the village 
occurred through a concerted plan of putting in place a new village housing 90 
dwellings. The purpose was to relocate villagers from the coastal belt5 who were 
caught in the tsunami waves, losing their homes and belongings, to a new place 
inland up to 18 km away from their original location. The impetus for building 
this new village was the coming together of a small group of foreigners who had 
previous links to Sri Lanka through their work and business. They used their 
social and political standing in their home countries to raise large-scale funding 
and	started	the	village	rebuilding	scheme	on	a	site	 identified	as	suitable	where	
the villagers would ‘become responsible for their welfare’. The connections of 
this group of foreigners to politicians and high offices in Sri Lanka also assisted 
in expediting the work through established processes and protocols. State-
level procedures required that donors work together and implement the village 
construction scheme via registered NGOs already working in the country. The 
NGO became the executing agency and this meant that it had the task of not 
simply constructing the dwellings but also had to demonstrate to the donors 
when particular milestones were met. These clear aims and goals meant that 
commemorating the achievements of the donors was crucial in indicating that 
the project had been successfully completed.6 The scale at which the opening 
ceremony was conducted in E-village was thus of a different nature to that of 
the L-village – although opening ceremonies at the latter stages of the project 
resonated with that of the one opening ceremony in E-village. The next section of 
the article describes what constituted these practices and what it aimed to signal 
regarding the achievements of the institutional actors. 
5 The Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL) declared in 2005 a ‘buffer zone’ of 100–300m around the         
   coastal line in order to secure the inhabitants in case of a further tsunami and people were relocated  
   accordingly (Hyndman, 2008).
6 ‘Success’ for the donors was measured by completing the physical infrastructure necessary for   
   constructing a village, rather than necessarily how community life will be organised and managed in  
   the new social, political and economic environment. The donors neglected the fact that people are   
   forced to migrate into a new environment and leave behind their habituated social world. The new  
   village is formed out of 13 different villages along the coastal belt, and so social, ethnic and economic  
   structures and relations began anew.
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III. Ceremonies and Rituals: A Commemoration of Achievements? 
The	 donor	 driven	 scheme	 had	 a	 clearly	 stated	 objective	 of	 building	 a	 specific	
number	 of	 houses.	 It	 meant	 that	 a	 sense	 of	 finality	 to	 the	 project	 needed	 to	
be registered at some point through the lifetime of the village construction. By 
the start of 2007, there was increasing emphasis placed on holding a mid-year 
inauguration ceremony and the planning for it therefore had to get underway. The 
thinking was that a ceremony would show the results to the donor country and 
the respective institutions as the village building was nearing completion. Further 
delay beyond July 2007 was likely to minimise attention and lose interest in the 
project, it was thought. Although holding a celebratory launch was being stressed, 
the village construction process was still not completed and it was facing major 
problems with the water supply and road construction. Moreover, the 90 families 
who	 were	 identified	 as	 eligible	 for	 new	 housing	 were	 increasingly	 unwilling	 to	
move into the new village. There was great pressure placed on the NGO to deliver 
through ‘participative’ meetings with the housing recipients. Consequently, there 
was much persuading done by the NGO to get villagers to move to the site while 
construction was going on. Fifteen families ended up agreeing to move to the 
village. Several other recipients were also coaxed to move in temporarily, in order 
to make the houses look occupied for the inauguration ceremony. The NGO had 
to demonstrate its accountability but the donors too were under pressure to show 
responsibility towards their generous friends and supporters. Nevertheless, more 
than half of the houses remained empty at the inauguration ceremony.7 However, 
the recipients agreed to participate in preparing for the inauguration ceremony 
and to help make the village look attractive on the day. 
The ceremony itself was a celebration of the donors’ efforts and a staging of their 
generosity. The donors arrived a day before and took their time to walk through 
the village with journalists and photographers. They took pictures and gave 
interviews to the foreign press. They also requested to walk into occupied houses 
in order to ‘familiarise’ themselves with how people live. The recipients more or 
less voluntarily opened their doors and invited the donors to come in. However, 
as the implementing NGO had anticipated that the donors would make such a 
request, four families were approached with this request ahead of time. It was like 
a show, a well-arranged theatre play. Because the NGO was aware of the ‘donors’ 
visit game’, it was important to play it; there was dependency involved as well as 
the	aspiration	to	get	further	donations	and	financial	support	(see	also	Li,	1999).	
7	The	majority	felt	that	to	move	out	to	Akmeemana	division	into	unfinished	housing	was	worse	than			
    their current temporary living conditions, because there was no running water, no roads and access to 
    main roads, food markets and construction was still ongoing. 
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At the opening ceremony the rituals continued. The donors and official invitees 
arrived at the village and a school choir dressed in lama-sariya (white traditional 
clothing worn by girls attending Sunday school at Buddhist temples) welcomed 
the guests. The village square became the stage, that was decorated with 
additional donations gifted to the village – a tractor, a gully bowser, a waste 
disposal collector wagon – were all on display. A hewisi (Oriental/Kandyan) school 
band, dressed in colourful lungi (a long straight cloth and short jacket) and piping 
Oriental	percussion	and	string	instruments,	guided	the	invitees	to	the	first	event,	
the	hoisting	of	the	national	flags	which	included	the	flag	of	Sri	Lanka,	the	donor	
country,	 the	 donor	 state,	 and	 agencies.	 Each	 flagpole	 demonstrates	 that	 the	
partners are now permanently monumentalised in front of the community hall. 
The monument, a huge wall made of natural stones, carried the emblem of each 
institutional actor and its sponsorship was inscribed. It symbolically demonstrates 
to the villagers on a daily basis that the place they live in is generously gifted; 
‘it is made for people affected by disaster rather than by them’ (Simpson and de 
Alwis,	2008:	7).	After	the	flags	were	hoisted,	the	guests	of	honour	were	invited	
to the ribbon cutting ceremony in the community hall and were again guided by a 
Kandyan-dancing group and the band to their seats. The housing recipients were 
standing to the side, watching. Their part in the play was only to watch, a passive 
form of acting; their contribution to the ceremony was to be present as a thankful 
audience. However, their children had to dress in shirts, which carried the logo of 
the NGO involved in the project. 
The inauguration lasted almost three hours. With the lighting of the traditional 
lamp and blessings of religious leaders from different faiths, the ceremony was 
initiated. Because the village was to represent a ‘model’ for peaceful living among 
all ethnic and religious groups, one important element was the representation 
of all religious groups at the ceremony. ‘It is important to bring all the religious 
groups together, especially now as the country again faces political problems. 
The village should be a symbol of peace and harmony, and we want to show 
that people from different religious backgrounds can live with each other’ said 
one donor. The implementing NGO had to engage in protracted conversations, 
convincing	 and	 negotiating	 with	 the	 religious	 figures	 of	 the	 temples,	 church	
and mosques to accept their invitations. In the end all agreed to attend the 
ceremony; one convincing fact was a small donation to each religious institution. 
The Buddhist monks opened the ceremony with prayers and blessings at the 
astrological auspicious time, which was followed by the Imam and Hindu priest 
blessing the donors and the village.8 
8 This moment of harmony is well recorded with many photos taken by foreign journalists. In a         
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Speeches were given by the donors, the NGO and official representatives from 
the donor country and Sri Lankan politicians. Alongside, traditional dancing and 
singing were staged for the guests in order to create a convivial and ritual ‘Sri 
Lankan’ spirit. The arrangement of the seating was also symbolic. The donors 
were seated on comfortable chairs in good condition looking on at the receiving 
families, who were either seated on plastic chairs or standing in the sun due 
to lack of space. The asymmetric power relations could not have been starker. 
Even the placement of the stage connoted the thankfulness to the donors. The 
speeches by the donors were all monotonous. They talked about their solidarity 
and obligation towards Sri Lanka in this devastating moment of the tsunami 
disaster	and	the	efforts	taken	to	help	raise	and	finance	the	village.	Each	speech	
emphasised the responsibility the recipients now had in taking over the ownership 
and management of the village, to sustain good and peaceful living within the 
community. ‘You, the new citizens of the E-village... have to grow together and 
become a community, a community in the true sense of the word’ said one of the 
donors in his speech. Ironically, talk of ownership was incorporated at the behest 
of the donors. 
Since the 90 houses comprising the new village were not completed, the key 
handing over ritual was carried out via one family who represented the villagers. 
It was an important moment. The four donors handed over a symbolic key,9 cut 
out from cardboard with a huge red ribbon and the name of the village written 
on it, while paying attention to clicking cameras. The family selected to receive 
the symbolic key was an exemplar of an active member of the village community. 
They	were	always	the	first	to	support	new	ideas	and	participate	in	events	to	show	
their gratefulness and appreciation; ‘we know without the tsunami we never could 
afford to own property’ said the woman. 
IV. Marking Milestones via Staggered Rituals 
The staging of ceremonies in reconstructing totally and partially damaged houses 
by the local foundation in L-village was, in contrast, staggered. Because there 
was no stated aspiration by the local foundation to construct and reconstruct 600 
houses	 from	 the	 inception,	 there	was	 no	moment	 of	 finality.	 Indeed	 given	 the	
founder’s aspiration for a holistic village uplifting scheme, he was aware that ‘it is 
difficult to state that there is an end-point to what I have in mind for the village’. 
   documentary done by a foreign TV production company, this ‘moment of harmony’ is represented as a   
   positive effect that the project has achieved in Sri Lanka.
9	This	was	merely	symbolic	because	legal	questions	on	land	ownership	are	still	not	clarified	(2010).
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Since the primary goals of the foundation were modest and the preliminary 
steps were taken through the assistance of individuals, the initial ceremonies 
were spread out. The rituals of the sort enacted for the E-village only occurred 
afterwards, when institutional donors became players in the rebuilding of sub-
villages within the local village. 
During	May–August	2005	 the	first	 batch	of	 rebuilt	 houses	was	being	 ‘gifted’	 to	
the tsunami-affected recipients. This ‘gifting’ ceremony consisted of a seemingly 
minor ritual whereby the donor, in this case Canadians of Sri Lankan origin, 
cut the ribbon at the entrance of the rebuilt house and handed the keys10 over 
to the head of the family. Then the family member opened the door and other 
family members – already inside the house – welcomed the donor with a plate 
of milk-rice (kiribath) and fruit. Alongside the donor family was the founder of 
the organisation, numerous foreign volunteers and friends of the founder, with 
a photographer taking photos. The family then served all the onlookers and 
strangers – of which there were quite a few since this was one of the initial houses 
to be rebuilt and donated – kiribath and bananas. All of this was done at the 
nakath (auspicious) time. 
It was a sunny day and around mid-morning we had ventured to the house a 
good few minutes prior to the ribbon-cutting ceremony. The family members 
were anxious that the founder and the donor family would not arrive on time. 
Their fears stemmed from the fact that the founder and the chief guest were 
apparently officially donating the keys at another house nearby. Amidst the 
people who had gathered around the house, it was evident who were the locals 
and who were the outsiders. During this time through casual conversation with 
the family our research was explained to them. We inquired if it would be alright 
if the ritual ceremony was observed and there was no objection.11 When we 
spoke about the tsunami and the destruction to property, the family mentioned 
that they considered themselves to be fortunate to be an early recipient of a 
reconstructed house. When queried about the layout we were told that it was 
a two bedroom house; they suggested that we walk around the house after 
the chief guest/donor had officially handed over the keys to them. Through our 
conversation, when it seemed apparent that the family itself was larger than an 
10 At this point, the symbolic gesture was to hand over the keys and not necessarily the title deeds to 
the
   house. In fact in early 2008 during a return visit to the village, some villagers noted that there was   
   some variation in obtaining the legal deeds to their new abodes. Some had obtained the title deeds,  
   especially where the houses were rebuilt within the land premises of their destroyed houses, while    
   others got them after some delay and still others who had not received the title deeds at all – and  
   were unaware as to when they would obtain these.
11 And in every sense, how could there be – in so far as the researcher was of a different social standing
   who is unlikely to have been turned down at a joyful event.
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idealtype nuclear unit with mother, father and two children, they explained that 
every	house	was	of	a	standard	size	and	even	though	it	may	be	a	tight	fit	for	the	
family they were still grateful for being given a restored house (Hyndman, 2008; 
Caron, 2009; Ruwanpura, 2009). Their ambivalence about the house, even for 
practical concerns, was tempered by appreciation of the ‘gift’ of a house, similar 
to the sentiments echoed by recipients in the foreign-built village. The father 
then showed us around the small garden path and noted how the foundation was 
offering an incentive for the best kept garden by offering a monthly supply of 
dry rations and groceries. In the midst of the conversation, the guests and their 
friends arrived and everyone fell into place – with cordial welcomes and the usual 
hustle and bustle which facilitated the start of the ceremony. 
The ceremony of ‘gifting the keys’ was also about marking the milestones 
achieved in reconstructing a tsunami-affected village. It was, in the words of the 
founder, about ‘performance and delivery’ – of accomplishing goals. But this rite 
of passage was also about the numerous unstated structures and symbols that 
mark the giver and the getter as stemming from rather different social milieus. 
The tsunami-affected family should now be doubly grateful – for not simply being 
lucky	enough	to	have	survived	the	tsunami,	but	also	for	being	a	donor	beneficiary	
within six to seven months of the tsunami. The bows, the welcome smiles, and 
the passing around of kiribath, fruits and aerated-water drinks was all put on for 
the donor family, the founder and all other participants. The privilege and status 
were	 all	 unstated	markers	 at	 this	 joyous	 occasion	 which	 the	 founder	 reflected	
upon subsequently. These practices are not only symbolic of the habituated status 
occupied but are also ways of reinforcing people’s place in society through ‘special’ 
rituals. Serena Tennekoon (1988) reminds us that it is possible to understand 
that ‘rituals, whether sacred or secular... are socio-cultural constructs, endowing 
authority and legitimacy to the positions of particular persons... and structure the 
way that people think about social life’ (1988: 294). We pursue this point further 
by showing that the legitimacy sought and reinforced through ritual practices 
also inscribe moments of symbolic and gentle violence (Bourdieu, 1990; see also 
Wilford, 2008). 
While the initial house warming and opening ceremonies were spread out, the 
L-village also had inauguration ceremonies for the larger compounds of its 
subvillages. The involvement of corporate or foreign donors who facilitated the 
construction of sub-villages, where each patron built 30 to 85 houses, required 
such	 grand	 events.	 The	 construction	 of	 these	 plots	 had	 specified	 time	 lines	
attached to them; hence celebrating its completion through rituals and ceremonies 
was crucial for marking and displaying the milestones achieved to the donors and 
community. The founder said, ‘I have been often asked... what the purpose of 
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these ceremonies is? You know the truth of the matter is that the villagers want 
these rituals and celebrations; it is a moment for them to come together because 
for them it is part of their way of doing things, something native. It is also for 
them to see what has been achieved. For us, the foundation, it is to show how we 
are ‘‘performance oriented, accountable, transparent, and deliver as promised’’ 
... which is important for our implementing partners.’ However, according to a 
village recipient, by the time their sub-village was completed, one of the last, 
the enthusiasm and need for such ceremonies and rituals were overkill. ‘Yes, yes 
... we had an opening ceremony too. There was quite a bit of tamasha that the 
Foundation	put	together	because	this	was	the	final	constructed	sub-village	–	and	
we got two-storied houses too. We went for the event because it seems to be 
expected of us, and it makes the people at the foundation happy. To tell the truth, 
by now [end 2007] we are a little tired of attending so many ceremonies. You 
will notice there are fewer people who go for these functions these days.’ Quite 
in contrast to the founder’s reading of the village recipients ‘liking’ and ‘wanting’ 
these ceremonies, the villagers had a slightly more jaundiced take on such rituals. 
But the show was important, in particular for the donors – as the village man said. 
The ceremonies usually involved a representative of the donor agency cutting 
a ribbon and walking around the compound, approving and appreciating the 
construction and layout of the houses. The recipients watched, standing on the 
sidelines of a designated house or two; they received the guests of honour by 
serving kiribath, savoury accompaniments and fruits. Ambling in the compound 
was important for the donor, as they appreciated the layout that resonates 
with their image of idyllic rural communes located in lush tropical areas with 
coconut palm trees, green grass and well laid-out shrubbery and gardens. Upon 
entering P subvillage one comes across small and pretty garden paths with 
street lighting fashioned after old gas lamps leading into a small and seemingly 
cosy community of 9–10 houses. V-Gardens are designed with paved/tarred 
roads and have a children’s playground in the midst of 84 two-storied houses, 
a novelty in any Sri Lankan village. Large or small boards adorn the entrance to 
each sub-village complex explicitly denoting its association to the donors, where 
the benefactors’ contribution to uplifting the village through these compounds is 
recorded. The quality of the housing and the effort put into designing the layouts 
of each compound is impressive. Yet these built communes and the ritual opening 
ceremonies signal the interventions of foreign and corporate donors and their 
claim on these villages. Indeed, it did not seem that the local villages and owners 
of these new houses had any say, except for the colours used to paint the houses, 
in redesigning of the village into smaller compounds. Instead, it was the founder 
– elite and English-speaking – who as the Colombo-based ‘local’ mediator spoke 
a donor-friendly language and negotiated the funding and reconstruction plans on 
behalf of the villagers. 
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V. Power Politics or Celebrations of ‘Authenticity’ 
Even though the commemoration efforts of the local foundation and foreign donors 
gathered pace over time, their occurrence differed, given the distinctive rhythms 
of each project. Yet in both instances the public display of ceremonies and rituals 
were important moments for analysing the ways in which social distance and 
power relations are stabilised and negotiated. The differences in the ways in 
which these rituals were enacted in the two rebuilt villages can be explained by 
the different pathways used to regenerate village communities. This distinction 
also feeds into the different scales of ritualistic performances of the inauguration 
days and handing over key ceremonies in the two locations; yet underlying 
similarities remain and need closer reading. In both projects donors have a 
certain interest in requiring rituals and celebrations. As Bourdieu states, ‘social 
agents don’t do just anything, ... they are not foolish... they do not act without 
reason’ (1998:75). But is it always a conscious reason or does the habitus of the 
social agent provoke certain reasons? Habitus represents the social structures of 
our subjectiveness, which describes the process of internalisation of outwardness 
–	 internalisation	 of	 social	 structures:	 ‘The	 habitus	 fulfils	 a...	 socialized	 body,	 a	
structured body, a body which has incorporated the immanent structures of a 
world... and structures the perception of the world as well as action in the world’ 
(Bourdieu, 1998: 81). Therefore action is not only the result of conscious calculus 
but chosen by the relation between subject and society. The habitus relates to a 
certain	 social	 field	 within	 the	 process	 of	 internalisation	 and	 establishes	 certain	
structures by which to think, act and perceive. It is a multidimensional matrix of 
social reality, constructed through existing practices of society which represents a 
differentiated social space within which social practices are continuously produced 
and	achieved.	Bourdieu	(1990)	substitutes	the	term	social	field	with	the	metaphor	
of the game, ‘Pre-perceptive anticipations, a sort of practical induction based on 
previous experiences, are not given to a pure subject, a universal transcendental 
consciousness. They are the fact of the habitus as a feel for the game. Having the 
feel for the game is having the game under the skin’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 80). These 
embodied dispositions are apparent in the conversations with the donors and the 
local philanthropist on the one hand, and the villagers, on the other hand: each 
busily and skilfully playing their own game. 
In the illustrations used in our article it is clear that one aspect of celebrations 
and	rituals	is	the	legitimisation	and	accountability	towards	financial	and	political	
supporters. The donors at the ceremonies represent the smaller benefactors who 
contributed to reconstruct and rehabilitate the tsunami affected houses. Results 
had to be shown to these non-present supporters. As the founder of the L-village 
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stated, it is about ‘performance and delivery’ or as one of the donors of E-village 
stated, ‘the opening ceremony has to take place in July 2007, afterwards the 
attention from Germany will be less’. The founder and the foreign donors acted 
in	their	social	field	of	being	a	receiver	of	funds	and	within	this	field	it	is	important	
to show results, be accountable, keep the social standing and not lose their 
credibility. The donation of funds was not only about the physical construction but 
also about serving their interests and reinforcing their privileged social position. 
‘Strategies aimed at producing practices ‘‘according to the rules’’ are one among 
other types of offcialization strategy, aimed at transmuting ‘‘egoistic’’, private, 
particular interests into ‘‘disinterested’’, collective, publicly avowable, legitimate 
interests’ (Bourdieu, 1997a: 202). It is about the accumulation of their social 
capital even via episodes of symbolic violence which secures the continuation of 
the	social	standing	within	a	social	field	(Bourdieu,	1998).	
The involvement of local politicians and celebrities in the rituals and ceremonies 
further helped to solidify their existing social ties and connection. Rituals are 
then used not only to inaugurate development but also to demonstrate political 
and social presence as the country ‘modernises’ (see also Spencer, 2007). The 
habitus	 of	 donors	 and	 givers	 within	 the	 field	 of	 aid	 in	 Sri	 Lanka	 includes	 the	
celebration of donation, and through local rituals, the acceptance of development 
work (Tennekoon, 1988). These rituals help internalise and localise the imposed 
and external-driven development projects. But this also involves reinforcing 
local power structures. In the above cases, the local politicians, officials and 
celebrities were able to re-formalise their social positions within their social 
field.	 Participating	 in	 a	 development	 project	 funded	 by	 foreign	 agents,	 having	
access	and	personal	contacts	to	this	social	field	of	 international	relations	shows	
superiority and exclusivity; it enhances their social capital and social recognition. 
In E-village many local politicians from various authorities were involved and 
the foreign donors used these good social relations in order to achieve project 
milestones. The external access road construction, for example, started just one 
day	before	 the	opening	 ceremony.	At	 this	 point	 it	was	 clear	 that	 a	high-profile	
minister	 from	Colombo	would	attend	 the	ceremony	and	his	 influence	made	 the	
local road authority fear sanctions; consequently the road was constructed within 
a	 day!	 Again,	 this	 example	 illustrates	 how	 habitus	 and	 social	 fields	 influence	
actions and strengthen existing power relations, with agents trying to keep their 
social	 position	 and	 recognition	 within	 their	 social	 field.	 In	 L-village	 the	 social	
position of donors was also demonstrated by inviting Colombo-based celebrities to 
highlight the importance of the tsunami project and its exclusivity. Listening to the 
initiator of the L-Village and the way he explained the need for the inauguration 
ritual, his habitus becomes clear: his relationship with society makes him believe 
in the need for such a ritual. It is as Bourdieu (1998: 98) says, ‘everything occurs 
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as if’. The embodied habitus demands that the ritual be a natural consequence of 
constructing a development project. ‘In such a social universe, the giver knows 
that his generous act has every chance of being recognized as such (rather than 
being seen as a naivetee or an absurdity) and of obtaining recognition (in the 
form	of	a	counter-gift	or	gratitude)	from	the	beneficiary’	(Bourdieu,	1997b:	233).	
Or, in other words, ‘Generosity very often proves to establish a good reputation 
and to serve our longterm interests. It supplies us with honour and gratitude’ 
(Vandevelde, 2000: 2–3). It becomes clear that the game of honour and 
recognition	within	one’s	 social	 field,	 in	 this	 case	 the	 rebuilding	of	post-tsunami	
villages, represents the entrenchment of micro-level political structures even 
when it comes in the guise of generosity and goodwill. 
VI. Ambivalent Gratitude 
The local founder and the implementing NGO for the foreign donors for L-village 
and E-village, respectively, were convinced of the positive deeds enacted by 
them in rebuilding and regenerating rural communities. Indeed, the rhetoric of 
‘empowering’ communities was frequently used. The local founder, for instance, 
said, ‘But I personally think if you compare our village to the one neighbouring 
it, ours is conceded to be a rural community model – the disadvantaged families, 
rural youth and children are being empowered with facilities that they would not 
have	got	even	if	they	came	to	Colombo.’	The	ways	in	which	this	confident	ethos	
is shared by the villagers in both locales is more ambiguous. Segments of the 
community in each of the villages appreciate the ways in which their communities 
have	 been	 revived	 and	 renewed	 and	 how	 they	 have	 become	 beneficiaries	 of	
houses with a minor plot of land. Yet this gratitude has to be counterbalanced 
with the ways in which villagers were playing the system and appropriating the 
rhetoric of gratefulness to garner access to resources they would not have had in 
different circumstances. Their ability to turn the tables and play their role in the 
donor/philanthropy games are also important illustrations of the ways in which 
their agency is registered, albeit under constrained conditions. The ambivalence 
of their gratitude is critical in understanding the ways in which symbolic gestures 
deployed by those in positions of power are sometimes overrun and inverted by 
those at the receiving end. Quite in contrast to Bourdieu’s emphasis on class 
reproduction through gaming spaces, which tends to render impotent the capacity 
of	marginalised	groups	in	effecting	resistance,	what	we	find	is	how	they	engage	in	
practices	which	play	with	the	system	in	a	manner	that	is	beneficial	and	critical	for	
their welfare (see also Jeffrey, 2008, 2009). 
Juxtaposing motivations for obtaining houses and wanting to participate in the 
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ceremonies and rituals performed in E-village highlight the ambiguity at play. 
One villager mentioned, ‘for me the tsunami was the only chance to obtain a legal 
housing deed. In my situation, working as a seamstress and with my husband as 
a	daily	labourer,	we	could	never	aﬀord	to	own	a	house.	I	move	there,	even	if	it	
is far away from Galle and it is still very dirty because of the construction taking 
place.’ Here, even though the distance from Galle Road was counterproductive 
to the economic life of both her and her husband and the village site was noted 
as being dirty, the promise of receiving a legal housing title was the motivation 
to move into a village under construction. Another recipient was blunt when she 
said, ‘Madam, we help you to make the donors happy. You have worked hard for 
us. So we help you to make this a good day and make donors happy.’ Here she 
was echoing the sentiments of some villagers who recognised that they would 
participate in and undertake these rituals – not because they wanted to but 
because they were aware that their participation would ‘make the donors happy’. 
They were acutely aware that without them, the ability of the donors to create a 
particular type of representational space would be thwarted. The game, therefore, 
was	played	when	it	was	deemed	to	be	of	benefit	to	them.	
Even though the two housing reconstruction schemes show differences, they 
have one major aspect in common: the direct involvement of donors in the giving 
process. This turns generosity around and unfolds its double truth. Tittmus (1971) 
agues that the modern altruistic giving has nothing in common with the giving in 
archaic societies (Mauss, 1924). Therefore modern giving rules out ‘the three-fold 
sequence of obligations (the obligation to give, to accept, and return)’ (Silber, 
1998: 138) and the capacity to create and transform social relations that Mauss 
ascribes to the archaic gift giving systems. For Tittmus (1971) modern anonymous 
giving makes this exchange very close to an altruistic gift with no strings attached 
and no expectation of any return. The Tittmusian modern altruistic gift is certainly 
not in place in these projects. 
Since the writings of Marcel Mauss (1924) and Jacques Derrida (1992) we know 
that there is no such thing as a ‘free’ gift. Giving always involves reciprocity 
and even being aware that a gift is given does invalidate the spirit of a ‘free’ 
gift. Giving binds people together, it creates individual and social ties; it is 
motivated by the nature of human relationships (Douglas, 1990; Bourdieu, 
1997a, b; Komter, 2005). In both projects we see this direct involvement, the 
strings attached to the gift and reciprocity demanded, even extracted in certain 
instances. The donors create their own vision of a village, they make decisions 
about the implementation process, the housing plan, the village design and they 
put pressure on how aid is delivered. The recipients in return accept to participate 
in various ceremonies knowing that this is the only way ‘to make donors happy’. 
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This exchange illustrates how the giver and receiver stand in relation to each 
other in their capacity to reciprocate. It also reveals that the universal obligation 
of reciprocity no longer holds where the social divide is vast and the recipient 
cannot offer anything in return. Sahlins (1972) suggests this type of reciprocity 
aﬀrms	social	hierarchy	over	time.	If	generous	gifts	cannot	be	reciprocated	they	
leave	behind	a	significant	social	debt	and	dependency.	Or	in	other	words,	‘giving	
is also a way of possessing (a gift which is not matched by counter-gift creates a 
lasting bond, restricting the debtor’s freedom and forcing him to adopt a peaceful, 
co-operative, prudent attitude)’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 195). 
The depth of this ambivalent feeling of gratitude still binds people together in an 
asymmetric relation of domination and hierarchy. As Bourdieu states, ‘one of the 
ways of ‘‘holding’’ someone is to keep up a lasting asymmetric relationship such 
as indebtedness; ... because the only recognized, legitimate form of possession 
is that achieved by dispossessing oneself – i.e. obligation, gratitude, prestige, 
or personal loyalty’ (1990: 195). Gratitude therefore serves the interest of one’s 
social position. Furthermore, the accumulation of social capital legitimises the 
standing	rule	of	the	field	–	prestige	and	power	–	obtained	in	our	cases	through	
forms of symbolic and gentle violence. 
VII. Conclusion 
The proliferation of NGO and private philanthropic giving is presented as a 
laudable, necessary and charitable act – as it has the potential to unpick the 
vulnerability of the giver (Clark, 2007). Yet we have shown that this process is 
legitimised with cultural meaning extended through rituals and practices: the 
positions of giver and receiver do not merely show the social and power divide, 
but also the ways in which the ‘physical world and the human world participate 
in the construction of meaning’ (Wilford, 2008: 659). These are often etched 
through forms of symbolic capital. The involvement of local philanthropists from 
the English-speaking middle class and foreign donors in these acts of generous 
charity always entail employing ‘cultural’ practices as a crucial conduit of 
situated development. However, we have shown that this does not necessitate an 
alternatively imagined development but rather often becomes about ‘reproducing 
and deepening class structures’ and positions of power (Bourdieu, 1998; see also 
Jeffrey, 2008). 
Acceptance of these practices, however, results in a Bourdieuian non-violent 
form of violence being perpetrated through masked acts of generosity. Bourdieu 
(1977: 196) calls this symbolic violence and suggests that it works through 
the	 ‘transfiguration	 of	 relations	 of	 domination	 and	 submission	 into	 aﬀective	
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relations,	the	transfiguration	of	power	into	charisma	or	into	the	charm	suited	to	
evoke affective enchantment’ (Bourdieu, 1998: 102). This transformation can 
only	work	if	all	agents	within	the	social	field	have	acquired	the	same	habitus	and	
do understand the rules of the game. Therefore, ‘agents lastingly ‘‘bind’’ each 
other, ... , only through the dispositions which the group inculcates in them and 
continuously reinforces, and which render unthinkable practices which would 
appear as legitimate and even be taken for granted in the disenchanted economy 
of ‘‘naked self-interest’’’ (Bourdieu, 1990: 196). Here it becomes clear that 
through the development of the same habitus all actors become accomplices 
of symbolic and gentle forms of violence. The dominant and the dominated 
collaborate, knowingly and unknowingly, in a work of dissimulation tending to 
deny the truth of exchange. This shows the subtle and cowardly form symbolic 
violence takes and how hard it becomes to escape. To escape, people would need 
to	 reflect	on	 their	habitus,	 change	both	 the	 ‘nature’	of	 their	embodied	 thinking	
and	 their	acting	 (dispositions).	We	find	 that	even	where	 the	 ‘beneficiaries’	play	
the game creatively and skilfully, political economic realities keep them in place. 
It is not that marginalised groups lack the capacity to confront their predicament 
and be deliberately ambivalent in their gratitude. Even though their voices and 
narratives have shown that they are aware of and use their capacity to subtly 
and creatively counteract the domination by NGOs and philanthropists, this in 
and of itself does not transform social structures and power bases. That would 
require	all	social	agents	to	accept	the	intrusion	into	their	field	and	transform	their	
dispositions. 
The cultural practices and rituals in the post-tsunami context then go beyond what 
Tennekoon (1988) showed to be taking place through the various development 
projects over nearly two decades. Quotidian cultural practices are no longer 
used and deployed to generate, reinvent, legitimise and press on the quest for 
modernisation. The destruction caused by the tsunami meant that the urgent 
need for physical reconstruction was taken for granted while the entrenched 
positions of power, social standing and authority of foreign donors and local elite 
actors were legitimised through these rituals. This was visible in the seemingly 
simple act of gifting the key to new homes: the donors were on one side of 
handing over the key and the recipient family on the other, smiling and showing 
their thankfulness and happiness. They were aware that they were part of a game 
but had to feign their lack of awareness. Here generosity reveals its double truth: 
it reveals social asymmetry, hierarchy and the manifestation of power. However, 
material conditions prevent a stripping away of the inherent tensions in these 
symbolic gestures where cultural rituals and practices are used to convey the 
habitus of power, the symbols of domination and the episodes of gentle violence. 
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Article 4 
Hollenbach, P. (forthcoming)
Seeing like a donator: guiding communities into better lives in  
the after math of the Indian-Ocean tsunami. 
International Development Planning Review.
Abstract
The paper provides an ethnographic insight into a well-intended private initiated 
housing project conducted in the aftermath of the Indian Ocean Tsunami in 
Southern Sri Lanka. Informed by the Foucaults’ concept of governmentality 
the aim is to understand the governmentality of ‘building back better’ and 
how donators define, guide and create ‘better lives’ for the recipients of their 
benevolent intentions. Therefore the paper presents the logic, thinking and vision 
of donators showing that this particular socialized knowledge not only shaped 
the project plan and implementation process, but also how donators attempted 
to shape the conduct of beneficiaries, governing their mentality through 
humanitarian aid and its technicalities. Moreover a small aperture is presented of 
how recipients find allies in order to re-shape and re-define everyday community 
life in relation to the newly defined ‘modelled’ life. 
Post-disaster housing: improving peoples’ well being
On 26th December 2004 two thirds of Sri Lanka’s coastal region had been 
affected by one of the biggest natural disasters in recorded history. In February 
2005 the Department of National Planning and the Ministry of Finance and 
Planning presented a first damage assessment and proposed a way forward for 
rehabilitation - ‘Rebuilding Sri Lanka: Action Plan’ (TAFREN, 2005). The report 
identified housing, with over 100’000 houses partly and fully damaged, as one 
of the most important and most cost intensive sectors1 that urgently needed 
attention and reconstruction assistance. The report stated: 
1 The overall costs for rehabilitation and reconstruction was identified with US$ 1,8 billion. The      
   amount was divided among different sectors crediting Housing the biggest share with 21% of the total  
   amount, followed by  Fisheries (13%), Road Development and Water Supply &Sanitation (each 10%),  
   Microfinance &SME (8%) and Rail Transport (6%). The remaining 32% were divided among Electricity,  
   Telecommunication, Health, Education, Tourism, Environment, Enterprise and Industrial Development,  
   Law and Order, Port Development, Agriculture and Social Services. Source: (TAFREN 2005: 11)
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“Rehabilitation and resettlement of the families needs to be done with 
utmost urgency… They need immediate assistance to get back to their 
normal livelihood” (TAFREN, 2005, 7)
In order to achieve quick results in rebuilding permanent houses and creating 
new homes for tsunami affected people, the Government of Sri Lanka (GoSL), 
multi- and bilateral aid organisations, national/international non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs) as well as private and other aid initiatives joined their 
workforce, financial as well as knowledge capacities and divided the labour. It was 
agreed, that the GoSL takes over the responsibility for distribution and allocation 
of land, infrastructure and beneficiary lists and other stakeholders undertake the 
task of funding, planning and construction of houses. However as Korf writes “The 
whole process of housing relocation is state-centred …[and] by subscribing to 
these conditions, charities supported this process which deepens a state-centred, 
hierarchical political system of clientelism and creates conditions that foster 
favouritism” (2002, v).
Through this agreement the GoSL broke away from its long-established tradition 
of planned housing schemes, which emphasized internal and indigenous Sri 
Lankan processes in housing, villagization and social development, while avoiding 
‘’western’’ development catchwords. Since Sri Lanka gained independence in 
1948, the government placed a huge emphasis on defining an “indigenous Sri 
Lanka development strategy” (Gunaratna, 2006, 8) to revitalize a well functioning 
society based on harmonious village communities that had supposedly been 
ruined by foreign invasion and the imposition of colonial rule (Brow, 1988; Brow, 
1999; Brun and Lund, 2009; Gunaratna, 2006; Tambiah, 1992; Woost, 1994). In 
the aftermath of the 2004 disaster however an unprecedented number of western 
aid organisations entered Sri Lanka with good intentions to improve the well being 
of affected people, to enhance their capacity for action, and to direct and guide 
them into a ‘better life’. Both intentions from government and from western aid 
agencies came in the guise of benevolence (Bryant, 2002; Korf, 2005; Korf, 2007; 
Korf et al, 2010; Li, 1999; Li, 2007; Scott, 1998; Watts, 2003).
This paper looks into these benevolent intentions and asks: how do these 
stakeholders define, guide and create ‘better lives’? And what pathways 
towards leading better lives are propagated? The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami 
and the aid wave it generated are a particularly useful case to study how these 
benevolent intentions of guiding people into better lives operate, in particular as 
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the destruction created a seemingly blank space to “build back better”2, which 
became pronounced through the numerous housing reconstruction schemes 
aiming to guide Tsunami-displaced families in an improved direction. The 
ambition of shaping and forming new social behaviour and living patterns relates 
to Foucault’s’ concept of ‘governmentality’ - shaping and ordering “the possible 
field of action of others” (Foucault, 1982, 221). The concept helps to diagnose, 
“…the rationalities of rule, the forms of knowledge and expertise they construct, 
and the specific and contingent assemblages of practices, materials, agents 
and techniques through which these rationalities operate to produce governable 
subjects” (Hart, 2004, 92). The aim of this article is to uncover the logic of a 
private donator-driven3 post-disaster housing project and to gain insights in the 
socialized knowledge upon which donators base and define their vision of ‘better 
life’. Therefore, the analysis is informed by governmentality as a productive way 
to conceptualise the logic of donators and to identify the how of doing aid. As 
Scott (1998) emphasises: it is important to first understand the logic of a vision 
in order to understand it’s engineering. Moreover the paper looks “beyond” (Li, 
2005) donators’ vision, providing a small aperture of how recipients find allies in 
order to re-shape and re-define everyday community life in relation to the newly 
set path for their future.
Since the Tsunami occurred, a lot has been written on the outcome, the dilemmas 
and the ambiguities of aid activities in Sri Lanka (Bennett et al, 2006; Brun 
and Lund, 2008; Khasalamwa, 2009). Others critically analyse the different 
processes and practices involved in aid delivery (Fernando and Hilhorst, 2006; 
Haug and Weerackody, 2007; Korf, 2007; Korf et al, 2010; Telford and Cosgrave, 
2007; Ruwanpura, 2008), or how tsunami rehabilitation fostered and influenced 
the countries’ long-term conflict situation (Hyndman, 2007; McGilvray and 
Gamburd, 2010; Uyangoda, 2005). All these studies give a detailed overview of 
aid processes in the aftermath of disaster, and their influence upon the recovery 
and rehabilitation of social life. However, an ethnographic view that analyses the 
rationale of projects, the thinking and logic of donors/donators, and how they 
2 The slogan ‚building back better’ was introduced in 2005 by former US President B. Clinton acting as    
   the UN Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Tsunami Recovery and widely adopted by various actors  
   in post-tsunami recovery. In 2005 the Sri Lankan government presented under the ‘building back  
   better’ slogan their official national post-tsunami policy
3 Donator is used to indicate private persons giving donations to aid and development organisations.  
   Donor stands for official development institutions like government, semi-official foundations or aid  
   organisations. The phenomena of private (national/international) donator-driven aid projects emerged  
   in a multitude of tsunami projects in Sri Lanka in which  private donators acted as ‚experts’ and part      
   of the project planning team becoming and active part in the rehabilitation process. This led not    
   only to new relationships and networks within the aid chain, but also to new practices of how aid was  
   delivered (cf. Henkel/Stirrat 1997; Korf et al 2009; Stirrat 2006).
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transferred their visions into practices and technologies of development aiming to 
create governable subjects has been underexplored. 
Seeking to understand the governmentality of “building back better” the paper 
diagnoses the rationale and logic behind one specific donator-driven planned 
model village in Southern Sri Lanka, in the Galle District, as the product of a 
specific vision and a particular socialized knowledge. The housing scheme is 
interesting, as it was designed and funded by a group of private individuals from 
southern Germany who had the intention to create a model village: an eco-village. 
The model village was to be designed technically as a sustainable settlement and 
also entailed a self-governing structure that sought to guide its inhabitants to a 
more independent and self-determined political life, as civil society. The paper 
provides an ethnographic insight into a well-intended private housing project 
presenting that the logic, thinking and vision of donators not only shaped the 
project plan and implementation, but also how donators attempted to shape the 
conduct of beneficiaries, governing their mentality through humanitarian aid and 
its technicalities. 
Towards a genealogy of model villages and housing schemes
Many post-tsunami housing projects in Sri Lanka show evidence, that project 
implementers created a vision of an ideal ‘model village’ that is a product of their 
ideas, picturesque ideals, and socialized knowledge of village and community life. 
Donors “…carried in their mind’s eye … a certain aesthetic, … a visual codification 
of modern … community life” (Scott, 1998, 253). These architectural and 
technical visions became a driving force for the rehabilitation process in Sri Lanka 
underlining what Scott pointed out for authoritarian high-modernism schemes: 
“to look right becomes more important than whether they work; or, better put, the 
assumption is that if the arrangement looks right, it will also, ipso facto, function 
well. The importance of such representations is manifested in a tendency to 
miniaturize, to create … microenvironments of apparent order as model villages” 
(Scott, 1998, 225; emphasis added). Therefore, the model village described 
here stands for an underlying logic of tsunami villages in Sri Lanka as in many 
other disaster development scenarios: creating a ‘model’, an ‘apparent order’ of 
physical structure via the feasibility of architectural and technical planning, will 
produce ‘appropriate’ governable subjects, and an immediate social community 
(Bryant, 2002; Darley, 2007; Hart, 2004; Lewis and Mosse, 2006; Li, 2007; Rose, 
1999; Scott, 1998; Watts, 2003).
1 7 4  | T h e  P a r a d o x  o f  G o o d  I n t e n t i o n s
Various actors in post-tsunami housing were ambitious to improve the well being 
of the tsunami-affected population by constructing houses and introducing new 
forms and ways of community life (Brun and Lund, 2009; Khasalamwa, 2009; 
Ruwanpura, 2008; Saravanthan and Sanjeewanie, 2006). Benevolent intentions 
and the ambition to set and guide people onto a better path of development turns 
donators in to what Li (2007) defines as trustees: “The objective of trusteeship 
is not to dominate others – it is to enhance their capacity for action, and to 
direct it…their intentions are benevolent, even utopian. They desire to make 
the world better than it is” (2007, 5; emphasis added). Thereby all activities of 
recipients are based on the willingness to voluntarily participate in the pursuit of 
donators’ objectives, visions and nobility of ideals. Donators consider the subject 
of ‘their’ good intentions no longer as passive and powerless victims without the 
ability of a self-regulating agent, rather it presupposes their capacity as agents 
(Cruikshank,1999; DeBois, 1991; Foucault, 1991; Hart, 2004; Li, 2007; Rossi 
2004; Watts 2003). The ability of a self-regulating agent, yet not in the way 
donators comprehend self-regulating, appears, particularly if we observe the 
everyday life within the planned village. Recipients start to live with the new 
situation and adjust their lives towards newly set rules or the other way round, 
adjust set rules to their lives. As Li (2005) writes: “…improvement schemes are 
simultaneously destructive and productive of new forms of local knowledge and 
practice. Rather than attempt to generalize, the effects of planned interventions 
have to be examined empirically, in the various sites where they unfold… ” (391).
The empirical material for the case study is based on ethnographic observation 
and participation, as the author was involved in managing the donator-driven 
tsunami housing project today known as German Haritha Gama (GHG)4 in Galle 
District, Southern Sri Lanka from early 2005 to late 2007. The project was 
initiated by three individual persons in Southern Germany, co-financed and 
implemented through a Germany based Emergency Aid organisation (AID5). 
During the author’s involvement valuable insights into the rationale of the project, 
the thinking and logic of donators, their professional and social background and 
how they created the vision of an ideal village were ascertained. This phase 
of participant observation was complemented by subsequent field research in 
2009/2010 and 2011 when interviews with village inhabitants, local officials 
4 The name German Haritha Gama was given by the new villagers. During a community meeting        
   local aid  workers in cooperation with new villagers created this name as villagers wanted     
   the village be identified with Germany (German). The ecological notion is expressed in Haritha,         
   which can be interpreted as “green place where the flowers grow and bloom” (explanation of villagers,  
   February 2006) and Gama is the Singhalese word for village.
5 The abbreviation AID is used to secure anonymity of the implementing aid organisation.
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and government authorities were conducted. Further German donators, German 
project managers and project managers of two Sri Lankan NGOs that took over 
the project management from 2008 when the German aid agency withdrew from 
Sri Lanka were interviewed and several informal discussion took place.6 
In the following sections I first introduce the housing initiative, its formation 
and actors and its political dimension showing how donators understand to 
guide themselves and others, and which technologies and practices were used 
in order to achieve a new ‘apparent order’ of community life. A second section 
will introduce the vision of the “Eco-Village”; the logic behind this vision and 
how it materialized and was legitimized in practice. Donators hoped with the 
introduction of their ideals and the construction of high quality houses, that the 
recipients would develop the desire to move into the village and adopt the concept 
of eco-friendly living and self-governance, a newly introduced form of village 
management in Sri Lanka. In a last section I will introduce examples of the ‘dark 
twin’ to present the adjustments and the reality of everyday living in a ‘modelled’ 
manner. Overall the paper intends to show that the particular housing project 
can be understood “as a right manner of disposing things so as to not lead to the 
common good… but to an end that is convenient for each of the things governed” 
(Foucault in Watts, 2003, 13, emphasis added; cf. Li, 2005). 
 
The idea of a model village – making of governance
The subsequent sections will introduce the ‘Eco Village’ project, later named 
German Haritha Gama, and will analyse how a group of private donators 
developed and designed their ideas and visions of a “model village”. The material 
will illustrate donators’ rationale and socialized knowledge, showing how this 
informed certain claims and activities in the implementation process, and how 
donators’ thereby produced an identity of community life.  
When asked why Galle district was selected for the project, one donator honestly 
stated: “We knew the East was more in need for housing projects, but with the 
distance and troublesome travel conditions we thought it is better to choose Galle 
… you know we wanted to participate and attend the implementation process and 
6 89 households, 25 government officials and 8 key informants have been interviewed (semistructured)   
   several times during fieldwork period in 2009/10 and 11. Further  9 group discussions were held in the 
   village. Also during this period interviews and conversations were held with 9 informants in Germany.
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visit the site from time to time… also the political situation in the North and East 
was still insecure and we could not risk delays or even rupture of the project” 
(34,082009, Donator A).
This quote is indicative of the process that led from the original affect of 
benevolence among donators (as from now: donator A, B and C) to the 
selection for a site and subsequent implementation of a housing relocation 
scheme, designed as a “model village”. The whole set-up was shaped by the 
dense networks of politically influential figures and their relationships in Baden-
Württemberg (Ba-Wü), Germany as well as in Sri Lanka; networks that the project 
initiators had established long before the tsunami happened. These networks of 
personal contacts up to the highest political levels, both in the governments of 
Baden-Württemberg and in Sri Lanka gave the project a particular prominence 
and urgency, which required special attention by the subordinated organizations 
and bureaucracies in order to make the project become a success, both for the 
donators in Germany and for their political allies in Sri Lanka. This created a 
significant dilemma: On the one hand the strong networks of the donators made 
their efforts publicly visible and showcased the importance of the project, making 
fundraising very successful. On the other hand, the conditions that different 
donators attached to the project made its design complicated and created high 
pressure to produce successful and visible outcomes fast. 
Each of the donators worked (or had done so) for governmental institutions or 
had close linkages to governmental agencies thereby gaining good reputation 
in their political and private social field. Further they had built up long-term 
business as well as personal relations with Sri Lanka. Donator C, for example, 
had worked seven years in Sri Lanka building up the ‘German Vocational Training 
Centre’ in Moratuwa, today one of the most accredited technical schools in the 
country. He had remained well connected to Sri Lankan institutions, ministries and 
senior officials and almost every year voluntarily organized courses in Moratuwa 
or exchange programs for Sri Lankan students to visit Germany. Donator B had 
an established business rapport and linked Ba-Wü companies with Sri Lankan 
companies for business knowledge and technology exchange. For his efforts he 
was honoured with the position as honorary consul to Sri Lanka. Subsequent to 
the tsunami he reported, “I was asked by many people if I am going to help in Sri 
Lanka … people trusted my knowledge and contacts … but also I was asked from 
Sri Lankan friends, colleagues and politicians if I am willing to donate money” 
(22, 102009, Donator B). He therefore wrote “begging/ letters” to companies and 
work colleagues in order to raise money and was overwhelmed by the response. 
The third donator (Donator A), a senior official of the Ministry of Environment in 
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Ba-Wü (MEBW), considered Tsunami rehabilitation as a promising opportunity to 
revitalize a former cooperation between his ministry and the Sri Lanka Ministry 
of Development and Water Supply. In the mid 1990s the two ministries had 
partnered in a bilateral development cooperation to transfer knowledge and 
newly invented eco-friendly technologies for waste water systems and energy 
generation for small rural communities. 
Due to their social standing and political linkages, fundraising was very efficient. 
This coincided with the then German chancellor, Gerhard Schröder, using his 
traditional New Year speech 2004/2005 to call for solidarity with the disaster 
affected communities in Asia and Africa. The Chancellor’s appeal was particularly 
directed towards states, cities and communities to take over partnerships7 in 
tsunami affected regions, which created new forms of public and official financial 
support. In early 2005 the state of Ba-Wü organized a meeting for such private 
initiatives in which Donator A, B and C met and collated ideas. The outcome 
was the formation of the ‘Baden Württemberg Tsunami Relief Cooperation’ 
(BWTRC), officially linked to the MEBW with the aim to rebuilt houses. The then 
state minister supported their idea using his contacts to the Baden Württemberg 
Foundation (BWF) to set up a Tsunami Fund (1 Mio Euro) for private initiatives 
to access money for long-term engagement in tsunami affected regions.8 In mid 
2005 the BWTRC was granted 750’000 Euros of this fund to construct an ‘Eco-
Village’. The project had to fulfil the following criteria9: (1) focus on long-term 
investment into infrastructure, by (2) building a new village model for eco-friendly 
living, (3) introduce new technologies originating from Baden-Württemberg, and 
7 Abridgement official German New Year Speech 2004/2005:
   “Ich habe von der Dimension des Leidens gesprochen, der wir gerecht werden müssen und zwar   
   jeder an seinem Platz. Die Staaten, die Regionen, die Wirtschaft und die ganze Weltgesellschaft. Ich  
   möchte nachhaltige Hilfe für die Region. Ich will, dass wir uns lange verantwortlich fühlen.    
   Alle wohlhabenden Länder sollten Partnerschaften für den Wiederaufbau bestimmter Regionen   
   übernehmen... Das würde zeigen, dass wir über das Spenden von Geld - das gewiss wichtig ist -   
   weit hinaus wollen. Dass wir Verantwortung als etwas Dauerhaftes begreifen...” (Source: http://www. 
   lc-bonn-venusberg.de/lcbnvb_d_eingang_20050102_bk_n-anspr.htm) 
   The Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation guided the process of the Partnership Initiative.
   The ‚Service Agency Communities in One World’ (SKEW) of the Ministry was assigned with the task  
   to coordinate and match partnerships. Communities, town councils, regions, schools, or companies   
   were able to place a request for a partnership with SKEW and they provided the service to identify  
   local aid projects in which the initiators were able to invest there money. However many private      
   initiatives directly contacted aid agencies in order to directly communicate and negotiate possible aid  
   projects and to have a bigger influence in the delivery process.
8  „…für längerfristige Probleme wie Infrastrukturmaßnahmen oder Präventivprojekte großen Hilfsbedarf  
    geben. Der Aufsichtsrat hat daher einer grundsätzlichen Bereitstellung zunächst bis zu 1 Mio. Euro in  
    den Wirtschaftsplan 2005 zugestimmt…” (Source: http://www.bwstiftung.de/index.php?id=401&tx_ 
    ttnews%5Btt_news%5D=274)
9  Source: Internal Memo MEBW (13052005, MEBW)
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(4) transfer knowledge to improve peoples eco-friendly behaviour. 
With growing funds and involvement of official authorities the BWTRC decided 
to partner with a knowledgeable and experienced emergency aid agency. The 
partner was found in AID with its headquarters in the capital city of the state of 
Baden Württemberg. Even so, the former director of the agency suggested in an 
interview that she was reluctant to accept the partnership at one point, however 
it was not possible to decline, as “…there was so much politics involved, that to 
withdraw from the project would have caused problems and a bad reputation for 
our agency” (44, 012009, HH). To counterbalance donators’ influence AID topped 
up the project budget with 1,2 Million Euros - half of the total budget - to keep 
a say in its planning and implementation and to legitimize the project under the 
organizational mandate. 
The politically charged importance of the project in Germany was also carried over 
to Sri Lanka. During a preliminary fact finding mission10 conducted by the founders 
of BWTRC, the idea of a ‘Green Village’ was introduced to the Sri Lankan Ministry 
of Development & Water Supply, and to the Minister of Skills Development, 
Vocational & Technical Education, the former partner of Donator C. Both agreed to 
support the project and to liaise with the relief cooperation to provide necessary 
assistance. In a first step the Sri Lankan Ministry of Development & Water 
Supply signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) creating bilateral project 
cooperation. Later this cooperation was transferred into an official tsunami 
project under TAFREN, later RADA11, to allow for applying full tax exemption and 
accessing other key benefits like access to government land, allocation of basic 
infrastructure, and support in beneficiary selection. Even though the bilateral 
agreement first sidelined the official Tsunami rehabilitation approach the political 
involvement of higher senior officials helped to revoke the MoU and transfer ‘Eco 
Village’ into an official tsunami project. Further evidence of the political influence 
of senior officials lies in the fact that ‘Eco Village’ was one of the first international 
tsunami projects to be granted full tax exemption in early 2007. 
10 Source: Internal Memo of Fact Finding Mission (29042005, MEBW)
11 Task Force for Rebuilding the Nation was immediately set up in the aftermath of the tsunami disaster    
     in order to coordinate the reconstruction programmes. Its main activities was to coordinate, facilitate  
     and assist implementing organizations, coordinate donor assistance and fund raising activities, to   
     expedite the procurements process, and to build capacity in government implementing agencies.  
     In November 2005 RADA was created as a government agency by presidential decree taking over  
     TAFREN’s coordination activities. 
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German Haritha Gama: Planning and implementing 
Making a “A suitable site” 
“I remember when the Germans came first time. We received a call from 
Minister’s Colombo office that we have to support them finding a nice land 
in Galle… we showed them 3 sites but nothing was good, too far away, too 
small, too hilly, very difficult. But later we found Walahanduwa Watta in 
Akmeemana Division and this they liked” (45, 022010, AP).
This quote by an administrative official of the Galle District Secretariat (DS office) 
takes notice of the complicated process of finding a “suitable site” that would 
please the donators’ expectations and indicates the level of attention and urgency 
that the local officials attributed to complying with the demands from these 
specific individuals due to their special connections to high-level politicians and 
“the minister”. As a result of the complicated negotiation among local (DS Galle, 
Government Agent Galle, RADA Galle) as well as central-government officials 
(RADA Colombo, and befriended officials from the Ministry of Development 
and Water Supply and Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs) 
Walahanduwa Watta, a former tea and rubber estate located in the Akmeemana 
Division, was transformed to an official tsunami reconstruction site. 
Even though the location is quite far away from the place of origin of future 
village inhabitants12 and thus not necessarily ideal, donators and local authorities 
justified the quality of the location by creating a narration of future ‘economic 
development’. With Walahanduwa Watta closely located to the newly constructed 
Colombo-Matara highway, the local authorities as well as the central government 
anticipated fast economic development for the region. The Galle Government 
Agent (GA) said, “You know the location seems to be far off but I can assure that 
this will change with the upcoming Colombo-Matara Highway. A new economic 
zone is planned – ‘Economic Development Plan Akmeemana’ - and therefore 
all tsunami housing projects will be in the centre of growth and development…” 
(15, 022007, GA). Visiting the Mayor of Galle City in 2010 to discuss the issue 
of ‘Economic Development Plan Akmeemana’, he said, “I am very sorry. Since 
many years we talk about the upcoming economic zone … all is negotiated in 
several planning meetings on City and District level, but nothing agreed yet” (18 
,012010, MAG). The visionary ‘economic boom story’ developed a certain truth, 
which helped to encourage beneficiaries to accept the disadvantageous location 
12 The land is 12 km inlands from the main Galle road and up to 18km from the Grama Niladari   
     Divisions the new villagers originate from
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as a new place for living and also attracted other international donors to finance 
and reconstruct houses at this location. In total 11 new villages were constructed 
in the region (Akmeemana, Imaduwa, and Habaraduwa Division) under the 
donor driven housing program with over 600 new houses and about 2’500 new 
inhabitants (Source: DS Document_Donor Driven Housing Program Galle District, 
23012007).
The local authorities anticipated receiving further support by the central 
government for infrastructural development, an expectation which proved to 
remain unmet, as an administrative official of Akmeemana Division Secretariat 
complained: “I really thought the new tsunami villages will bring development 
for the region… but today I have more work, more complaints and less options 
to support the new villages… the central government should have done a proper 
planning because now we face lot of problems, many conflicts in the villages, no 
proper access to school, health, income…” (26, 022010, DSA). The vision of the 
‘economic hub’ proved to be unfounded later on, and was merely used to produce 
a legitimizing truth for the project stakeholders to justify the disadvantageous 
location and guide them into the direction aimed for. 
Village layout – creating picturesque ‘little Germany’ 
“The village should be like a German village” 
 (German Technical Engineer (GTE))
“The public buildings should present Sri Lankan architectural tradition” 
 (Donator B)
This seeming paradox – a village that should be like a German village and 
represent Sri Lankan architectural traditions – shows the implicit tension in the 
spatial and technical design of a sustainable, eco-friendly “model village”. To some 
extent donators seemed to solve this paradox by hiring a German architect familiar 
with local architectural styles as well as design requirements for local houses. 
And yet, donators were eager to see their visions of a “village” represented in 
the spatial design of the relocation scheme – a village, as they knew it from their 
home country. The village plan was developed based both on the possibility of the 
landscape, and following the vision of a ‘typical’ well-functioning German village. 
The village plan of German Haritha Gama illustrates the organization of many 
German villages: a public square in the centre surrounded by public buildings, 
shops, a market place, church and often a fountain. As the reconstruction site is 
quite hilly, the houses had to be built on different levels but the middle, flatter 
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area was reserved for a huge public square enclosed by a community centre 
with kindergarten, doctor’s room, a public library and office and surrounded with 
flowerbeds, benches, shops, a bakery and a parking ground. 
The village layout satisfies all indicators and visions of the donators: it lays 
out the ‘apparent new order’. Moreover the plan includes a designated space 
to practice peaceful coexistence of all ethnicities, religions and socio-economic 
groups. A special area in the village was disclosed for acting out religious rituals 
including a building offering small segregated open departments in which each 
religious group can establish a shrine. To further support the identification process 
of villagers with their new home, donators insisted that the public buildings should 
be designed based on Sri Lankan architectural style. As one donator mentioned, 
“the public buildings should present Sri Lankan architectural tradition…they 
should look like Bawa designed houses with open areas, the typical Bawa roof 
and so on…” (54, 102009, Donator B). Bawa architecture is linked, however, to 
upper class and caste society, which is indicative of the kind of imagination of “Sri 
Lankan culture” that was guiding the visions of donators and not representing the 
social origin of the new villagers.
In effect, the plan was designed as a spatial layout to guide the new inhabitants 
into a specific mode of life – eco-friendly and peaceful. The plan included all 
measures of how donators foresaw the future village, its organization and 
maintenance. Through proper planning of the spatiality of village life and the 
architectural layout of its public buildings they used “…a variety of technics 
and micropolitics of power (from the map, to national statistics, to forms of 
surveillance) to accomplish, or attempt to accomplish, stable rule…” (Watts, 
2003,12) intending to “educate [the inhabitants’] desires and [to] reform their 
practices” (Li, 2007, 16).
Realizing ‘Eco’ 
As the village was planned under the notion of ‘eco-friendliness’, donators and 
village engineers integrated several eco-friendly and sustainable technologies. 
For example solar operating street lamps, solar panels to generate electricity for 
public buildings and each house was equipped with a three-chamber cesspit, which 
in a long natural process dehydrates the waste and cleans the water releasing it 
back into the ground, and a rainwater tank, collecting rainwater from the roof 
to be used for the toilet and the garden. The other aspect was to influence the 
ecological awareness of recipients as one donator mentioned: “You know, people 
have to change their ecological behaviour… just think how strict we are with waste 
collection in Germany, we separate everything, really everything! And people in 
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Sri Lanka still burn everything; even plastic… this has to change otherwise our 
efforts to strive towards a clean environment will be without success… it is about 
education and awareness on ecological effects of their behaviour” (12, 082007, 
GTE)
To achieve changing behaviour several trainings and community meetings 
on environmental issues were held. Between 2007-2008 several trainings in 
cooperation with the Department of Agriculture (DOA) were organized to introduce 
composting technologies and how to set up home gardening. Donators supported 
this education process by financing a gardening set for each household comprising 
of a pick, bucket, garden shovel and a barrow. Further each house was provided 
with a composting system developed by a local environment organisation. In 
addition a reforestation project was started in which new villagers were asked 
to participate in planting trees, hedges and vegetables in public spaces. Also 
recipients were encouraged to set up kitchen gardens. 
To expand the ‘eco-friendly’-part into the long-term, the village community 
was equipped with a waste collecting shack, a tractor, gully bowser and waste-
collecting hanger to separate and collect the waste. To present waste separation in 
more attractive manner additional trainings were offered illustrating the value of 
waste and how the community can make a profit with waste. The donators’ idea: 
generate money through waste processing and selling it to recycling companies in 
the region. ‘Eco-Village’ was perfectly planned in order to change behaviour and 
to adopt an ecologically friendly life style in the future. 
Governing victims to better lives
A model village of liberal governance
“Germany Haritha Gama should be a model to show that people participate 
in community politics and take decisions together for their lives… I am sure 
if they learn to participate in community politics, they will start formulating 
their political desires and make demands for their rights as a Sri Lankan 
citizen…” (42, 102009, Donator B). 
This quote indicates that the donators had a clear imagination in mind of a 
politically self-governed village “community” and that such a “community” 
could not only be realized through spatial and architectural design, but requires 
educating villagers to become “citizens”. Based on their everyday experiences 
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with local governance and politics in southern Germany, donators identified a 
supposed deficiency in Sri Lankan politics that needed to be readdressed and 
regulated. Cruishank writes: “…democratic participation and self-government are 
regarded as solutions to the lack of something: for example, a lack of power, of 
self-esteem, of coherent self-interest, or of political consciousness…” (1999, 3). In 
the case of German Haritha Gama donators wanted to transform passive victims 
and supposedly apolitical villagers into active (liberal) citizens, but – and that 
is the paradox – politically active outside of the mundane and dirty world of Sri 
Lankan party politics. They sought to achieve this through educating villagers and 
regulating their ‘conduct of conduct’ in the political life of the village.
Two problems were identified: first, corrupt local and national politics, and 
second, lack of a critical public opinion in Sri Lanka that could push national 
politics into a more peaceful future. The problem with this view is reflected in two 
statements asking donators why they designed a special governing constitution 
for the model village: “We know the government authorities in Sri Lanka and how 
corrupt they are and therefore we think it would be good if the village is managed 
and functioned autarkical. Villagers should control where the money goes to, 
they should take decisions for the village and develop it further in their own 
understanding… I think this will train them in democracy, decision-making and 
good governance… I am sure this will help to develop an active political mindset 
which I believe the Sri Lankan society urgently needs” (24, 052007, Donator 
B). He continued: “I think the people need to be more active and challenge the 
government and its politics…” (32, 052007, Donator B). Both statements indicate 
some assumptions, first, about the actual affairs of Sri Lankan politics, as being 
deficient, dirty, corrupt, and second, a normative suggestion of how local politics 
should be designed and regulated – participatory, transparent and autarkic 
(administrative and economically).  
To achieve a “coexistent living pattern” (Village Constitution: 2) and to be more 
independent of the formal local government structures, a self-governing system 
based on donators’ knowledge and experience of community self-governing was 
introduced. The core idea was an active self-managing village community, which 
in turn would create a new political identity and assertiveness to become a self-
caring and independent society member, challenging politics and politicians. This 
ideal is reflected in the mission statement of the village constitution:
To establish a coexistent village whereby the community who have been 
displaced by the Tsunami disaster is capable of independently managing and 
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developing the village to create and generate income to the betterment of 
themselves (Village Constitution 2009: 2)
 
The vision of self-caring and politically active people originates from donators’ 
own professional and private experience with the self-administrative political 
community system in Baden-Württemberg. That governing system has a long 
tradition and is seen within Germany and Europe as a model for democratic 
peoples participation, as it provides the community with great power and many 
opportunities to actively participate in village politics and decision-making. 
In general the German Constitution regulates, that each state has to warrant 
communities to implement a self-governing system but the how of the system 
can be decided individually. The only prerequisite is a democratically elected 
town council. Since 1945 various self-governing systems had been developed, 
however, in the mid 1990’s many states conducted reforms and re-oriented their 
self-governing systems along the Ba-Wü model. The two particularities of this 
system are a) the strong position of the governing mayor, directly elected by 
the people and unifying three leading positions: head of local council with voting 
power, head of local administration and representative of the community; and b) 
the strong position of the community members. They elect the governing mayor 
and can directly influence decision-making processes of the local council and 
the governing mayor via democratic measures (e.g.: petition for a referendum 
or public decision). The Ba-Wü bylaw ascribes its citizens a high position to 
show, that community institutions and authorities have to serve for and are only 
legitimized by their community. Community participation is seen as a tool of 
quality management, power regulation and a model for anti-corruption (Wehling, 
2009). 
This model of self-government was complemented by an ideal of “peaceful 
co-existence” of different ethnic groups within one community. Donators saw this 
as a model to work towards peace in Sri Lanka more broadly. The aim was “…to 
create a village in which all Sri Lankans, irrespective of their ethnicity, social and 
economic background, will live next to each other peacefully…I think the village 
should become a model for peaceful coexistence, this is important for Sri Lanka, 
especially in the current situation… People have to develop a sense of community 
and togetherness” (43, 022007, GTE). 
Forming liberal subjects
Both, the self-governing system and the plea for peaceful co-existence create an 
imagination of liberal subjects, citizens who actively take part in the constitution 
and making of a democratic political space, where decisions are taken in an open 
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space of debate and consent. The challenge for the model village designers was 
to transform relocated beneficiaries into these liberal subjects. This created a 
paradoxical situation, because donators had to implant their vision into the minds 
of the new villagers.
Based on their model ideas, donators asked a local lawyer in Galle to write a 
constitution for the ‘German Haritha Gama Community Development Foundation’ 
according to their vision but complying with Sri Lankan laws. Writing this 
constitution could only be the first step; it had also to be brought to life in 
the everyday political practices of the village inhabitants. To achieve this, two 
local non-governmental organisations (NGOs) that had experience in forming 
community foundations and educating people in self-management were hired. 
One was responsible for the social mobilisation; the other to train and educate 
villagers how to properly maintain the new eco-friendly technologies that 
were introduced (cf. p. 12). For social mobilisation training in ‘friendly’/open 
communication and discussion, problem-oriented management, team building 
workshops, and trainings on democracy and peoples’ participation were provided 
with further training in financial management to set up a transparent system. 
However the biggest challenge was to form the Community Development 
Foundation in the way donators had already planned. This involved the election 
of a Management Committee including an elected Community President, a 
Secretary, a Treasurer and seven members of the village plus two representatives 
of the ‘Tsunami Relief Cooperation Baden-Württemberg’ and one representative 
of the Divisional Secretariat Galle. This Committee “shall manage, administer and 
perform all the affairs of the Foundation” (Constitution 17022009: 4). As one NGO 
representative mentioned, “…all was well elaborated along donators’ knowledge 
and vision…” (09, 012010, ARY). Yet, even the NGOs did not fully understand the 
content of the Constitution. In this situation educating and guiding the people 
did not mean asking their consent but telling them what and how to do things. 
Everything was pre-given. Donators and their experts set out the way forward and 
villagers had to be “remade into modern producers following the instructions of 
experts” (Scott, 1998, 235).
The vision of an apparent order, and conviction through which conduct can be 
shaped and changed did not leave any flexibility in the planning process, nor 
changes related to the everyday reality on the ground. This created discontent, 
both among villagers who were told to become liberal subjects and among NGOs 
who had to provide training for a pre-designed governance set-up. One NGO 
representative told: “You know, usually we organize everything in the way we 
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know self-governing or village community organization; but in GHG donators 
had kind of a ‘road map’ showing how to do it ... There was not much space to 
negotiate and you know they prepared the constitution with minimal influence of 
villagers or us… I have to admit: this was a very hard job and honestly, I am quite 
disappointed with the result” (12, 012010, ARY). How villagers felt underlines the 
following quote: “Never in my life I had to go to so many workshops ... I felt like 
a school boy when teachers told me what to do and how… but sometimes I just 
participated in these trainings because it was in a nice hotel or once we travelled 
to Batticaloa to visit a village in which the NGO set up a community foundation 
before. This was interesting; I had never visited the East before, you know the 
war…” (22, 012010, PRE). The paradox is, of course, the pre-designed set-up and 
the time pressure to deliver results, was counter-productive to the very idea of 
self-reliant, liberal subjects and citizens who critically engage in a political space. 
Looking beyond the modelled plan – the everyday in GHG
Some of these tensions also arose later. Only few tsunami victims could be 
convinced to adjust to the newly created life, the new social order. In early 2011 
only 59 houses were permanently occupied, of which only 42 were actual tsunami 
victims. 12 houses were temporarily occupied and the rest either non occupied, 
rented out or sold to ‘others’ (as tsunami housing recipients call them). This 
created a huge divide within the community. The actual tsunami recipients didn’t 
want to have the ‘others’ being part of the community foundation as one villager 
said, “they should not be part of the community foundation, they should not profit 
from the tsunami… they are no victims! We do not want them in the village, but 
we also understand that some want to make money with their house rather than 
to leave it empty” (18, 04012011, SNJ). 
With regard to new patterns of eco-friendly living, villagers adjusted or rejected 
donators’ ideals of integrating it into their economic and cultural life-style, which 
I briefly illustrate with the help of the composting and waste management issue. 
Composting is mainly regarded as regressive and poor life standard as one 
villager said, “Composting is old-fashioned and too much work… especially here in 
the nature… I tried during the training but it smells and animals come. Now I burn 
my organic waste and from time to time other waste as well” (34, 122009, NK). 
The second component, waste separation was also not realized in the envisaged 
manner, as villagers not only have another understanding of waste processing but 
also no one was willing to work with waste. The ‘Waste Management Committee’ 
officially exists and having discussions with its members it became clear, that 
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various obstacles and cultural misunderstandings of waste collection hinder a 
successful implementation. A member said, “Waste collection is dirty, it’s done by 
certain people. We do not have them in the village you know… no one from GHG 
wants to do this job, it is considered a poor job…” (22, 122009, GP). But it is not 
only the social and cultural interpretation of working with waste but also from a 
practical perspective waste collection is not an easy task to manage. Recycling in 
Galle District is organized on various levels – private and public – and to integrate 
one village into this complex system separately becomes a problem. Economically, 
to use private recycling companies brings profit only if a high volume can be sold 
and GHG would have needed to store the waste until a profitable amount has been 
reached. “We have no room to store waste nor money to built a waste storage…
its not nice to have waste everywhere in the village, no? We need a place or we 
cannot collect it…” (9, 122009, RS). Based on these obstacles the committee 
remained inactive and today most of the households burn their waste. One 
housing owner told, “There is no waste collection from Pradeshiya Sabha, so what 
to do, we cannot leave the waste no, so we burn most of our waste or some just 
throw it (pointing down the valley) look you can see, bad no? But what to do?” 
(45, 122009, GP). The idea of an autarkic, environment friendly village did not 
work out, as villagers based on their socio-economic and cultural understanding 
were not willing to interfere with waste on professional or private level; waste is 
associated with a poor standard. 
The above statements and examples are quite apart from donators’ imagination 
of eco-friendly, peaceful co-existence and active citizenship, although politics of 
inclusion/exclusion and adjustment are certainly part of liberal political life itself. 
But the ambivalences that the whole process of trying to create liberal subjects 
and a model village based on a certain socialized knowledge reminds us that 
those who designed and established the vision of GHG had “forgotten the most 
important fact about social engineering: its efficiency depends on the response 
and cooperation of real human subjects” (Scott, 1998, 225). 
Conclusion
“We the donors provided you with a new village, new houses and 
infrastructure. The foundations for a better future are laid… Now it is 
your responsibility to make the village a place of peaceful and prosperous 
coexistence…” (26, 072007, Donator C). 
This statement taken from an inaugural speech of one of the German donators 
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indicates the fundamental logic of the vision of the German “model village” 
in Sri Lanka: the engineering of a better future – “building back better”. The 
benevolent and generous act of giving, of building better, did on the one hand 
mean to provide technically solid and spacious houses and a more modern design 
of the village layout, from the donators’ personal experience. On the other hand 
the vision of setting people on a better path of development was defined on a 
larger scale: it meant to create new political subjects, new citizens that, in a 
way, would transgress the limited bounds of the mundane, dirty party politics as 
practiced in Sri Lanka. The vision was to ‘conduct the conduct’ of beneficiaries in 
order to implant peace into local communities as an antipode to the ethnicized 
antagonisms prevailing in Sri Lanka at the time of planning the project, and even 
today. In this sense, the project was designed as a model to govern mentalities – 
the mentalities of disaster victims to make them active political subjects managing 
their “own community” and starting to participate in politics.
What does the example of German Haritha Gama tell us? We could look at the 
model village as another example, of how visions and ideals have rarely proven 
to be translatable into reality, how utopias, which are a continuing currency of 
development projects and aid, are bound to fail especially if they are the utopias 
of outsiders. It could be understood as a miniature-modernizing project of the 
kinds that James Scott had in mind (certainly on much larger scales) in Seeing like 
a State (2000). And surely, even on its own terms, the model village cannot claim 
to have been fully successful: only parts of the houses are permanently occupied, 
the political life of the village is far from the ideals elaborated in the village 
constitution and considerable frustration abounds among those who accepted to 
settle in the village. But as Li (2005) suggests, that by looking “beyond ... failed 
schemes” it becomes evident that project participants find new practices and 
compromises “to fill the gap between project plans and on-the-ground realities” 
(Li, 2005, 391). Therefore improvement schemes such as German Haritha Gama 
produce new forms of local knowledge and practices, they change and influence 
‘the conduct of conduct’ but however not in the way as laid down and envisioned 
by the donators but as it is newly interpreted by its recipients (Li, 2005; Li, 1999; 
Lewis and Mosse, 2006). 
The 2004 Indian Ocean Tsunami was an extreme case of a natural disaster: in 
magnitude - 13 countries in Asia and Africa were affected but as well in its global 
solicitousness. No other disaster, man made or natural had and since then has 
ever evoked so many donations – private, national and international. These 
yield a high inflow of money into disaster-affected countries with its well-known 
shortcomings of mismanagement, high competitiveness and inefficiency. Also the 
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Tsunami highlights a new upcoming trend in international aid: privately driven 
and financed aid projects. Private donators with huge financial resources attract 
notice as partners in international aid, however donators in return demand their 
participation in concrete project planning and decision-making as well as in 
defining core areas of development. Even so private donators consider and define 
themselves as an antipode to the official aid ‘business’ the above case study 
shows; that the attempt to build better – producing governable subjects – is a 
source of power replicating existing asymmetries and deficiencies in international 
development aid.  
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From compassion to the will to improve: Elision of scripts?  
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Abstract
The paper analyses how two private post-tsunami reconstruction initiatives in Sri 
Lanka mobilized well intended aid to support and assist tsunami affected families, 
drawing on narratives of compassion, which resulted in an inadvertent obtrusion 
of the moral imperatives of donors upon the lives of aid receivers. We trace the 
discursive terrain around goodness, kindness and compassion utilized to generate 
donations. This quickly slipped into the practical construction of village models 
that	reflected	individuals’	ideas	and	understandings	of	development,	modernism,	
social consciousness and peaceful coexistence. This merging, we argue, quickly 
subverted intention for the ‘betterment of villagers lives’, and became a means 
through which donors made claims on villages and impressed their will upon 
recipients. Given that private donor involvement in post-tsunami Sri Lanka was a 
critical factor shaping conditions on the ground, we contend that it is important to 
unpack their (powerful) role in giving meaning to building back better. 
1. Introduction 
‘‘Our expectation was to create a new way of living, to increase the standard 
of housing in Sri Lanka. We wanted to build more than houses. We wanted to 
build homes.’’ Donor A 
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‘‘We realized that communities are poorly managed in Sri Lanka as people 
do not feel responsible for their village assets. For our Tsunami housing 
project, we wanted to change this and wanted to make the new villagers feel 
responsible to maintain the village.’’ 
Donor B 
‘‘Ten years before the tsunami when I went to the village, I had a dream. The 
dream was two fold. One was to try and get a kind of new rural community 
development plan right, especially with a focus and aim to give back...Right, 
so	for	me,	you	know	I’m	at	the	end	of	the	day	so	pleased	and	gratified	that	
we have been able to at least – you know – create something positively 
better for those in desperate circumstances.’’ Founder of philanthropic 
institution
 
Travelling down the Southern coast of Sri Lanka nearly 10 years after the tsunami, 
we no longer see the devastation and debris of tsunami waves. Instead, the 
coastline is dotted with pleasing and colourful sites of housing communities and 
sign-posts signalling various donor-funded model villages. Just as the destruction 
caused	by	the	tsunami	waves	was	hard	to	miss,	it	is	difficult	to	ignore	the	spread	
of newly built post-tsunami villages along the southern coast-line of Sri Lanka. 
The	signs	not	only	denote	which	country,	 federal	state,	corporate	firm	or	donor	
agency was instrumental in rebuilding the destroyed villages, they also indicate 
bold claims of model village construction. They signify a certain ethos of self-belief 
regarding	 model	 villages.	 The	 above	 quotes	 capture	 a	 widespread	 confidence	
that each recreated community was to stand for a better order of village life; 
a different social order. The architects of model villages seem to suggest that 
‘improvement’ can be achieved through the physical construction of houses and 
solid village planning; to ‘‘try and get a new kind of rural community development 
plan right’’. Compassionate rhetoric slips into technical and programmatic 
registers as the only viable means of making a ‘difference’, echoing Li’s (2007) 
observation that problems are constructed and framed such as to be amenable to 
technical interventions. 
In this paper, our association with two philanthropically-supported village 
construction efforts in the post-tsunami context of Southern Sri Lanka is used 
to explore the extent to which ‘model’ villages were attempting to create a new 
social order.3	Based	on	fieldwork,	which	included	conversations	with	various	actors	
involved in rebuilding ‘‘model’’ villages, we uncover the ways in which the initial 
3	Section	two	offers	a	more	detailed	description	of	the	fieldwork	site	and	methods	adopted.	
1 9 4  | T h e  P a r a d o x  o f  G o o d  I n t e n t i o n s
compassionate impetus shifted to a will to improve the life of villagers over time. 
Research has shown how compassion initially motivated by ‘‘pure intentions 
to help’’ morphs into other facets. For example, Korf (2006) argues how such 
intentions slide into a ‘‘consumption good’’ where donors use various technologies 
because of expectations placed upon them to produce success (2006:246). We, 
in contrast, focus on how it is not merely the accomplishment of the project that 
matters, but also the production of particular images of village life. Abiding to 
their own frames of reference, private donors were keen to instil an ethos of 
improvement into Sri Lankan village life by invoking their own understanding of 
improvement and development. Hence, we argue that they discipline and guide 
villagers into a better life inverting the status quo, making ‘‘the new villagers feel 
responsible for their village assets’’ said Donor B (see also Li, 2007). 
The temporality and politics of recovery (Hyndman, 2011), the multiple dilemmas 
and ambiguities embedded in the housing rebuilding process (Brun and Lund, 
2008,	2009;	Ruwanpura,	2009),	 the	politics	of	memorialisation	and	purification	
(Simpson and de Alwis, 2008), the commodifying of good intentions (Korf et al., 
2010), and the gendered world of post-tsunami spatial politics (De Mel, 2007; 
Ruwanpura, 2008) are well documented and researched topics in post-tsunami 
Sri Lanka. This literature emphasizes ways in which the reconstruction process 
is embedded within a wider political, cultural, social and cultural terrain of war, 
ethno-nationalism and uneven development. They point out that despite the 
mantra of ‘building back better’,4 existing fault lines have been overlooked, 
creating and perpetuating stress and anxiety in an already fragmented social 
context. Hyndman (2011) in particular notes how disasters always occur within 
specific	political	 situations,	and	 that	 those	countries	most	affected	by	disasters	
tend to suffer from both man made and natural disasters. In this context, the 
task of humanitarian aid is to focus not just on the relief but also on political 
futures since receiving countries also have certain agendas. In contrast to 
Hyndman’s	(2011)	focus	on	the	circuits	of	official	aid	exchange,	our	gaze	shifts	
to	philanthropists,	themselves	positioned	outside	official	aid	and	its	practices.	We	
are interested in those whose purported aim is to help people in need. Our paper 
shows	that	since	private	aid	givers	are	positioned	within	a	political	field,	i.e.	the	
aid business and the local political context, they too cannot avoid the existing 
fault lines. 
Our discussion explores more closely the ways in which human interventions in 
the physical world – rebuilding villages – are also about the will to rebuild a Sri 
Lankan sociality (Li, 2007; Woost, 1994; Brow, 1990). Our case studies point to 
4 This is espoused Sri Lankan government policy position on post-tsunami reconstruction efforts, and its  
   policy contours traced elsewhere (Brun and Lund, 2009; Khasalamwa, 2009). 
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how discourses of compassion and moral cultural rhetoric elide into righteousness 
about improving village communities. Moreover, by scrutinizing the deployment 
of cultural and moral tropes by non-state actors, we highlight how these scripts 
also encompass individualist undertones. We show how emblematic models ‘‘don’t 
attempt to accommodate messy realities of pre-existing social and economic 
relations’’ (Li, 1996:519), but are moreover subtle architects reifying a neo-liberal 
political	 economy.	 More	 specifically,	 post-tsunami	 Sri	 Lanka	 witnessed	 private	
individuals	 taking	 an	 active	 role	 in	mobilizing	 the	 flow	 of	 foreign	 funds,	 which	
was unusual in the development landscape as non-accountable philanthropists 
were taking an active role in post-tsunami reconstruction. Rather than the state 
or NGOs, it was individuals who initially raised and disbursed funds. Logics of 
compassion hence were crucial in the nascent stages – striking a chord both with 
the aid givers, but also with the local communities. This script of compassion 
differs from Li’s scholarship (2007). Similar to Li’s (2007) research, however, 
these rhetorical devices eventually lapsed into a discourse on the will to improve 
communities, which also intersected with previous efforts of the Sri Lankan state 
to rebuild a nation of villages that harked back to a hegemonic vision of a mythical 
and glorious pre-colonial past (Woost, 1993; Brow, 1996). These registers 
invariably evoked Sinhala-Buddhist registers – which nearly three decades later 
were effortlessly resurfacing. 
Wilful village construction and revitalizing the village community can be traced 
to colonial and immediate post-independence Sri Lanka, thus revealing a 
genealogical association with Sinhalanationalism (Woost, 1994; Brow, 1988). 
Uplifting rural communities was a tool of various political regimes (Woost, 1994; 
Brow, 1988). Villagers were used to the idea of revitalizing a ‘‘Sri Lankan’’ way of 
living in order to overcome a history of colonialism and oppression. Brow (1999) 
using the early works of Tambiah (1992) notes how post-colonial development 
efforts focused on creating a self-conscious society, which ‘‘were believed to 
have	 flourished	 under	 the	 ancient	 kings’’	 (1999:68).	 The	 explicit	 task	 for	 the	
post-colonial	 state	 was	 to	 recreate	 imagined	 self-confident	 and	 harmonious	
villages, reinforcing hegemonic visions of nationhood. Pioneered through 
village-level housing constructions, which commonly came to be known as the 
gam udawa (village awakening) scheme in the 1980s, it became a politically 
expedient development strategy. Gam Udawa evoked Sri Lanka’s glorious 
(Sinhala-Buddhist) nationalist past while registering its commitment to a path 
of development (Woost, 1993, 1994; Brow, 1988, 1996). A similar impetus lay 
behind the Accelerated Mahaweli Development Programme in the 1980s; tanks 
and temples were important metonyms for ‘‘material prosperity and spiritual well-
being, respectively’’ and were placed alongside rebuilt housing communities for 
forcibly displaced villagers (Tennekoon, 1988:297). 
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The tsunami, by contrast, offered a catastrophic ‘‘natural’’ event necessitating 
the reconstruction and rebuilding of various coastal villages. In the post-tsunami 
period it is crucial to consider the ways in which a plethora of private donors, 
numerous non-governmental organizations, and international actors have taken 
on this mantle of national housing to boost villages. Brun and Lund (2009) offer 
an overview of Sri Lanka’s ‘‘One National Housing Policy’’ (ONHP) and the ways 
in which land distribution politics and ethnic formations coloured these initiatives 
historically and in contemporary times. We analyze how compassionate discourses 
deployed by private individuals eventually coalesced with enduring nationalist 
visions	 of	 village	 life.	 From	 our	 fieldwork,	we	 unravel	 the	 discursive	 strategies	
used by donor communities and other stakeholders’ rehabilitating model village 
community schemes; a neglected topic in post-tsunami scholarship. The potent 
currency of nationalist development politics noted previously, honed in on state 
processes in the hegemonic formation of a nation of villages (Woost, 1994, 1993, 
Brow, 1988, 1990a, 1996). The important distinction is that this mantle now is 
taken on by individuals in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, where its will to compassion 
clouds a hegemonic vision. 
2. Fieldwork in a nation of model villages 
The village settings for our study are in southern Sri Lanka; one in the deep 
south 120 km from Colombo and 18 km inland; the second approximately 80 km 
south of Colombo and on the coastline. Research in both these locations began 
in	 2005	 (Hollenbach	 and	 Ruwanpura,	 2011).	 Ruwanpura’s	 fieldwork	 started	 as	
part of a larger project funded by UNIFEM (Ruwanpura, 2008, 2009) and entailed 
conducting in-depth and semi-structured interviews lasting 40 min to an hour 
with	 twenty	 villagers.	 Numerous	 fieldtrips	 during	 2005–2008	 continued	 with	
follow-up visits in 2009/2010 and early 2011 to sustain the relationships built with 
interviewees. 
These frequent visits helped establish close familiarity with some villagers, 
with conversations in and out of their homes on various facets of village life 
and the activities of the institution. She also conducted 17 interviews with non-
governmental	 organizations,	 local	 government	 officials,	 religious	 clergy	 and	
local activists to obtain a sense of the ways in which they operated in the area. 
On average these interviews approximated 45 min, with some of lasting as long 
as 2 h. Repeat interviews took place as well. These were supplemented during 
2009/2011 by interviews with senior level project managers at ten multi-lateral 
agencies that eventually came to develop partnerships with the institution 
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initiated by the philanthropist. Prior social connections with the founder aided 
several lengthy formal interviews (lasting over an hour) and casual conversations 
on the plans and activities for rebuilding the village. They also offered easy access 
to	project	documents	and	interviews	with	five	staff	working	for	the	institution.	The	
frequency of visits and privileged access through social connections to the founder 
afforded the researcher personalised encounters and dialogues with the activities 
of the place in both formal and informal contexts. As a bi-lingual researcher, all 
interviews	by	the	first	author	were	conducted	in	either	English	or	Sinhalese	and	
recorded. The transcribing was done by a bilingual Research Assistant who was 
present at almost all interviews. 
Similarly,	 Hollenbach	 shares	 an	 intimate	 association	 with	 the	 inland	 field	 site.	
She worked for two and a half years (2005– 2007) as project manager for the 
privately initiated housing project discussed in this paper. Afterwards, as an 
academic	researcher	she	conducted	fieldwork	for	a	further	2	years	(2008–2010)	
at the same site. During the research phase, semi-structured interviews were held 
with the three foreign project initiators, 15 senior personnel of the NGO managing 
the reconstruction site, 25 local politicians and bureaucrats. This research also 
included document analysis of donor meeting minutes and internal discussion 
papers. Because of the rapport built with housing recipients, it also became 
possible for her to understand the complex motivations of affected families who 
moved to the housing scheme and participated in village community workshops. 
Two Sri Lankan researchers helped her to interview 62 villagers and to conduct 
five	focus	groups.	These	were	translated	and	transcribed	by	Research	Assistants,	
as all were done in Sinhalese – of which Hollenbach has a working knowledge. As 
a bi-lingual speaker, all other interviews were the sole responsibility of the second 
author – which were recorded and transcribed. 
At all times the respondents were made aware that these conversations will be 
used	 for	 research	 and	 fieldwork	 analysis,	 guaranteeing	 their	 anonymity,	 hence	
we	have	concealed	the	names	of	the	villages.	Our	fieldwork	did	not	involve	long	
periods of habitation in the villages – as both Woost (1994, 1990) and Brow (1988, 
1990) have done with their situated ethnographic research, which captures the 
fine	grain	of	village	life.	However,	because	we	were	both	very	close	to	the	founders	
of	the	project,	we	are	able	to	illuminate	findings	based	on	more	than	mere	formal	
interviews. In other words, the insights gained through interviews and personal 
conversations offered the chance to interrogate the slippage between rhetoric and 
ideas that was not otherwise easily available to researchers. So while we do not 
make claims of knowing everyday village life as Woost (1994, 1990) and Brow 
(1988,	1990)	do,	we	find	ourselves	in	a	position	to	capture	the	fine	grain	of	village	
life across different scales of thinking, particularly where the founder and donors 
claimed to ‘know better’ about good community life in Sri Lanka. 
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3. Model village(s): Ownership and construction 
houses built are seemingly high calibre and aesthetically pleasing. There is an 
order to the village plans; the houses are neatly interspaced in equal measure, 
decoratively painted, with eye-catching brickwork and tiled porches and pretty 
front gardens. The villages are not simply visual. The establishment of community 
halls, libraries, medical facilities, playgrounds, and village squares was also a 
crucial dimension to the physical erection of these model villages, even though 
these	 were	 not	 facilities	 previously	 available.	 Such	 efforts	 reflect	 what	 Woost	
(1994)	 notes	 as	 a	 ‘‘floor	 plan	 for	 the	 ideal	 village’’	 (1994:79;	 see	 also	 Li,	
1996:518–519). The programmatic aspects to the reconstruction then shows how 
donors draw on what they believe is ‘good’ for those receiving ‘their’ help and 
‘‘they	occupy	the	position	of	trustees,	a	position	defined	by	the	claim	to	know	how	
others should live, to know what is best for them, to know what they need’’ (Li, 
2007:4). 
Though	 there	 are	 differences	 between	our	 field	 sites	 –	 one	 is	 a	 foreign	donor-
driven initiative and the other a local private philanthropic scheme operationalized 
through urban and foreign networks, there are important overlaps between them 
which the following analysis will focus upon. This analysis is concerned to outline 
the modus operandi of the villages to show the ways in which reconstruction 
efforts came into being. We start, however, by showing through tabulated 
evidence the key features of the two village rebuilding projects.
Local village
(L-village)
Foreign village
(F-village)
Location Southern Province, on
the Galle Road
Southern Province,
20 km off Galle Road
Initiators Local person with natal 
connections to the village 
and previous charity work 
in the area. Initial funds 
sought through private 
individuals, with estab-
lished corporate and inter-
national donors getting 
involved afterwards.
Four German private donors 
funded through private and 
official donations
Size 600 houses 90 houses
Construction/
funding period
2006–2010 20016-2009
 Information on villages
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The foreign donor driven project came into existence through the initiative 
of four foreign individuals with long-standing relations to Sri Lanka. After the 
tsunami,	they	instigated	a	high-profile	fund	raising	project	from	an	assemblage	of	
institutional actors in their home country. A national-level ministry, local branches 
of international service clubs, volunteer organizations, and large scale foundations 
with the mission of promoting, peace, development and democracy were all 
involved.5	Leading	figures	were	directly	involved	and	were	motivated	to	implement	
a ‘‘good’’ project to improve the situation and lives of tsunami-affected people 
permanently and sustainably. ‘‘We felt the need to help, as we lived and worked in 
this beautiful country for such a long time; and our friends were helpless. We had 
an obligation and felt responsible to help and give’’ said one donor, while another 
noted ‘‘It was a good opportunity to re-establish our working relationship to Sri 
Lanka and continue the partnership with the country. After a couple of years we 
were able to implement a project, we could legitimize and get funding from the 
local government’’. In contrast to previous times where development is framed 
as	 restoring	 an	 ancient,	 mythical	 and	 glorious	 past	 not	 influenced	 by	 western	
concepts of living (Woost, 1993:505; see also Brow, 1996), the idioms deployed 
attempted	to	reflect	the	befallen	calamity.	
After several visits and conversations with local partners, donors assessed 
the demand for houses as a priority. This led to the conception of creating a 
new village for tsunami-affected communities from the Galle area, where they 
hoped to instil ‘‘a new way of living’’. Eco-friendly housing and living was an 
underlying	 premise	 reflecting	 the	 interest	 of	 the	 Ministry	 involved:	 ‘‘we	 need	
to focus on eco-friendly aspects as we had to legitimize the funds within the 
portfolio of the Ministry’’. Core to the eco-friendly vision were: eco-friendly 
construction materials, minimizing electricity consumption per unit, instituting 
better sewage tanks to recycle waste water, re-forestation of the village area, 
and waste water management. To be holistic in their ‘model’ it was important 
in donors’ understanding to implement a new community self-administration 
system where villagers were to take more responsibility and ownership to secure 
developmental	sustainability	(see	also	Li,	2007).	The	way	philanthropists	defined	
better	community	life	shows	that	they	were	influenced	by	their	knowledge	of	eco-
friendly construction, community organization, and by preconditions given by the 
Ministry. Suggestions on self-governing were based on community self-governing 
systems	of	the	federal	state	of	their	native	country.	This	clearly	reflects	how	‘‘[t]
5 The issues raised in this paper are not necessarily about the particularities of the organizations per se  
   as much as much as the particularities of the Sri Lankan social hierarchy and political economy fabric  
   which enables the existence of social practices which gets evaluated in this article. We call the village  
   which came through direct foreign intervention the ‘Foreign Village’ (F-Village) and the other the ‘Local 
   Village’ (L-Village). This binary categorization is used for ease rather than to connote a parochial      
   reading of difference between the foreign and the local.
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he	identification	of	a	problem	is	intimately	linked	to	the	availability	of	a	solution...
experts are trained to frame problems in technical terms...their claim to expertise 
depends on their capacity to diagnose problems in ways that match the kinds 
of solutions that fall within their repertoire’’ (Li, 2007: 7). Self-administration 
echoed with past state-led initiatives, with routines motivated in ‘‘the dominant 
quest	to	redefine	village	society’’	where	‘‘covert	efforts	to	restructure	the	habitus’’	
are constantly invoked (Woost, 1993:82; see also Bourdieu, 1977). To identify 
potential	 beneficiaries,	 surveys	 were	 undertaken	 in	 order	 to	 pick	 the	 ‘right	
eligible’ person. As Li (2007) notes, ‘‘planned development is premised upon the 
improvability	of	the	‘target	group’’’,	where	‘‘deficient	subjects	can	be	identified	and	
improved only from the outside’’ (2007: 15). According to a principal coordinator 
the surveys helped to get a ‘‘proper mix of Sri Lankan society together’’ and 
prevent the risk of, in their words, a ‘‘squatter village or slum’’. The eco-friendly 
village emphasis was congruent with the latest environmental discourses and an 
apparent social justice concern for ‘‘promoting the moral and material welfare of 
the poor’’ (Brow, 1988:318). This drive, however, is undergirded by interpellations 
of the ‘‘deserving poor’’, which attempts to thwart undesirable manifestations of 
an idealized village community. 
Responsibility and ownership by the villagers was crucial to the success of the 
‘model’	village.	Yet,	the	donor	group	identified	that	the	planning	and	implementing	
capacity	of	the	Sri	Lankan	partners	would	be	insufficient	to	‘‘properly’’	transfer	all	
the ideas into this new village. Therefore, a knowledgeable implementing partner 
had to be found. An international NGO was given the mandate of identifying 
appropriate land in Southern Sri Lanka and consultating with a close Southern 
political	 figure.	 An	 old	 rubber	 and	 tea	 estate	 in	 the	 interior	 of	 Galle	 was	 ear-
marked because of its proximity to the Southern Expressway, which they told 
villagers opened new socio-economic vistas. 
In	contrast	the	momentum	for	the	other	field	site	came	‘‘locally’’.	The	philanthropic	
institution was initially involved in charitable activity in a small village enveloped 
between Ambalangoda and Hikkaduwa for approximately 10 years prior to the 
tsunami. It started off as a one-person led initiative seeking to contribute to a 
parental village from which the founder came (from a family of privilege unlike 
other villagers). With an educated legal professional as a father, the founder 
was from the English-speaking village elite. Though mostly Colombo-educated, 
his parental family resided in the village. After inheriting the parental home, he 
tore it down and rebuilt a tropical home making ample use of the spacious land, 
coconut palm trees, the nearby beach breeze and local vegetation. The newly 
built residence was used as a holiday home, hosting a swimming pool, tennis 
courts, and basket ball courts. The new abode was a symbol of luxury, wealth, and 
privilege in a village-community which is dotted with small cadjan houses. Yet, the 
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founder claimed a social conscious, noting ‘‘....I’m going to my roots where my 
father and mother came from. And I have gone and 
[I] basically work....for the good of the people in the region.’’ Here too the 
trusteeship, of which Li (2007) reminds us is invoked, with a twist of claims to 
‘authenticity’ given that the village is the founders natal village. This was no 
‘external’ intrusion. Instead the initiation emerges from apparently well-grounded 
internal and local interest, if only one was to ignore class dynamics which create 
propitious conditions for one group of people to ‘‘do good’’ towards others (see 
also Korf, 2006). The tsunami offered him the opportunity to transform these 
moral aspirations into new ambitions. 
The holiday home with its spaces of leisure was destroyed by the tsunami. The 
founder survived because he was at the local Buddhist temple, which was on 
a higher elevation made of large granite rocks. After the tsunami waves had 
receded and a few days later, when the founder returned to the village and his 
holiday home the destruction was monumental. His network of Colombo-based 
friends and family mobilized to start cleaning up operations. He also used his skills 
and capabilities to tap into the deluge of donations, which had started pouring into 
post-tsunami	Sri	Lanka.	He	accepted	that	the	first	step	to	rebuilding	the	village	
was to clean/clear-up the debris and dead bodies from the physical destruction. 
After this clean-up, the next step involved starting to rebuild the houses. This 
required	 not	 just	 available	 voluntary	 help,	 but	 also	 financial	 help,	 architectural	
input, and planning. These all came from urban-based English-speaking middle 
classes. Individual assistance and social connections mattered here too in the 
immediate aftermath. Financial goodwill found in the immediate post-tsunami 
period came not just from the donors, but also from the Sri Lankan diasporic 
community. Quite astutely, the founder used his networks existing at multiple 
scales to channel resources into rebuilding houses and homes for those whose 
homes had been destroyed by the tsunami. The ‘indigenous’ knowledge was his 
vital asset. Initially he drew upon resources from a network of friends, later he 
tapped on bi-lateral aid donors in his will to improve village life. His ability to 
make claims on behalf of his natal village, despite his distinctly different socio-
economic standing, offered him an ‘‘insider’s’’ legitimacy that he did not need to 
create from scratch (see also Li, 2007: 176). 
The initial phase was modest: to rebuild the partially destroyed homes of families 
who had lost a breadwinner. Afterwards, the goodwill of private individuals 
(mostly from the diaspora) enabled funds to rebuild houses on a larger scale. 
The motivation to envision a rebuilding scheme was only dreamt of in his earlier 
philanthropic activities: ‘‘But for me, if I look back ten years ago – just planting 
the seed with purity of intention to help people compassionately has taken me 
to an extreme level of establishing what I dream of in the most unfortunate 
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of circumstances, of course, by way of a tragic tsunami. But I have made that 
huge setback into a blessing.’’ In Sri Lanka’s long history of restoring villages, 
individual participation in the development project in the search for utopian 
communities is, however, not novel (Brow, 1999, Woost, 1993). It offers the 
chance	to	construct	and	recreate	‘‘an	image	of	society	that	modifies	and	represent	
ideological elements of both past and present’’ (Woost, 1993:506). By evoking 
tropes of compassion and kindness, the founder was citing Buddhist culture as the 
moral compass precipitating action in reconstructing a village after a catastrophe. 
The mobilization of dominant themes opportune for the time augmented the 
probability of effected communities and people recognizing ‘‘themselves in the 
forms of address contained in those discourses’’ (Woost, 1993:506; see also 
Brow,	 1988:322;	 Li,	 1996).	 Unlike	 in	 the	 past,	 where	 it	 was	 state-led	 official	
rhetoric that papered ‘‘over cracks and cleavages’’ and bound people through 
articulations of Buddhist idioms in Sri Lanka (Brow, 1990:9), in the post-tsunami 
landscape this mantle was increasingly taken on by philanthropists and non-
governmental organizations.6 While the Sri Lankan state is not quite in retreat 
(Hyndman, 2011; Jazeel and Ruwanpura, 2009), the space for individual actors 
– unelected and unaccountable – was on the rise. Moreover, the lip service paid 
to Sinhala-Buddhist rhetoric in a country besieged by a three decade ethno-
nationalist	 conflict	 was	 ignored	 by	 the	 donor	 community	 in	 its	 eagerness	 to	
embrace development activity via the philanthropic and non-governmental sector. 
Holding non-state actors and philanthropists culpable for the dangers of deploying 
Buddhist idioms via development projects was less of a concern for the corporate 
and donor community than celebrating the ‘successes’ of doing productive 
development work with the non-state. The neo-liberal development ideology 
of rewarding performance by the non-state sector was more fundamental than 
being concerned with the pernicious effects of Sinhala-Buddhist ideology (see 
also	Li,	2007:239–243).	When	the	first	author	interviewed	USAID	and	World	Bank	
officials	on	the	potential	problems	of	being	involved	with	nonstate	actors	peddling	
Buddhist idioms through their development work in a context of an on-going and 
prolonged	ethno-conflict,	they	deftly	avoided	responding	to	the	query.	Slippages	
between ideological frames of reference and its potential dangers were rarely 
registers of concern; as Li (2007) notes: ‘‘Trustees cannot addressindeed, may not 
acknowledge-the contradictory forces with which they are engaged.... Capitalism 
and improvement are locked in an awkward embrace’’ (2007: 21), despite other 
existing political realities in a war-ravaged and staunchly ethno-nationalist Sri 
Lanka. 
6 Hyndman (2011) reminds how geopolitical shifts and stresses on aid effectiveness also meant donors  
   becoming more entrusting of ‘‘neutral’’ NGOs and civil society and sometimes working only with this  
   sector (2011:877).
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An	 inflow	 of	 a	 steady	 stream	 of	 funds	 meant	 re-imagining	 a	 rebuilt	 village	
emblematic of an idyllic community. Two room houses were built with small, 
beautified	 garden	 patches	 for	 each	 recipient	 family.	 Within	 the	 village,	 each	
house was separated with low-level brick, hedge or picket fences that cordoned 
off individuals properties. Whilst initially the houses built were single storied, 
over the years two-storied houses were built as well. Shortage of land did not 
pose an insurmountable problem because donorfunding was not lacking. Hence 
building two-tiered houses was a logical step in the reconstruction process; it also 
signalled to donors’ bold thinking by the institution. Moreover, so long as it paid 
attention to systems, donors were attracted to working together with such NGOs. 
As the founder put it: ‘‘There are donors, don’t get me wrong, who like to be 
associated with projects...where there are systems and discipline.... You plan your 
work and work your plan; that is a simple thing...that should be the agenda.’’ The 
vectors of success had merged into plans, systems and disciplining with barely a 
reflection	on	the	impetus	of	compassion	that	led	to	aid	waves	in	the	first	place.	
Eventual support from corporate entities and state-level donors led to each 
institutional benefactor becoming responsible for smaller communes within the 
village. Today there are many smaller compounds with names designating the 
corporate or donor-named sub-villages within the local village. This donor imprint 
on ‘model’ villages exists in both situations. For the foreign donor driven scheme, 
the new village name starts with the name of the donor country, while for the 
locally initiated ‘model’ community, the donor and corporate imprints are on 
recently created sub-villages. 
Despite the rhetoric of ownership by local communities, the interest of the 
villagers, and language of sustainability, the imprint of ‘‘my/our’’ model is an 
integral component of reconstruction efforts. Stewardship and the self-assurance 
of knowing which comes with it underscored the activities of both the local and 
foreign	donors.	It	reflected	what	Li	(2007)	notes	as	trustees	intervening	in	social	
relations ‘‘in order to adjust them’’ while pulling them together from ‘‘an existing 
repertoire, a matter of habit, accretion and bricolage’’ (2007:6). However, we 
show how this aim, in the post-tsunami landscape, is taken up by non-state 
mediators, and how emerging ideological frames are not subject to scrutiny as the 
state is. 
4. A new kind of rural development – Planning an ideal village 
In	L-village,	the	founder	portrays	himself	as	a	local	figure,	albeit	from	the	English-
speaking upwardly mobile class and with necessary networks to make a socially 
conscious difference. Post-tsunami, the philanthropic institution’s goals shifted 
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from offering temporary shelter to rebuilding partially destroyed houses, and then 
to constructing sub-village compounds for the affected. Currently it has rebuilt 
approximately 600 damaged and new houses, cited as testimony to its resounding 
accomplishments. As the success of plans shifted from one scale to another, 
the funding altered from individual members of the diaspora to corporate and 
foreign	donors.	Accordingly,	the	official	status	evolved	from	a	one-man	charitable	
institution to a legally recognized non-governmental organization (NGO).7 At all 
times, however, the village and smaller sub-community compounds were designed 
by a Colombo-based architect with village needs assessed by committees made 
up of Colombo-based friends and relatives. The preparation of the main needs 
of the community and the designing of the village was all undertaken elsewhere. 
As Woost (1994) reminds us, the urban elite have a mental image of a typical 
village, which may not necessarily resonate with the messy community and 
spatial formations on the ground (see also Scott, 1990; Li, 1996). The legitimacy 
the founder and the philanthropic institution drew upon was a narrative of being 
a ‘‘local’’ institution seeking to empower poverty-ridden communities in a holistic 
manner. 
Reflecting	 the	urban	biases	of	 the	Colombo-based	elite,	 the	 ‘‘ideal’’	 village	and	
the smaller compounds are planned to have hubs, such as libraries, learning 
and activities centres, employment generating units and shops (see also Woost, 
1994). The entire village is served by a ‘centre of excellence’ which is the former 
destroyed residence-turned-holiday home. It hosts ten sectors of activity, ranging 
from women’s entrepreneurial training to artisan production and a healthcare 
centre in which villagers apply and seek appointments to participate. A memorial 
to dead members of the village community is installed at the centre with episodes 
of consternation amongst some villagers (see Simpson and De Alwis, 2008). 
The centre does not institute an open-door policy. The gates to it are manned 
by security and those entering the premises need a reason for doing so. Prior 
appointments can be made to meet project staff, health sector workers and/or 
participate at the weekly classes inside the centre; in the words of the founder, 
the emphasis was on ‘‘leading by example with strict rules and regulations.’’ 
Orderly conduct is a key attribute instilled through participation and any sense 
of accessing it in a leisurely way, as most villagers would familiar with, is not 
encouraged. In the case of Sulawesi border-park villagers, Li (2007) notes 
how ‘‘villagers were to be true to themselves, while also conforming to new 
requirements’’ (2007:132). A similar expectation was instilled through the 
changes instituted with getting appointments and orderly entrancing to the 
7 This was because attracting funding from foreign governments was feasible only with NGO-status.
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Centre.8 Importantly, the language of the founder changed regarding the activities 
offered by the Centre. In the immediate posttsunami period, the founder spoke 
of the skills training offered to the villagers by the centres – initially one but by 
now three dotted around the village or boundary villages. In more recent times, 
the founder speaks of ‘empowerment’ of villagers via skills training. Shifting the 
jargon to suit the development rhetoric of the donor community is clearly vital to 
his ability to expand to be able to continue to be treated as a serious trustee with 
commitment to not just local needs, but also global development discourses. 
The building of the main centre itself concretizes a spatial and social division: 
areas designed for village community activities and hosting the philanthropic 
organization’s	project	office	are	accessible	to	villagers	by	appointment.	Meanwhile,	
the lavish rear of the building, a holiday and residential quarter complete with 
swimming pool, is reserved for visiting dignitaries, friends, family and similarly 
socially connected people. This is a space creatively carved out as a distinct area 
which separates the rural people, permitted entrance only as domestic workers, 
from the mostly Colombo-based and foreign visitors to the reconstructed village. 
Was this a new kind-of rural planning implemented in practice? In F-village when 
the foreign donor driven project selected its site, there was no prior consultation 
with recipients, local authorities or other associated bodies aware of local 
housing	matters.	Even	when	the	details	among	different	partners	were	clarified	
regarding implementing an ‘eco-friendly housing model’ and a MOU signed in 
October 2005, the government instituted Tsunami authorities were not involved. 
Partially	the	donor	group	sidelined	official	authorities	because	they	ranked	their	
linkages	 with	 local	 political	 officials	 and	 partners	 highly.	 Formal	 bodies	 were	 a	
trivial detail. When the decision to implement the project via an international NGO 
was	made,	 links	with	official	 relief	 structures	were	mobilized.	At	 this	point,	 the	
NGO registered the project with TAFREN (Task Force to Rebuilding the Nation)/
RADA	 (Reconstruction	 and	Development	 Agency),	 so	 that	 it	 became	 an	 official	
tsunami	 housing	 scheme.	 In	 reality,	 however,	 the	 political	 influence	 of	 local	
political	figures	and	authorities	was	more	crucial	in	creating	a	‘model’	project	as	
it helped bypass established state policy for sake of punctuality. For instance, 
the	slowness	of	a	local	government	official	to	make	decisions	resulted	in	a	donor	
calling a political friend to impel quick action in the decision-making process: ‘‘You 
know, if things are not moving you should let us know; we will use our contacts 
to pressure the local authorities to work faster. We can not have more delays in 
the implementation process, we need to show success ...We made promises... 
we	need	 to	 fulfil	 these	promises.’’	By	 this	 time,	 the	matter	of	 showing	 success	
8 Gated entrances to the homes of village elite have been in place over decades in the village; this was    
   merely a reinforcement of class and place in the location (Hollenbach and Ruwanpura, 2011).
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and delivering on promises was the driving force – and the political expediency 
of ‘will to improve’, rather than compassion, had taken the upper-hand. Post-
tsunami housing schemes and their practices were much messier on the ground, 
embedded as they were in the politics of access and privilege over and above 
those discrepancies already examined (Brun and Lund, 2009). 
Once the NGO signed up with TAFREN/RADA, they strictly followed all rules 
introduced by local authorities. The size of the house, the minimum space between 
structures, the size of roads, and all other standards regarding post-tsunami 
housing policy were taken into consideration. The projected task was to build 
90 new houses with an emphasis on individual gardens designed by an architect 
native to the donor country. The donors demanded building a kindergarten, a 
library, a medical facility, a playground, shops, a bakery,9 a village square and 
a community hall alongside the houses. The structuring was similar to villages 
of the donor country where the community hall is located at the centre of the 
village. This was the space where people meet, come together, communicate and 
create a ‘‘peaceful’’ living environment. Representing village communities through 
an emphasis on ‘‘harmony, equality and tradition’’ was a critical device in giving 
meaning to these schemes (Li, 1996:502). Planning for the perfect community, 
however, was undergirded by constraints of timing and success: ‘‘...we have to 
start	 the	 project	 now	 as	we	 have	 to	 show	progress	 to	 the	 financial	 backers	 in	
the	host	country.	The	identification	of	beneficiaries	is	important,	I	know,	but	we	
cannot discuss more details about the project. We have to start construction!’’ The 
ideal village where people were supposed to take responsibility for its sustenance 
was planned and constructed without considering who this group was. There was 
thus no issue about sidelining their interests and wishes. 
The scales at which both post-tsunami village building schemes have taken place 
is	significant	and	impressive.	Yet	the	quest	to	build	ideal	villages	is	a	story	about	
the ability of a group to instil and promote particular values, revealing the degree 
to which improving the human condition is always pervaded by modern impulses. 
More critically, however, there is another shift taking place. No longer are these 
initiatives solely the purview of the state (Woost, 1993, 1994; Brow, 1988, 
1990). The current juncture has also led to private people and groups seeing it as 
their unquestioning responsibility to implement and instil changes perceived as 
bettering deserving people. This drive is starkly apparent in the ways in which the 
village layout resonated with each donor’s notion of rural community ordering (Li, 
1996). Detailed neighbourhood practices show how planned efforts did not always 
go as intended. It thus shows that even as the sliding from compassion to the 
9 The bakery is reflective of the critical role bread plays in the donor country, where a local bakery is a   
   present in most village settings.
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will to improve lead to powerful efforts at village reordering (Li, 1996:504), lived 
realities of village community life also need documentation.
 
5. From idyllic villages to everyday living
The	restructured	L-village	with	its	sub-communes	was	aflood	with	road	names	and	
sub-village names recently given to signify the renovated and newly built homes’ 
connection to the numerous corporate and donor associations. Within the main 
village	there	is	a	plethora	of	other	sub-villages	with	distinctive	flavours	connoting	
ownership to the donor community, for example Victoria Gardens, AVIVA village 
and Perth village. Beyond signposts, the layouts resonate with donor images of 
idyllic communes. Walking through Perth village one comes across small and 
pretty garden path with street lamps fashioned after old gas lamps, lighting the 
way into a small and seemingly cosy community of 6–7 houses. Victoria Gardens 
is designed with a tarred road, which has a children’s playground in the midst of 
84 two-storied houses, a novelty and rarity in any Sri Lankan village. 
The local unit is actively involved in attempting to maintain an idealized vision of 
a village community. Hence 9 years after the tsunami there is still great effort and 
commitment to maintain this. 
However, both the donor and several villagers conceded that efforts to beautify 
and keep individual home gardens and paths through a scheme of awarding 
a monthly prize with dry food rations had been abandoned because of costs 
involved with giving prizes and monitoring and judging best gardens. The lack of 
interest on the part of the villagers was also a contributory factor. A villager said 
‘‘Mahathaya (the gentleman) thinks that we have the time to be looking after 
home gardens. He does not realize that we are [too] busy trying to eke a living 
to have the time to be gardening and beautifying our premises.’’ A woman said 
‘‘It is not as if we Sri Lankan’s are known to be unclean people; we sweep the 
garden and keep our premises clean. We just don’t have the time to take the extra 
effort	to	be	keeping	flower	beds	and	planting	new	plants.’’	Their	reactions	were	
grounded in the everyday of their lives with economic pressures and material 
discomforts being prominent concerns. The inevitability of the ‘‘gap between 
what is attempted and what is accomplished’’ is not merely because ‘‘the will is 
stubborn’’ (Li, 2007:1). It is also because the persistence of material deprivation 
and class inequality thwarts these efforts, thus making villagers have different 
sets of priorities from those who are will a distinct improvement. 
Villagers also had a different understanding of space. Where architects built 
bathrooms and toilets into the houses they designed, villagers turned those 
bathrooms into storerooms or a spare room, prioritizing funds toward building 
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a new toilet outside, separate from their new homes – constraining even further 
their rather small rear compounds. The villagers expressed their strongest 
displeasure with this new feature. One villager simply put it thus: ‘‘Toilets 
shouldn’t be in the house. Everything that goes on in there can be heard – how 
civilized is that?’’ Additionally, laundry lines in front gardens – initially forbidden – 
and vegetable patches and small cash crop cultivations greeted us on subsequent 
field	visits	in	place	of	flowerbeds.	Village	life	lived	is	chaotic,	grounded,	and	with	
rough edges. 
In	F-village	the	central	meeting	office	is	the	dominant	building	in	the	square	and	
it	 houses	 the	 grama	 niladari’s	 office,	 kindergarten,	 library,	 etc.	 According	 to	 a	
donor ‘‘This should be the place where people meet, where life happens... the 
villagers have to organize a weekly-market and all the people can meet here and 
exchange’’. The space was planned with a large market place and several benches 
placed around the public space. One donor said ‘‘I imagine in couple of years if all 
the trees are big and there is enough shadow, then people will sit here talk and 
meet’’. Benches were also placed along the hilly area where several stairs connect 
the lower with the upper part of the village. Walking down the stairs in 2011, the 
benches exist but the anticipated view of the surrounding area is obscured by 
the woods because of neglect. Asking the villagers about this set-up, one woman 
recently (February 2011) noted, ‘‘You know we are not using these things... 
now the benches are more a meeting place for the young boys drinking and 
smoking	without	us	seeing	them...	You	can	go	there	and	you	always	find	bottles	
and cigarettes... we actually do not like to go there with our small children, it is 
not nice’’. Moreover, the publicly situated benches are unused because the trees 
planted alongside haven’t grown fully, hence anyone using it is exposed to the hot 
sun. 
Another characteristic eco-friendly concept was to put up public dustbins to keep 
public spaces clean and waste free. During several community meetings the 
concept was explained, and villagers were asked to set up a volunteer group to 
encourage recycling disposed waste. Today, the dustbins are rare. When villagers 
were queried, they stressed ‘‘You know the people did throw their waste anywhere 
and did not put these into the bins. Then young boys started to break them...
some	are	in	the	Presidents’	office,	you	can	see	them	if	you	like...some	people	took	
them to their house and use them for private waste. Also the waste collection 
never really started, we still burn all our waste’’. While the villagers are aware of 
expectations placed on them and how they were supposed to be disciplined into, 
in this instance, a version of environmentally-conscious citizens, they continue to 
use the village in ways consonant with everyday life as they know it (Scott, 1990). 
This failure of ‘‘reorganization ‘educated’ by development discourse and practice’’ 
suggests how ‘‘contradictory sedimentation of knowledge... and contextualized 
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judgements about practical experience in everyday life’’ occur (Woost, 1993:516). 
At	 first	 glance	 the	 village	 is	 idyllic	 with	 lush	 surroundings	 that	 offer	 a	 feeling	
of being apart from city-life. The wild foliage, rubber trees and tea estates 
dominate the backdrop. Since the public spaces are no longer well maintained, 
nature creeps into spaces originally planned as playgrounds, meetings areas or 
community gardens. Village life becomes disorganized not simply because of the 
everyday	lives	of	villagers,	but	also	because	the	environment	defines	it	to	reflect	
practices found on the ground. 
In both villages, the libraries and community halls were sporadically used. In 
order to protect books, the persons assigned to keep the libraries secure tended to 
be	stingy	and	were	reluctant	to	loan	or	had	strict	hours	of	operation.	This	reflected	
both	 the	 ways	 that	 those	 with	 some	 influence	 acted,	 entrenching	 their	 social	
position within the village and leading to disquiet amongst others (see also Brow, 
1996); or as levers managing accessibility to public facilities, values that varied 
from village norms were instilled. While the medical facilities are used, in F-village 
a medical practitioner has a private clinic in operation, in L-village volunteer 
medical practitioners work only over the weekends. The gradual privatization 
of healthcare facilities has become slowly instituted through these initiatives. 
These shifts are worthwhile noting because of the disjuncture between what was 
attempted and what has transpired; sometimes in keeping with the script and at 
other times incurring unexpected shifts. The effects of interventions, as Li (2007) 
reminds us, are always ‘‘contingent and diverse’’ (2007:272). 
These built communes signal foreign and corporate donor interventions and 
hence their claim on these villages, rather than necessarily how locals structure 
their	 village	 compounds	 to	 reflect	 their	 lived	 social	 community.	 Woost	 (1994)	
reminds us that often Sri Lankan villages are ‘‘loose conglomerates of homesteads 
dispersed’’; in his case throughout the jungle, in our case diffused on the 
coastline and in the immediate interior. Indeed it did not seem that the local 
villagers had any say, save for the colours used to paint their houses, in designing 
or redesigning the villages. The founder, elite and English-speaking, was the 
‘‘local’’ mediator deploying donor-friendly language who negotiated funding and 
reconstruction plans on behalf of the village. The donor village similarly was 
striking the correct chords in using the lingua franca of environmentalism that 
reverberated in the two countries. In both instances, at one scale it was his/their 
village	at	incipient	stages	of	the	process;	later,	the	villagers	redefined	their	space	
– shaped by their everyday situations and material realities. 
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6. The slippery slope between compassion and the will to improve 
Both initiatives presented here departed from village development terrains 
where tragic circumstances wrought by the tsunami necessitated compassion 
and kindness towards the other, whether distant or otherwise. The discourses of 
compassion, goodness, and kindness were paramount for accentuating the gravity 
of post-tsunami Sri Lanka, with catastrophic tsunami images not needing too 
much	effort	on	the	part	of	fund	raisers	to	capture	the	attention	of	the	munificent	
(Telford and Cosgrave, 2007). Korf (2006) points out that when the attention 
shifted to ‘‘our’’ generosity, creating narratives around the compassion to help 
acted as important catalysts creating empathy in the Western world. Using these 
tropes, however, comes with a price. Aid practices get tailored according to the 
will	of	 the	donor,	where	 their	primary	 interest	 is	 in	flourishing	donations	rather	
than necessarily listening to what the local recipients may most need (2006:246). 
Yet, enveloping this discourse was also donor recognition that an opportunity was 
created	with	a	seeming	clean	slate,	and	a	mandate	to	‘build	back	better’,	as	official	
tsunami housing policy states. This momentum underlined efforts to exemplify 
innovative rural development, a reoccurring theme in Sri Lanka’s development 
landscape (Woost, 1994; Brow, 1988, 1996), but one which continuously neglects 
class dynamics and social hierarchies or rural communities (Caron and Da Costa, 
2007). The distinction this time was that philanthropists and non-state actors 
were in full force, while the structural sources of inequality continued to be hidden 
from view (Li, 2007:275; see also Korf et al., 2010). 
Tropes of compassion and kindness were important to mobilize donor and 
philanthropic funding. Their import also lies in the ways such discourses engage 
villagers	 in	 a	 culturally	 familiar	 language.	 Thus,	 as	 beneficiaries	 moving	 into	
reconstituted villages, villagers found a semblance of coherence and recognition 
in the moral tropes used given its resonance with the proverbial. By documenting 
how the deployments of cultural idioms (compassion) cloak moral imperatives, 
we have shown how individual donors and non-governmental organizations take 
upon themselves the quest for uplifting villagers. We show the need to trace the 
discursive strategies of authoritative sources as they hit the ground. Li (1996) 
notes how competing visions of community offers space for imagining alternatives, 
whilst reminding us that ‘‘the attempt to catalogue tradition and locate an 
authoritative	source	able	to	represent	‘the	community’...	 leads	to	simplifications	
inevitably ridden with power, as articulate spokesmen.... overlook ambiguities in 
... indigenous terms and practices’’ (1996:508). The tsunami offered a space to 
rejuvenate these authoritative voices – whether they are the voices of local elites 
committed to socially-motivated betterment, or those of foreign donors with ties 
to Sri Lanka who envisioned harmonious village life. 
Pa r t  2  |  2 1 1
Good intentions are not value-free. A veiled script reveals how values of individual 
responsibility are inculcated and how outsiders attempt to rectify what they 
perceived tsunami-affected villagers to be lacking. As Cruikshank writes, ‘‘citizens 
are	 not	 born;	 they	 are	 made...[that	 explains]	 the	 political	 significance	 of	 the	
ways	social	scientific	knowledge	is	operationalized	in	techniques,	programs,	and	
strategies for governing, shaping, and guiding those who are held to exhibit 
some	specific	 lack’’	 (1999:	3).	Bettering	post-tsunami	village	 life	carries	with	 it	
the	connotation	that	the	deficits	of	village	life	needed	correcting.	The	assumption	
was that intervening outsiders would decide how to improve it for them without 
considering the need for redistributive social justice. Li (2007) reminds us that 
‘‘the objective of trusteeship is not to dominate others-it is to enhance their 
capacity for action, and to direct it. ... Their intentions are benevolent, even 
utopian. They desire to make the world better than it is. Their methods are 
subtle...	 They	 structure	 a	 field	 of	 possible	 actions.	 They	 entice	 and	 induce’’	
(2007:5). Similarly, in post-tsunami Sri Lanka the rejuvenation was not merely 
limited to re/building new homes. It also consists of self-contained and proto-
type village layouts, with access to various skill training programmes.10 This 
phase of restitution had a natural event as a catalyst and hence was distinct from 
preceding periods of village awakening schemes in which the state forced action 
(Woost, 1994, 1993; Brow, 1990, 1988). Consequently, it ‘‘blend[s] seamlessly 
into common sense’’ (Li, 2007:5) with a historical trajectory already in existence 
in Sri Lanka, made more urgent by a ‘‘natural’’ disaster. Yet it is a backdrop no 
less worthy of scrutiny. The development state is dissected for its entanglements, 
retreat, interference, visibility, or violence (Hyndman, 2011; Jeffrey, 2007; Brow, 
1996). Yet the growing presence of local and foreign philanthropists in new realms 
have escaped critical gaze in post-tsunami scholarship. Our intervention modestly 
attempts	to	fill	this	gap.	As	new	agents	of	development,	philanthropists	and	non-
state donors are engaged in a politics of representation that does not simply defy 
quotidian	conditions	on	the	ground,	but	also	reifies	a	particular	version	of	political	
economy (see also Hyndman, 2011; Brow, 1996). The villagers themselves did 
go	about	 their	 lives	 as	 they	 found	fit.11 Our foci, however, calls for reengaging 
moral tropes that are utilized by non-state agents to sustain a script pervaded by 
individualist undertones. 
10 With limited rural employment opportunities, the value of these training schemes beggars belief.
11 In this regard, the ways in which new governance regimes attempts and failures at disciplining local    
     communities into a better world in post-tsunami Sri Lanka needs further research.
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7. Conclusion 
Logics of compassion were critical for generating aid in posttsunami Sri Lanka. 
Tracking the moralities of the compassionate discourses of independent donors 
has highlighted that village planning continues to be governed by principles of 
modernization (Li, 2007). Crucially, we have traced how privileged philanthropists 
perpetuated hegemonic and nationalist visions of model villages, whereby 
individual responsibility was also encouraged. Non-state agencies are increasingly 
the preferred development partners, where they deftly deploy culturally sensitive 
tropes in a neo-liberal landscape (Hyndman, 2011). Yet our paper calls for 
examining the manner in which their actions are also about subtly shifting social 
relations favourable to neo-liberal incursions into village life, which we also 
contend bears upon nationalist politics. While we see the state (Jeffrey, 2007), we 
also need to see the non-state and its increasing role in development interventions 
to more fully appreciate its entanglements, intercession, gentle violence and 
culpability	 in	social	 life.	More	specifically,	we	have	shown	how	individual	donors	
used	 their	 personal	 connections	with	politicians	and	high-profile	bureaucrats	 to	
outwit state/non-state procedures so as to achieve their vision. Excavating the 
everyday violence perpetrated suggests how we need to pay careful attention 
to the emerging role of philanthropists and their increasing role in development 
interventions. 
Improving village communities and rural development schemes of all sorts was 
the purview of colonial administrators, the state and multi-lateral organizations 
– whether in Sri Lanka or other regions in the Global South (Li, 2007; Woost, 
1994; Brow, 1990, 1988). What we have illustrated is how this trusteeship is 
changing hands to philanthropists and non-state actors in post-tsunami Sri Lanka, 
albeit without the same level of analysis it deserves. The emergence of this new 
assembly of trustees equally needs unpacking since intervention schemes are 
‘‘fragments of reality....(which) signal new ways in which social forces can be 
bounded and dissected’’ (Li, 2007:277; see also Hyndman, 2011). The absence 
of the state in these instances may not necessarily lead to ‘‘anarchy, poverty and 
despair’’ (ibid 280), but rather results in non-state agencies stepping up its role 
without much scrutiny. Our concern then is that social hierarchies are reinforced 
despite the mobilization of localism, culture, responsibility and sustainability 
with	a	seeming	concern	 for	social	 justice.	Such	 rhetoric	deflects	attention	 from	
grounded political-economic relations, where producing responsible villagers 
depoliticizes their existing subjectivities and neglects prevailing social relations at 
the village scale.
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For post-tsunami Sri Lanka we have revealed how political economic relations are 
simultaneously implicated and yet elided in the shift from the discursive tropes 
of compassion in the advent of disaster to the will to improve. Villagers are not 
necessarily trapped in their new settings or unafraid to draw attention to the 
materially frenzied nature of their lives. Yet it is also the case that constellations of 
power at certain junctures need not necessarily lead to imaginative alternatives. 
The interpellation of religious and moral mores during disasters to assist affected 
others are compassionate gesticulations, but when taken to the scale of willing 
communities to improve, such schemes expose an underbelly where the political 
economy matters. The moral of the story remains thus: Compassion ultimately 
does not rid social relations of material inequality and class discrepancies. These 
can only be addressed through redistributive social justice. 
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Annex 1 
Table 1: Tsunami affected Provinces by District, DS and GN Division
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, 2005
Province District DS Division
Total Number
DS Division
affected 
(% of total)
GN Division
Total Number
GN Division
affected 
(% of total)
Eastern Apmara 20 10 (50%) 507 124 (24%)
Batticaloa 14 8 (57%) 348 68 (20%)
Trincomalee 11 6 (54%) 230 55 (24%)
Northern Jaffna 16 2 (13%) 435 31 (7%)
Kilinochchi 4 3 (75 %) 95 9 (9%)
Mullaitivu 5 1 (20%) 127 18 (14%)
Southern Galle 18 6 (33%) 895 132 (15%)
Hambantota 11 4 (36%) 576 33 (8%)
Matara 16 3 (19%) 650 71 (11%)
Western Colombo 13 5 (38%) 557 30 (5%)
Gampaha 13 2 (15%) 1177 13 (1%)
Kalutara 14 3 (21%) 762 54 (7%)
North-Western Putalam 16 1 (6%) 548 1 (0,2%)
Overall total 35 639
Pa r t  3  |  2 1 9
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, 2005
Province District DS Division
Total Number
DS Division
affected 
(% of total)
GN Division
Total Number
GN Division
affected 
(% of total)
Eastern Apmara 20 10 (50%) 507 124 (24%)
Batticaloa 14 8 (57%) 348 68 (20%)
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Table 2: Number of Tsunami affected population by Province and District
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, 2005
Province District Dead Injured Displaced
Eastern Apmara 10.436 5.762 75.172
Batticaloa 2.840 1.925 61.912
Trincomalee 1.078 1.426 81.643
In Total 14. 354 9.113 218.727
Northern Jaffna 2.640 1.775 39.907
Kilinochchi 590 3 1.603
Mullaitivu 3.000 3.904 22.557
In Total 6.230 5.682 64.067
Southern Galle 4.214 3.564 128.077
Hambantota 4.500 1.236 17.723
Matara 1.342 3.654 13.305
In Total 10.056 8.454 159.105
Western Colombo 79 452 31.239
Gampaha 6 109 1.449
Kalutara 256 711 27.713
In Total 341 1.272 60.401
North-Western Putalam 4 - 66
In Total 4 - 66
Overall total 30.985 16.067 502.366
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Table 3: Number of Tsunami damaged Housing Units by Province and District
Source: Department of Census and Statistics, 2005
Province District Completely 
Damaged
Partially 
Damaged 
(unusable)
Partially 
Damaged 
(usable)
Total
Eastern Apmara 9.573 2.792 8.836 21.201
Batticaloa 5.487 1.955 6.429 13.871
Trincomalee 4.691 1.037 3.646 9.374
In Total 19.751 5.784 18.911 44.446
Southern Galle 4.885 1.115 6.645 12.645
Matara 1.804 708 4.042 6.554
Hambantota 1.218 304 1.019 2.541
In Total 7.907 2.127 11.706 21.740
Nothern Mullaitivu 4.564 627 509 5.700
Jaffna 3.819 291 2.099 6.209
Kilinochchi 294 - - 294
In Total 8.677 918 2.608 12.203
Western Colombo 3.313 646 3.039 6.998
Kalutara 2.386 512 3.799 6.697
Gampaha 290 87 629 1.006
In Total 5.989 1.245 7.467 14.701
North-Western Putalam 12 15. 31 58
In Total 12 15 31 58
Overall total 42.336 10.089 40.723 93.148
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Government Leaflet – Official Tsunami Housing Policy
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Government Leaflet – To rebuild our Tourism Industry
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Annex 3
Overview conducted interviews (Field visits: 11/2009-03/2010, 02-03/2011)
Sri Lanka
Category Description Amount
Households
German Haritha Gama Permanent 
Tsunami settlers
35
German Harita Gama Permanent 
Non-Tsunami settlers
8
Galle Fourt Gravets Housing owners GHG
non permanent settlers
3
Mahamodara Housing owners GHG 
non permanent settlers
6
Gintota/Gintota East Housing owners GHG
non permanent settlers
4
Kaluwella Housing owners GHG
non permanent settlers
6
German Haritha Gama
Focus Group Discussion
Permanent
Tsunami settlers
9
Walahanduwa Watta 
(Private Donor Tsunami Relocation Project)
Permanent settlers 
neighbouring village 
9
Walahanduwa Watta 
(Local Donor Tsunami Relocation Project)
Permanent settlers 
neighbouring village 
8
Walahanduwa Watta 
(Donor Driven Tsunami Relocation Project)
Permanent settlers 
neighbouring village
6
Walahanduwa Watta Non-Tsunami Village 4
Overall total households 98
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The tables show the number of households and persons who were 
interviewed but does not specify the number of sessions (several 
households/people were revisited and re-interviewed during the PhD 
research process).
Number of Interview Partners in Sri Lanka
Tbc on following sides.
Sri Lanka
Category Description Amount
Households
German Haritha Gama Permanent 
Tsunami settlers
35
German Harita Gama Permanent 
Non-Tsunami settlers
8
Galle Fourt Gravets Housing owners GHG
non permanent settlers
3
Mahamodara Housing owners GHG 
non permanent settlers
6
Gintota/Gintota East Housing owners GHG
non permanent settlers
4
Kaluwella Housing owners GHG
non permanent settlers
6
German Haritha Gama
Focus Group Discussion
Permanent
Tsunami settlers
9
Walahanduwa Watta 
(Private Donor Tsunami Relocation Project)
Permanent settlers 
neighbouring village 
9
Walahanduwa Watta 
(Local Donor Tsunami Relocation Project)
Permanent settlers 
neighbouring village 
8
Walahanduwa Watta 
(Donor Driven Tsunami Relocation Project)
Permanent settlers 
neighbouring village
6
Walahanduwa Watta Non-Tsunami Village 4
Overall total households 98
Sri Lanka
Category Description Amount
Government Officials
Tsunami Housing Officer DS Galle 2
Additional DS for Tsunami (former) DS Galle 1
Social Service Officer DS Galle 1
NGO coordinator DS Galle 1
Director District Recovery 
and Development Unit
DS Galle 1
District Secretary DS Galle 1
Government Agent Galle 1
Urban Development Authority Galle 2
Urban Development Authority Colombo 1
Mayor Galle City 1
Pradesh Sabah Akmeemana 1
District Secretary DS Akmeemana 1
Planning Officer DS Akmeemana 1
Grama Niladhari Pilana 1
Grama Niladhari Gintota 1
Grama Niladhari Mahamodara 1
Grama Niladhari Kaluwella 1
Former Minister of 
Ministry of Public Administration and Home Affairs
Sri Lanka 1
Former Minister of 
Ministry of Water Supply and Development
Sri Lanka 1
National Housing Development Authority Colombo 3
RADA Committee Member Colombo 1
Overall total Government Officials 25
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Tsunami Housing Officer DS Galle 2
Additional DS for Tsunami (former) DS Galle 1
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District Secretary DS Akmeemana 1
Planning Officer DS Akmeemana 1
Grama Niladhari Pilana 1
Grama Niladhari Gintota 1
Grama Niladhari Mahamodara 1
Grama Niladhari Kaluwella 1
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Sri Lanka 1
Former Minister of 
Ministry of Water Supply and Development
Sri Lanka 1
National Housing Development Authority Colombo 3
RADA Committee Member Colombo 1
Overall total Government Officials 25 Number of Interview Partners in Sri Lanka
Tbc on following sides.
Key Informants Local Lawyer
legal Consultant to German donators
1
CEO Porsche 
Sri Lanka (business friend of German 
donator)
1
Former Legal Advisor Minister of Water 
Supply and Development (responsable 
project implementation GHG)
1
Former Director National Housing 
Development Authority
1
Local Academics
(Colombo University)
3
Overall total Key Informants 8
Overall total Interwiew Partners Sri Lanka 131
Sri Lanka
Category Description Amount
Aid Organisation Officials Local Representative 
Galle GHG (current/former)
2
Deputy Team Leader
Palm Foundation
1
Community Developer
Palm Foundation
1
Project Officer
Practical Action
1
Technical Advisor Sustainable 
Environment Technology
Practical Action
1
Former Project Staff 
DKH Office Sri Lanka
3
Overall total Aid Organisation Officials 9
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Germany
Category Description Amount
Private Donators Project Initiators GHG 3
Government Officials Former Administrative Officer Ministry 
of the Environment Ba-Wü
1
Aid Organisation Officials Project Coordinator Asia DKH – 
Headquarters
2
Former Director DKH 1
Current Director DKH 1
Former Technical Consultant to DKH 1
Overall total Interwiew Partners Gemany 9
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Private Donators Project Initiators GHG 3
Government Officials Former Administrative Officer Ministry 
of the Environment Ba-Wü
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Aid Organisation Officials Project Coordinator Asia DKH – 
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2
Former Director DKH 1
Current Director DKH 1
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Overall total Interwiew Partners Gemany 9
Number of Interview Partners in Germany
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Category Description Amount
Monthly Reports 
Local Office Sri Lanka
2005-2007 15
GHG three
monthly Reports
March 2006, June 2006, 
September 2006, March 
2007, June 2007
5
Final Project Report August 2008 1
Minutes of Donator Meetings
in Baden Württemberg
2005-2007 12
Communication Donators, 
Ministry of the Environment, Local 
Office DKH Sri Lanka/Germany
Letters, Emails, 
conversation notes
42
GHG Village Community Letter of Complains to AID 
and Donators
2
Village Management Village Constitution 1
Total Number of used 
internal documents
79
Annex 4
The table does specify which internal documents were accessed in order to gain 
more insights into the private donator driven housing project


